Margaret Bays v. Michael Canty

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0548n.06
Nos. 08-3707 and 08-3735
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Aug 07, 2009
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
MARGARET B. (SAM) BAYS; )
JAMES C. BAYS, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MICHAEL R. CANTY; JOSEPH W. ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
DIEMERT, JR.; HARVEY B. BRUNER; )
DEBORAH AXELROD; CHRISTOPHER )
LOCKHART; VILLAGE OF )
BENTLEYVILLE, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: GILMAN, COOK, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Margaret and James Bays (the “Bayses”) sued the defendants, claiming:
First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, constructive discharge, and legal malpractice. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Bayses appealed.
Our review of the record, the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs convinces us that the
district court’s memorandum opinion carefully and correctly set out the facts and the governing law.
*
The Honorable Jerome Farris, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Nos. 08-3707 and 08-3735
Bays v. Canty
A full opinion from this court would be duplicative and serve no jurisprudential purpose. We affirm,
adopting the reasoning of the district court’s June 17, 2008 opinion. We pause only to address the
intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine and plaintiffs’ intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
(“IIED”) claim.
The Bayses contend that the district court erred by rejecting their civil-conspiracy claim under
the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, but we disagree. That doctrine—drawing on a “common
sense” insight “that a person cannot conspire with himself”—teaches that, since a corporation only
acts through its officers, a group of corporate officers acting within the scope of employment cannot
create a conspiracy. See Harp v. King, 835 A.2d 953, 971 (Conn. 2003). The district court applied
this principle, citing federal case law. The Bayses, however, asserted their civil-conspiracy claim
under Ohio law, which governs this claim. See Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am. (Tenn.), Inc., 283
F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2002). The Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the intra-corporate
conspiracy doctrine. This court must therefore predict whether the Ohio Supreme Court would
embrace the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 249 F.3d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2001). We think it would. Most states endorse the doctrine, see
Robin Miller, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine”
as Applied to Corporation and Its Employees—State Cases, 2 A.L.R. 6th 387 (2005), and at least
one Ohio court has recognized it, Scanlon v. Gordon F. Stofer & Bros., Co., Nos. 55467, 55472,
1989 WL 69400, at *16 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. June 22, 1989). We thus conclude that the district court
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Nos. 08-3707 and 08-3735
Bays v. Canty
did not err by using the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine to enter summary judgment on the
Bayses’ conspiracy claim.
As for plaintiff’s IIED claim, Ohio law requires the Bayses to prove that the defendants: (1)
intentionally engaged in (2) outrageous conduct “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency” and that (3) the conduct proximately caused (4) serious emotional distress that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure. Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, & Helpers of America, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983), overruled
on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Ohio 2007)); Monak v. Ford
Motor Co., 95 F. App’x 758, 762 (6th Cir. 2004).
The district court rejected the Bayses’ IIED claim under the second element, reasoning that
the defendants’ actions did not go so far beyond the bounds of decency as to qualify as sufficiently
outrageous. Here too we agree with the district court. The Bayses’ claim also fails under the fourth
IIED element—severe emotional distress. In the section of their appellate brief discussing IIED, the
only evidence concerning the severity of the distress that plaintiffs cite is this: Ms. Bays visited a
cardiologist to have her blood pressure monitored, and in her husband’s estimation, she became
“terrified” because of a phone call. This falls short under Ohio’s demanding IIED standard.
AFFIRMED.
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