Joseph Gale v. Corrigan O'Donohue

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0582n.06
No. 18-1149
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 21, 2018
JOSEPH GALE, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
CORRIGAN O’DONOHUE, et al., ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
BEFORE: GUY, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Gale appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to preliminarily enjoin
practices and policies of the Royal Oak Police Department that Gale alleges are unconstitutional.
The district court did not err in finding that Gale failed to demonstrate either a likelihood of success
on the merits of his claim for municipal liability or a danger of irreparable harm absent the
injunction. We therefore AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:27 AM on September 4, 2016, a resident of 1409 Wyandotte Street in
Royal Oak, Michigan, placed a 911 call complaining of a “strange man” who had knocked on her
door five minutes earlier. (R. 22, Ex. D.) When the caller’s husband opened the door, the man
who had knocked stated that the police were on site—they were not—before asking if the residents
of the house needed any help and then abruptly leaving. The 911 caller said that the man’s
No. 18-1149, Gale v. O’Donohue, et al.
comments confused her and her husband. The caller described the man, told the police the
direction in which he had been walking, and asked the police to investigate. The caller stated that
the man did not appear to be intoxicated.
At approximately 2:37 AM, Officer Klinge observed Gale within one quarter of a mile of
1409 Wyandotte. Gale’s appearance was consistent with the description given by the 911 caller.
When Klinge exited his vehicle and approached Gale, Gale put his hands in the air.1 Officers
Heppner and Paramo arrived on the scene approximately 45 seconds later, and Gale’s interactions
with the officers are captured on both audio and video recordings from that point onward.
When asked where he was going, Gale told the officers that he was attempting to go to his
friend’s house. Although the officers asked Gale the location of the house a number of times over
the course of the encounter, Gale was unable to provide a coherent explanation of its location.
Paramo asked Gale if he had any identification, adding: “Do you mind if we check?” (R. 22, Exs.
B, C.) Gale, who still had his hands raised in the air, responded: “Absolutely.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.)
Paramo reached into Gale’s back pocket, retrieved his driver’s license, and contacted police
dispatch to check the license number.
While dispatch was running the check, Paramo explained that the police had received a call
that a person matching Gale’s description had been knocking on doors in the area. Paramo asked
whether Gale knew where he was, and Gale responded that he did not know his location, but that
he had “not been knocking on anyone’s doors.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.) Heppner then asked Gale how
much he had had to drink and Gale responded that he was unsure. The officers asked Gale whether
1
Officer Klinge’s audio recorder appears to have been malfunctioning, so the record contains no audio recording of
Gale’s interactions with Klinge prior to the arrival of the other officers. When one of the officers later told Gale to
put his hands down, he responded by saying that that he had been told to take his hands out of his pockets, suggesting
that Klinge ordered Gale to take his hands out of his pockets and that, in response, Gale put his hands in the air.
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he had seen anyone else on the street while he was walking and when Gale responded that he had
not, Heppner stated that none of the officers had seen anyone else on the street, either.
After Gale failed to provide a coherent explanation of where he was attempting to go—in
part because he had told the officers he was going to the intersection of two streets that do not
intersect—the officers offered to call Gale a taxi because they did not want him “walking around
the street intoxicated.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C; see also R. 18 Exs. H, I, PID 378-81.) The officers
asked Gale where he would tell the taxi to take him, and Gale responded that his friend’s house
was “right next to” “Third on the Rock, the bar”; Gale did not recall his friend’s specific address.2
(R. 22, Exs. B, C.)
Paramo continued to ask Gale whether he had knocked on any doors, and Gale maintained
that he had not. Paramo offered to drive Gale to his destination, and Gale stated that he would
“appreciate it” if the officers would “take [him] downtown.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.) Paramo explained
that he had to pat Gale down before entering the vehicle, and Gale responded by asking whether
he was under arrest; Paramo explained that he was not under arrest, that Gale was “free to go walk
on [his] own,” and that he was “just doing [Gale] a favor.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.) Paramo patted Gale
down, and Gale then entered the rear seat of Paramo’s police vehicle.
At this point, Heppner suggested that the officers might be able to locate Gale’s friend’s
address in a police database, but Gale refused to provide his friend’s full name.3 When Gale asked
whether he was free to leave the vehicle, Paramo responded: “Yeah, you’re good. I’m just trying
to get your buddy’s name so that I can take you to your buddy’s instead of me taking you to Rock
on Third.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.) Gale stated: “if you could just get me to the Rock on Third, that’d
2
Gale appears to have been referring to “The Rock on Third,” a bar in Royal Oak a 21-minute walk from the location
of the stop. (See R. 18, Ex. J, PID 383.)
3
The database at issue contained, among other things, the names and addresses of individuals who had had interactions
with the police.
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be great.” (R. 22, Exs. B, C.) Paramo again asked for Gale’s friend’s name, but Gale again did
not provide it.
When Paramo continued to ask for Gale’s friend’s name, Gale said that if the officer would
not take him to the Rock on Third, he would get out; Paramo responded by telling Gale that he
was not under arrest and was not in trouble and that Paramo was “trying to get [Gale] out of here
so no one else calls on [him].” (R. 22, Ex. C.) Paramo then explained that there had been “a ton
of [breaking and entering]” calls in the neighborhood and, although it was “obviously” not Gale,
“if [the officers] leave [Gale] out here to walk, someone is going to call on you again—I’m trying
to avoid that for you.” (R. 22, Ex. C.) Paramo then raised his voice and again asked for Gale’s
friend’s last name, explaining that he needed it to look up the address. When Gale attempted to
clarify why Paramo was requesting the full name, Paramo said “listen to me dude,” “I’m trying to
help you.” (R. 22, Ex. C.) Gale responded that he would “just walk,” but Paramo did not respond
and began driving the vehicle. (R. 22, Ex. C.) Gale again asked whether he was free to leave or
under arrest; Paramo responded by shouting: “what did I tell you the first time, dude, I said you’re
not under arrest; what don’t you understand about that?” (R. 22, Ex. C.) Gale responded that he
wanted to exit the vehicle, and Paramo responded: “I’m getting you out of here. You wanted to
go to Rock on Third, I’m taking you to Rock on Third.” (R. 22, Ex. C.) The drive lasted
approximately two minutes; Gale repeatedly requested to leave the vehicle, but Paramo responded
that he would not drop him off until they reached the Rock on Third. Paramo then pulled into a
gas station near the Rock on Third and allowed Gale to exit. From start to finish, Gale’s
interactions with the police lasted eleven minutes and twenty-seven seconds, approximately five
minutes of which took place in Paramo’s police vehicle.
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A. Gale Files a Citizen’s Complaint
On October 5, 2016, Gale filed a Citizen’s Complaint with the City of Royal Oak Police
Department. The department initiated an investigation that included a review of footage from the
responding officers’ vehicles, and Lt. David Van Ness met with Gale on October 17, 2016. Van
Ness and Gale agreed to record the audio of their meeting.
Van Ness and Gale discussed Gale’s complaint over the course of more than two hours.
Van Ness explained the department’s policy for responding to and investigating 911 calls and told
Gale that the officers were justified in stopping and questioning him. Van Ness explained that
there had recently been several nighttime home invasions in the area and that the police often
encountered intoxicated civilians in the area, and that, as a result, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop and investigate Gale based on a combination of (a) the 911 call, (b) the officers’
observation that Gale matched the 911 caller’s description and was walking alone on a nearby
street, and (c) the fact that Gale did not provide a coherent explanation for his presence. Van Ness
further explained that the officers were also motivated by concern for the safety of civilians who
might be lost or intoxicated. In short, Van Ness told Gale that the officers had acted in accordance
with police procedure and stood by the officers’ conduct.
B. The Instant Action
On July 5, 2017, Gale filed a “Verified Class Action Complaint” naming Klinge, Paramo,
and Heppner in their individual capacities and Royal Oak Police Chief Corrigan O’Donohue in
both his individual and official capacities. (R. 1, PID 1.) Gale filed an amended complaint on July
31, 2017, advancing nine separate claims: (1) search and seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against all individual defendants, (2) deprivation of property in violation of § 1983 against all
individual defendants, (3) “abuse of process and conspiracy” in violation of § 1983 against all
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individual defendants; (4) Monell liability under § 1983 against O’Donohue in his official capacity;
(5) false imprisonment or false arrest against all individual defendants; (6) conspiracy to commit
false imprisonment or false arrest against Paramo and Heppner; (7) assault and battery against all
individual defendants; (8) common law trespass against all individual defendants; and (9) violation
of Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act against O’Donohue in his official capacity.
Gale moved for a temporary restraining order against O’Donohue in his official capacity
on July 10, 2017. Gale asked the court to “restrain Defendant’s policy to stop or frisk individuals
within the City of Royal Oak for their identification, in order to run warrant checks, without any
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity being afoot, until such time as the Court can further
consider the merits.” (R. 6, PID 86.) The court denied the motion, finding that Gale “has not
shown that he will suffer immediate and irreparable harm before Defendants can be heard” and
has “failed to certify . . . whether any efforts have been made to give notice to Defendants.” (R. 7,
PID 120.)
C. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
On August 2, 2017, Gale moved for a preliminary injunction. In particular, Gale sought
an order (a) enjoining the Royal Oak police department from continuing its alleged policy,
practice, or custom of conducting suspicionless stops; (b) requiring defendants to maintain a
database of information concerning all stops conducted by Royal Oak police officers; and (c)
requiring defendants to monitor the police department’s stop-and-frisk practice on an ongoing
basis.
The district court denied Gale’s motion. The district court first noted that Gale’s municipal
liability claim was “his only claim that plausibly seeks prospective relief” and therefore considered
only whether Gale had met the requirements for a preliminary injunction with respect to that claim.
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(R. 31, PID 604, 608–09.) The district court ultimately found that Gale had failed to demonstrate
either a likelihood of success on the merits or a danger of irreparable harm.
The district court first found that Gale had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits because he “cannot show that he is substantially likely to establish the existence of a[n]
unconstitutional policy or custom.” (R. 31, PID 610.) Recognizing that Gale “has provided no
evidence that a Royal Oak city ordinance or police department official policy promulgated an
unconstitutional stop and frisk regime,” the court stated that Gale must demonstrate the existence
of “a particular custom or practice that although not authorized by written law or express municipal
policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”
(Id. (quoting Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935, 946 (6th Cir. 2010)).) The district court
concluded that Gale’s allegation that he was subject to an unconstitutional stop was “insufficient
to demonstrate a custom that is ‘so widespread, permanent, and well settled as to have the force of
law.’” (Id. (quoting Jones, 625 F.3d at 946).) Regarding Van Ness’s recorded statements, relied
on by Gale in support of his position that defendants have an unconstitutional policy, the district
court stated that Gale had “pluck[ed] isolated, out-of-context statements from a two-hour
meeting,” and that, “[c]onsidered in context, Van Ness’s statements described innocuous, routine
police work: responding to calls, investigating suspicious activity, managing intoxicated
individuals, and identifying persons stopped by police.” (Id. at PID 611.) The court further
concluded that Gale “has not shown that any of [Police Chief] O’Donohue’s actions demonstrate
that an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom exists.” (Id.)
The court next considered Gale’s argument that Royal Oak provides inadequate training
and supervision to its officers and concluded that, at “a minimum, [Gale’s] claim fails because he
cannot show deliberate indifference.” (Id. at PID 611–12.) The court noted that Gale “has not
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alleged, or provided evidence of, a history of abuse that would place Royal Oak on notice that its
training of police officers was deficient,” and “mere allegations that an individual officer was
unsatisfactorily trained are insufficient.” (Id. at PID 612.)
Finally, the court concluded that Gale “has not alleged or provided any facts showing prior
instances of similar misconduct” and, therefore, “has not shown that Royal Oak has a custom of
tolerance of acquiescence of federal violations.” (Id.)
The court also found that Gale “has not shown irreparable harm” because “he has not
shown that a constitutional right has been impaired” and has not demonstrated “a sufficient
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” (Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).)
The district court therefore denied Gale’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court
also found that plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery in support of his claim for injunctive
relief was moot.
II. DISCUSSION
Preliminary injunctions are “one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial
remedies.” Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hanson Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)). Courts considering a requested
preliminary injunction must consider four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the
injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.” Id. at 809 (quoting
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998)).
“While, as a general matter, none of these four factors are given controlling weight, a preliminary
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injunction issued where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.”
Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997).
A district court’s determination whether a movant “is likely to succeed on the merits is a
question of law and is accordingly reviewed de novo,” but “the district court’s ultimate
determination as to whether the four preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting or
denying preliminary injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Hunter v. Hamilton
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Certified Restoration Dry
Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007)). This is a highly
deferential standard, and the “district court’s determination will be disturbed only if the district
court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used
an erroneous legal standard.” Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 542 (quoting Hamilton’s Bogarts,
Inc. v. Michigan, 501 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007)). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 809 (quoting United States
v. United States Gypsum, Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
Gale seeks a preliminary injunction premised on his § 1983 claim against the municipal
defendant. Municipal governments “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978). In order to establish municipal liability, Gale must prove both the existence of a municipal
policy or custom and a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “To show the
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existence of a municipal policy or custom leading to the alleged violation, a plaintiff can identify:
(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official policies; (2) actions taken by officials with
final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom
of tolerance or acquiescence of federal violations.” Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 901
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 621 (6th Cir. 2015)).
A. Gale Has Not Demonstrated A Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Gale first argues that the police violated his constitutional rights because they lacked any
justification for stopping him. Gale contends that “community caretaking” does not justify the
police officers’ interactions with him because such a stop “may only be conducted in a consensual
manner, or in an emergency.” (Appellant Br. at 12.) Gale next argues that the officers were not
justified to stop him based on suspicion of public intoxication or a noise violation because
“reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor is not sufficient to justify an investigatory
stop.” (Id.) That is, Gale urges us to conclude that the officers were “investigating a completed
act,” not an ongoing violation. (Reply Br. at 6.)
Gale additionally argues that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights was a result
of the municipal defendant’s deliberate indifference. Gale relies on Van Ness’s comments to argue
that the municipal defendant was aware both that the officers were inadequately trained and that,
as a result of their training, the officers were likely to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
civilians with whom they came into contact. In support of this position, Gale asserts that “Van
Ness displayed, at the very least, a deliberate indifference to individuals’ Fourth Amendment
rights.” (Appellant Br. at 6.) Gale argues that the district court “erroneously ruled that a pattern
of violations is required to prove deliberate indifference.” (Id. at 13.) Gale asserts that, “contrary
to the district court’s holding, . . . a pattern of similar violations is not the only way to prove
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deliberate indifference” because “deliberate indifference may be proved by either direct evidence
of indifference or circumstantial evidence where the need for training is ‘obvious’ and
constitutional injury is the ‘‘‘highly predictable’ consequence’ of failing to provide it.” (Id. at 21
(quoting Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).)
Gale concludes that, “from O’Donohue down, the Royal Oak police officers wholly misunderstood
the law regarding investigatory stops and subsequent frisks” and that there “can be no excuse for
the failure to train police officers in such simple rules.” (Id. at 24–25.) Gale thus argues that the
evidence supports a finding of municipal liability on a failure-to-train theory.
“The Constitution forbids not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures.” Pennington v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 511 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.
2008) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). “A person is
seized when ‘a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with police.’” Id.
(quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005)). A court considering
whether a seizure has occurred “must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to
determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
We assume for the sake of argument that a reasonable person in Gale’s situation would not
have felt free to terminate the encounter with the police, and the interaction is thus constitutional
only if the officers possessed reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
Reasonable suspicion cannot be premised on an officer’s “inchoate or unparticularized suspicion
or ‘hunch,’” but must consist of “specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27.
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We apply a two-part analysis to determine the constitutionality of such a stop. First, “we
determine whether there was a proper basis for the stop, which is judged by examining whether
the law enforcement officials were aware of specific and articulable facts which gave rise to
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). When making that determination, we must “examine the
totality of the circumstances in order to determine the reasonableness of the investigatory stop.”
Id. (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). Second, we must examine whether “the degree of
intrusion was reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand, which is judged by examining
the reasonableness of the officials’ conduct given their suspicions and the surrounding
circumstances.” United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 608 (6th Cir. 2008) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Gale argues that defendants’ inadequate training caused his alleged constitutional
violation. In order to prevail under such a theory, Gale “must prove the following: (1) the training
or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the
municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually
caused the injury.” Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902 (quoting Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun.
Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)). Although evidence of “deliberate indifference”
often takes the form of a pattern of constitutional violations stemming from inadequate training or
supervision, Gale is correct that the Supreme Court has recognized that a finding of deliberate
indifference need not always be premised on such a pattern. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
Gale argues that Van Ness’s descriptions of the Royal Oak Police Department’s training
and supervisory practices establish that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of civilians. Gale relies primarily on Van Ness’s decision to support the police
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practices as they currently stand and argues that Van Ness conceded that adherence to current
practices would “guarantee” repeated constitutional injuries.
We agree, for the sake of argument, that Van Ness’s statements are indicative of the Royal
Oak Police Department’s practices. However, Van Ness did not describe an unconstitutional
failure to train. Instead—as the district court correctly noted—Van Ness “described innocuous,
routine police work: responding to calls, investigating suspicious activity, managing intoxicated
individuals, and identifying persons stopped by police,” and did not describe a “widespread,
permanent, and well-settled custom in the Royal Oak Police Department of violating the Fourth
Amendment.” (R. 31, PID 611.) Van Ness said nothing suggesting that the department improperly
trained its officers on the law governing street stops. Instead, Van Ness’s comments focus on the
types of calls and observations that may constitute reasonable suspicion for officers to conduct
investigatory stops.
Gale has thus failed to demonstrate that defendants provided inadequate training, that
defendants were deliberately indifferent to civilians’ constitutional rights, or that there was a causal
connection between any training and his alleged injury. Gale therefore has not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim against the municipal defendant, and we would be
justified in affirming the district court’s order on this ground alone. See Mich. State AFL–CIO,
103 F.3d at 1249 (“[A] preliminary injunction issued where there is simply no likelihood of success
on the merits must be reversed.”).
B. Gale Has Not Demonstrated Irreparable Harm
Gale’s argument for irreparable harm relies on our statements in Bonnell that, “if it is found
that a constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a finding of irreparable injury is
mandated.” (Appellant Br. at 27 (quoting Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 809).) Based on his allegations
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that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated pursuant to a municipal policy and that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to such violations, Gale argues that “there can be no
‘mistaking that the defendants proposed to continue their unconstitutional polices’” in the absence
of a preliminary injunction. (Appellant Br. at 28 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 374
(1976)).) Defendants respond that Gale cannot demonstrate a danger of irreparable harm because
“he is seeking redress for past injury . . . not harm that is likely to occur in the future.” (Appellee
Br. at 35.)
In Bonnell, we recognized that “the Supreme Court held that when reviewing a motion for
a preliminary injunction, if it is found that a constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a
finding of irreparable injury is mandated.” Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 809 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). But, Bonnell’s language is forward-looking; the fact that a plaintiff has
alleged a past constitutional injury does not mean that his “constitutional right is being threatened
or impaired.” Gale has not demonstrated that any unconstitutional policy caused his alleged injury
and provides no evidence suggesting that he will be subject to the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct again. He has therefore failed to demonstrate a danger of irreparable harm absent the
injunction.
C. Gale Has Not Demonstrated That the Balance of the Equities is in His Favor
Gale argues that “the balance of equities and public interest always favors ‘preventing the
violation of a party’s constitutional rights’” and that “these factors clearly tip in” his favor. (Reply
Br. at 13 (quoting G & V Lounge v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir.
1994)).) Defendants argue that Gale “seeks to prohibit the Royal Oak Police from performing
investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion and running warrant checks during those stops”
and that this “poses a substantial harm to the safety and welfare of the general public.” (Appellee
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Br. at 36.) Defendants thus argue that the proposed injunction “would pose a threat to public safety
and welfare.” (Appellee Br. at 36.)
The district court found that Gale had failed to satisfy the first and second prongs of the
preliminary injunction inquiry and did not address the equitable factors. But those factors do not
cut in Gale’s favor: without any evidence of an unconstitutional policy, he asks the court to enjoin
a wide swath of police activity in Royal Oak. Even assuming that Gale’s requested injunction is
practicable, the imposition of such an injunction would dramatically disrupt—rather than
preserve—the status quo by hampering defendants’ ability to respond to and investigate
complaints, resulting in tremendous hardship to defendants and, in all likelihood, endangering
civilians. Without evidence of an unconstitutional policy, we must find that the equities counsel
against Gale’s requested injunction.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Gale has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the preliminary injunction factors, the district court’s
denial of Gale’s requested preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.
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