Manning Coal Corp. v. Wright

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0518n.06
Filed: July 20, 2007
Case No. 05-4637
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MANNING COAL CORPORATION; )
KENTUCKY CENTRAL INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Petitioners-Appellants, ) BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD
)
v. )
)
CORBIN L. WRIGHT; DIRECTOR, )
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ )
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, )
UNITED STATES, )
)
Respondents-Appellees. )
)
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: RYAN, BATCHELDER and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Manning Coal Corporation
(“Manning Coal”) appeals the decision of the Benefits Review Board (“Board”) affirming the
decision and order of Administrative Law Judge Thomas Phalen, Jr. (“ALJ”). The ALJ awarded
benefits to respondent, Corbin Wright (“Wright”), pursuant to Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §
901, et seq. (“Act”). Manning Coal challenges the Board’s determination that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusions that (1) Dr. Williams’s medical opinion was sufficiently reasoned
to support an award of benefits under the Act and (2) Wright was totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis. In light of the remedial nature of the Act, we find that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision to award benefits to Wright.
I. BACKGROUND
Wright is a 77 year-old former mine worker who worked in the mines for 19 years during the
period from 1950 until 1986. Most of Wright’s mining work involved welding and repairs, although
he worked three to four years underground. In January 1986, Wright quit mining after his lungs
began to hurt and he “got sick.” He filed his original claim for benefits under the Act on March 24,
1986, and a second claim on March 22, 1989.
This case has an extensive administrative history, and it is not necessary to a determination
of the issues before us on appeal to recount it in detail. Suffice it to say that Wright’s attempts to
obtain benefits have included numerous hearings before two different ALJs and numerous appeals
to and remands from the Board, and the last opinion from the ALJ was on remand from the Board
with instructions to reconsider “whether Dr. Williams’[s] opinion that [Wright] suffers from a
moderately severe pulmonary impairment is sufficiently reasoned to establish that [Wright] is totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” The Board concluded that if, on remand, the ALJ found Dr.
Williams’s opinion sufficiently reasoned, the ALJ could find that Dr. Williams’s diagnosis of a
moderately severe pulmonary impairment was sufficient to support a finding of total disability under
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv).
The ALJ found that Dr. Williams’s opinion was reasoned, and therefore, sufficient to
establish total disability due to pneumoconiosis. As he had several times before, the ALJ awarded
benefits. Manning Coal again appealed to the Board, arguing that Dr. Williams’s opinion was
insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of total disability, and that the ALJ erred “in
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finding the evidence, specifically Dr. Williams’s opinion, sufficient to establish total disability due
to pneumoconiosis pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b), (c).”
The Board applied the law of the case doctrine and found that it had already rejected
Manning’s argument regarding total disability, because “given the exertional requirements of
claimant’s usual coal mine employment, the [ALJ] reasonably determined that Dr. Williams’s
diagnosis [of a moderately severe pulmonary impairment] was sufficient to support a finding of total
disability.” Further, the Board found that the ALJ did not err in his determination that Dr.
Williams’s diagnosis of a moderately severe pulmonary impairment was sufficiently reasoned to
support an award of benefits. The Board affirmed the award of benefits.
In their last go-round, the entirety of the parties’ arguments before the ALJ and the Board
turned on the questions of total disability, disability causation, and the nature of Dr. Williams’s
opinion. Our inquiry here then is two-fold: (1) does substantial evidence support a conclusion that
Dr. Williams’s medical opinion is sufficiently reasoned to support an award of benefits? and (2) does
substantial evidence support the ALJ’s inferences that Wright suffers a totally disabling respiratory
impairment due to pneumoconiosis?
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
While we must affirm the Board’s decision “if the Board has not committed any legal error
or exceeded its statutory scope of review of the ALJ’s factual determinations,” our review on appeal
is “focused on whether the ALJ — not the Board — had substantial evidence upon which to base
his . . . decision.” Jonida Trucking, Inc. v. Hunt, 124 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 1997). That is, “[w]e
review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and is
consistent with applicable law.” Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Webb, 49 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir.
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1995). “[A]s long as the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by the evidence, we will not reverse, even
if the facts permit an alternative conclusion.” Id.
Substantial evidence, from the record considered as a whole, “‘is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Ramey v. Kentland Elkhorn
Coal Corp., 755 F.2d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). “In referring to a singular ‘reasonable mind,’ the Supreme Court has directed us to uphold
decisions that rest within the realm of rationality; a reviewing court has no license to ‘set aside an
inference merely because it finds the opposite conclusion more reasonable or because it questions
the factual basis.’” Piney Mountain Coal Co. v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 756 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Smith v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 843 F.2d 1053, 1057 (7th
Cir. 1988) and discussing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Bizzarri v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 775 F.2d 751, 753 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[I]t is ‘immaterial that the facts permit
the drawing of diverse inferences.’” (quoting Parker v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 590 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1979)).
Indeed, “[a] remand or reversal is only appropriate when the ALJ fails to consider all of the
evidence under the proper legal standard or there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s
finding.” McCain v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 58 F. App’x 184, 201 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2000) and Dir., Office of Workers’
Comp. Programs v. Rowe, 710 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1983)). “Where, however, an ALJ has
improperly characterized the evidence or failed to [take] account of relevant record material,
deference is inappropriate and remand is required.” Eastover Mining Co. v. Williams, 338 F.3d 501,
508 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Additionally, we must bear in mind that “[t]his court has often repeated that the Act is
remedial legislation that should be liberally construed so as to include the largest number of miners
within its entitlement provisions.” Adams v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 886 F.2d
818, 825 (6th Cir. 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
Because Wright filed his claim for benefits after March 31, 1980, Part 718 of Title 20 of the
Code of Federal Regulations governs his claim. See Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569,
574 (6th Cir. 2000). To obtain federal black lung benefits, Wright must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he suffers from pneumoconiosis1, (2) the pneumoconiosis
arose out of his coal mine employment, (3) he has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
condition, and (4) that his total disability is due at least in part to pneumoconiosis. See Mountain
Clay, Inc. v. Spivey, 172 F. App’x 641, 646-47 (6th Cir. 2006). Manning Coal does not appeal the
ALJ’s determination that (1) Wright suffers from pneumoconiosis (2) that arose from his coal mine
employment; rather, Manning Coal’s appeal focuses on the latter two prongs.
A. Dr. Williams’s Opinion is Sufficiently Reasoned to Support an Award of Benefits.
Dr. Williams examined Wright on two occasions, first on April 25, 1986, and then on April
19, 1989. The 1986 examination included x-ray results showing the presence of pneumoconiosis
category 1/0; arterial blood gas (“ABG”) studies showing a resting oxygen tension level of 80.6; a
pulmonary function test (“PFT”) showing an FVC of 4.17 (104%), with an FEV1 of 2.64 (91%) and
1
“The term ‘pneumoconiosis’ means a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including
respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). “[A] disease
‘arising out of coal mine employment’ includes any chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary
impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20
C.F.R. § 718.201(b).
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a MVV of 99 (85%). Taking account of Wright’s coal mine employment history and his physical
ailments, Dr. Williams diagnosed Wright as suffering from “(1) [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (“COPD”)] with irregular and nodular fibrosis apparently related to pneumoconiosis, 1/0
QQ four lower zones; (2) Pulmonary emphysema; . . . .” Dr. Williams opined that Wright suffered
a mild pulmonary impairment and that he had “the respiratory physiological capacity to perform the
work of a coal miner or to perform comparable work in a dust-free environment[.]” Although Dr.
Williams checked the box indicating a mild pulmonary impairment, he did not elaborate or answer
the next question on the examination form: “If the miner has a pulmonary impairment, is such
impairment related to pneumoconiosis or does it have another etiology?”
Dr. Williams’s examination of Wright in 1989 included: x-ray results revealing the presence
of category 1/0 pneumoconiosis (the same as in 1986); ABG tests showing a resting oxygen tension
level of 79.2 (one point lower than the 1986 level); PFTs resulting in a FVC of 4.01 (103%) (one
percentage point lower than in 1986), a FEV1 of 2.56 (91%) (the same as in 1986), and a MVV of
80 (70%) (15% lower than in 1986). Dr. Williams’s 1989 cardiopulmonary diagnosis of Wright’s
condition stated: “(1) COPD with 1.0 Q P pneumoconiosis and pulmonary emphysema; (2)
Coronary artery disease with angina (by history) . . . .” Regarding the etiology of the
cardiopulmonary diagnosis, the 1989 medical report stated: “(1) smoking2; (2) genetic; (3) allergens
with intrinsic bronchitis and asthma; (4) exposure to coal dust. Etiology of his cardiovascular
disease is (1) genetic; (2) smoking.” Answering “[t]he degree of severity of the [pulmonary]
impairment, particularly in terms of the extent to which the impairment prevents the patient from
2
W right has smoked one pack of cigarettes a day for the last 40 years. He was still smoking at the time Dr.
W illiams evaluated him in 1989.
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performing his current or last coal mine job of one year’s duration,” Dr. Williams’s medical report
stated: “He has moderately severe impairment of the pulmonary system primarily due to his
emphysema. He has heart disease and angina. I would classify this as functional class 2, therapeutic
classification C. His heart disease would prevent him from doing strenuous work.”
Manning Coal asserts that Dr. Williams’s opinion that Wright suffers from a moderately
severe pulmonary impairment is not well reasoned and should not have been considered by the ALJ.
Manning Coal argues that Dr. Williams’s medical opinion is insufficiently reasoned because (1)
despite non-qualifying PFTs and ABG studies, Dr. Williams diagnosed a moderately severe
pulmonary impairment and (2) although the results of the 1986 PFTs and ABG study were virtually
the same as the 1989 results, Dr. Williams diagnosed Wright with “mild pulmonary impairment” in
1986 and a “moderately severe pulmonary impairment” in 1989.
Manning Coal’s argument here “is doomed to fail, for in black lung adjudications, the
decision of whether a medical opinion is reasoned is a decision that rests ultimately with the ALJ,
not with us.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 294 F.3d 885,
895 (7th Cir. 2002). “Determinations of whether a physician’s report is sufficiently documented and
reasoned is a credibility matter left to the trier of fact.” Moseley v. Peabody Coal Co., 769 F.2d 357,
360 (6th Cir. 1985).
Section 718.204(b)(1) provides that
[A] miner shall be considered totally disabled if the miner has a pulmonary or
respiratory impairment which, standing alone, prevents or prevented the miner:
(i) From performing his or her usual coal mine work; and
(ii) From engaging in gainful employment in the immediate area of his or her
residence requiring the skills or abilities comparable to those of any employment in
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a mine or mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity over a
substantial period of time.
A claimant may establish total disability in one of four ways, including
Where total disability cannot be shown under paragraphs (b)(2)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this
section, or where pulmonary function tests and/or blood gas studies are medically
contraindicated, total disability may nevertheless be found if a physician exercising
reasoned medical judgment, based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques, concludes that a miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition
prevents or prevented the miner from engaging in employment as described in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv). When determining whether an opinion is documented and reasoned,
our case law requires the ALJ “to examine the validity of the reasoning of a medical opinion in light
of the studies conducted and the objective indications upon which the medical opinion or conclusion
is based.” Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Rowe, 710 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added).
The ALJ found that Dr. Williams “did interpret [Wright’s] non-qualifying test results as
demonstrating pulmonary impairment.” The ALJ concluded that though a number of similarities
existed between the 1986 and 1989 opinions, some differences existed also, including, (1) “the ABG
and PFT values in 1989 are lower than those recorded in 1986” and (2) “subsequent to the 1986
examination, [Wright] underwent a heart catheterization that revealed artery blockage.” “Although
[Dr. Williams] relied on pulmonary tests exhibiting levels of impairment below that required to
establish total disability under section 718.240(b)(2)(i), these tests did demonstrate some impairment
and can form a basis, along with other evidence, for a reasoned medical decision establishing total
disability under section 718.240(b)(2)(iv).” Jonida Trucking, 124 F.3d at 744; see also Cornett, 227
F.3d at 577 (“the regulations explicitly provide, a doctor can make a reasoned medical judgment that
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a miner is totally disabled even ‘where pulmonary function tests and/or blood-gas studies are
medically contraindicated.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(iv)).
Dr. Williams’s 1989 medical report reflected Wright’s medical history, an accurate
description of his coal mine employment, a physical exam, a chest x-ray, PFTs, and an ABG study.
While Dr. Williams did not explicitly state that he based his diagnosis of moderately severe
pulmonary impairment on the non-qualifying tests or his examination of Wright, the ALJ found that
the medical evidence contained in the record supported Dr. Williams’s diagnosis. For instance, as
in Jonida, Wright’s non-qualifying PFT and ABG results did indicate some impairment.
Furthermore, Wright’s tests indicated some worsening — albeit slight — of his pulmonary condition.
Moreover, “even a ‘mild’ respiratory impairment may preclude the performance of the
miner’s usual duties, depending on the exertional requirements of the miner’s usual coal mine
employment.” Cornett, 227 F.3d at 578. The ALJ, in a previous decision, concluded that Wright’s
usual coal mine work consisted of repairing equipment by welding, and specifically, that Wright “sat
for one hour per day, stood for six hours per day, lifted 100 to 150 pounds three to four times per
day, and carried 100 to 150 pounds 100 to 500 feet per day.” The ALJ characterized Wright’s work
as “heavy work,” and this characterization has not been disputed.
Dr. Williams certainly could have prepared a more thorough report that more clearly stated
the interplay between his diagnosis of Wright’s pulmonary impairment and Wright’s ability to work
in mining. See Poole v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 897 F.2d 888, 894 (7th Cir. 1990) (“We
note our concern, however, about Dr. Rao’s practice of completing the DOL reports without
providing an explanation where the form requests one. Such reports are minimally sufficient to
support a claim for benefits and hamper review by this court.”). The standard, however, requires a
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sufficiently reasoned medical opinion — not perfection. We find that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Williams’s 1989 medical opinion was sufficiently reasoned to
support an award of benefits.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding that Wright Suffers a Totally Disabling
Respiratory Impairment.
In a related vein, Manning Coal asserts that the ALJ erred as a matter of law by attributing
any meaning other than a plain meaning to the words “his heart disease would prevent him from
doing strenuous work.” Section 8a of Dr. Williams’s 1989 medical report, entitled “Impairment,”
contains this inquiry:
If the patient has chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease, give your medical
assessment — With Rationale — of:
a. The degree of severity of the impairment, particularly in terms of the extent to
which the impairment prevents the patient from performing his/her current or last
coal mine job of one year’s duration.
Dr. Williams responded:
He has moderately severe impairment of the pulmonary system primarily due to his
emphysema. He has heart disease and angina. I would classify this as functional
class 2, therapeutic classification C. His heart disease would prevent him from
doing strenuous work.
(Emphasis added.) Dr. Williams failed to fill out subpart b of this section which asked for a
description of “[t]he extent to which each of the diagnoses listed in D.6 [cardiopulmonary diagnoses]
above contributes to the impairment.”
Critically, Section 9, the very next section, asks for “Non-Cardiopulmonary Diagnosis — If
the patient has any disabling non-respiratory condition(s) indicate what the condition is and
describe its degree of impairment, especially as it may affect the patient’s ability to perform his coal
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mine work.” (Emphasis in original). Here, Dr. Williams wrote “None.” The ALJ reasoned,
While it could be interpreted that Dr. [Williams] unequivocally concluded that
[Wright] was disabled based solely on his heart condition, I find this not to be the
case. Considering the fact that Dr. Williams was responding to a question
concerning impairment due to pulmonary disease, and responded that [Wright’s]
condition is “moderately severe,” it stands to reason that the total disability from
performing strenuous work is not only based on the heart condition, but also on
[Wright’s] pulmonary impairment. Therefore, I find that when Dr. Williams’[s]
statement is read in pari materia, with the prior sentences, it is clear that the entire
statement constitutes his response to the form instructions, and thus clearly infers that
he found [Wright] to be totally disabled from a pulmonary standpoint.
The ALJ candidly acknowledged that Dr. Williams’s opinion could be read as finding that
Wright was totally disabled based on his heart condition. But the ALJ drew an inference based on
the questions and answers in their entirety. While we might not have drawn the same inference
under a de novo standard of review, we find that, here, the ALJ drew a permissible inference in light
of the entire record before him and the remedial nature of the Act. See Grundy Mining Co. v. Flynn,
353 F.3d 467, 484 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Board determined, and we agree, that the ALJ drew a
reasonable inference that lies within his ‘broad discretion in evaluating the medical evidence.’”
(Citation omitted)). The ALJ’s inference here was within the “realm of rationality,” and we have
“no license to ‘set aside an inference merely because [we find] the opposite conclusion more
reasonable or because [we question] the factual basis.’” Piney Mountain Coal Co., 176 F.3d at 756
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Manning Coal argues that the phrase “moderately severe pulmonary impairment” is an
undefined, non-medical term that is insufficient as a matter of law to allow an ALJ to compare
Wright’s specific exertional requirements to his pulmonary condition and reach a finding of total
disability, primarily because Dr. Williams’s opinion did not discuss any limitations or restrictions
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that Wright’s impairment may have had on his ability to perform his job at the coal mine. But as we
have already pointed out, the ALJ may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before him.
See Grundy Mining Co., 353 F.3d at 484. “To infer disability, the ALJ must first determine the
nature of the claimant’s usual coal mine work and then compare evidence of the exertional
requirements of the work with medical opinions as to the claimant’s work capability.” Poole, 897
F.2d at 894. Moreover, “in determining whether total disability has been established, an ALJ must
consider all relevant evidence on the issue of disability including medical opinions which are phrased
in terms of total disability or provide a medical assessment of physical abilities or exertional
limitations which lead to that conclusion.” Midland Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 486, 493 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
As we discussed previously, Dr. Williams’s medical opinion is not a model opinion, but we
are persuaded that the ALJ could have inferred from it that Wright is totally disabled in light of his
“moderately severe pulmonary impairment” and his job, which the ALJ characterized as requiring
“heavy work.” A reasonable mind could conclude that a moderately severe pulmonary impairment
(consisting of both COPD and emphysema) would prevent Wright from performing his usual coal
mine work, which consisted of lifting 100-150 pound loads several times a day and carrying the
loads up to 500 feet, or substantially similar work. See §718.204(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination that Wright’s Total Disability
is “Due To” Pneumoconiosis.
Section 718.204(c)(1)(i)-(ii) provides that
A miner shall be considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis
if pneumoconiosis, as defined in § 718.201, is a substantially
contributing cause of the miner’s totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment. Pneumoconiosis is a “substantially
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contributing cause” of the miner's disability if it:
(i) Has a material adverse effect on the miner’s respiratory or
pulmonary condition; or
(ii) Materially worsens a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment which is caused by a disease or exposure unrelated to
coal mine employment.
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added).
“To satisfy the ‘due to’ requirement of the [Act] and its implementing regulations, a claimant
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that pneumoconiosis is ‘more than merely a
speculative cause of his disability,’ but instead ‘is a contributing cause of some discernible
consequence to his totally disabling respiratory impairment.’” Grundy Mining Co., 353 F.3d at 483
(quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. Smith, 127 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 1997)). “To the extent that the
claimant relies on a physician’s opinion to make this showing, such statements cannot be vague or
conclusory, but instead must reflect reasoned medical judgment.” Id. “[Wright] may . . . possess
a compensable injury if his pneumoconiosis ‘materially worsens’ [his] condition.” Tennessee
Consol. Coal Co. v. Kirk, 264 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2001)
The ALJ adopted his reasoning from a prior order in this case on the issue of “due to”
causation:
Dr. Williams’[s] opinion establishes that [Wright’s] pneumoconiosis had a material
adverse effect [on Wright’s] condition because it was a cause in part of [Wright’s]
COPD. Dr. Williams also diagnosed emphysema partially caused by coal dust
exposure, which falls under the legal definition of pneumoconiosis. Emphysema was
the primary source of [Wright’s] moderately severe pulmonary impairment. Thus,
there is further evidence that [Wright’s] pneumoconiosis caused [Wright’s] total
disability.
The ALJ concluded that pneumoconiosis was more than just a de minimis contributor to Wright’s
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total respiratory disability. His pulmonary impairment was primarily due to emphysema with the
remainder of the impairment caused by COPD with pneumoconiosis. Coal dust contributed to his
overall pulmonary impairment. While slightly attenuated, the inferences drawn by the ALJ are once
again within the “realm of rationality,” Piney Mountain Coal, 176 F.3d at 756 (citation omitted) and,
therefore, “it is ‘immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences,’” Bizzarri, 775
F.2d at 753 (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Dr. Williams twice physically examined Wright, made note of his medical and employment
histories, ran blood gas and pulmonary function tests, and reviewed chest x-rays. Objective evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Wright’s pulmonary condition worsened from the 1986 to the
1989 examinations. No evidence refuted the ALJ’s finding that Wright performed heavy work while
employed at Manning Coal. The ALJ acknowledged that Wright’s heart condition also affected his
health and ability to work. The ALJ, in reviewing the evidence before him and examining it as a
whole, determined that Wright’s “moderately severe pulmonary impairment” rendered him totally
disabled, and that his total disability was due to pneumoconiosis.
Manning Coal provides no evidence to counter Dr. Williams’s report. Rather, it simply
disagrees with the inferences drawn by the ALJ. We do not shift the burden of proof to Manning
Coal — the burden is on Wright to establish entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the
evidence. Manning Coal is not helped, however, by the fact that it produced no evidence or opinions
to counter those of Dr. Williams.
We recognize that the record may permit an alternative conclusion from that of the ALJ, but
“it would lie beyond ‘our limited scope of review’ to assign a different weight or meaning to [Dr.
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Williams’s] medical opinion.” Grundy Mining Co., 353 F.3d at 484 (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v.
Groves, 277 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2002)).
In light of our limited scope of review and Congress’s indication that courts should liberally
construe claims to bring as many miners as possible within the Act, we find that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s award of benefits. Accordingly, we DENY the Petition for Review.
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