DocketNumber： 80-3458
Judges： Edwards, Martin, Taylor
Filed Date： 8/12/1982
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/4/2024
The Dana Corporation seeks this court’s review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 110, of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction which were entered pending arbitration of Dana’s alleged breach of a neutrality agreement with the United Automobile Workers. Dana appeals the District Court’s adjudication of its contempt of the temporary restraining order, as well. We affirm the orders of the Honorable Don J. Young, Senior Judge.
Dana, a corporation with its principal place of business in Toledo, Ohio, and in interstate commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, 152, and 185(a), has had a collective bargaining relationship with the appellee labor organization since at least 1956. The parties have negotiated and executed National Master Agreements every third year since then, the most recent of which was executed on behalf of Dana and the International as well as 25 UAW Locals, and is effective by its terms from December 3, 1979 through December 5, 1982. It governs the terms and conditions of employment of approximately 12,000 employees. Section 3 of that contract provides that there shall be no application of the contract or any supplement thereto, “or should any trouble or controversy of any kind arise with respect to the employees within the unit as between company and union.” Instead, all such disputes are to be resolved with utmost dispatch only through the Grievance Procedure. It is also provided, at Section 37, that any dispute over “interpretation and/or application of terms” may be raised directly between the UAW Dana Department Director and appellant’s General Office Industrial Relations Department. Failure to agree is appealable directly to the parties’ permanent arbitrator. Section 38 provides that the Arbitrator’s decision “shall be final and binding upon both the Union and the company.”
Since 1976, supplements to the Master contract have included an agreement that
In the course of the 1979 negotiations of the Master Agreement you requested a letter concerning relationships of certain Dana facilities in which the employees are not represented by any union.
Over the years Dana and the United Auto Workers have developed a constructive relationship based on trust, integrity, and mutual respect. Our management is dedicated to an autonomous organizational structure for our various divisions. However, we recognize that certain matters cut across divisional lines and require a corporate position.
Our corporate position regarding union representation is as follows:
We believe that our employees should exercise free choice and decide for themselves by voting on whether or not they wish to be represented by the UAW or any other labor organization.
We have no objection to the UAW becoming the bargaining representative of our people as a result of such an election. Where the UAW becomes involved in organizing our employees, we intend to continue our position of maintaining a neutral position on this matter. The company and/or its representatives will communicate with our employees, not in an anti-UAW manner, but in a positive pro-Dana manner.
If a majority of our employees indicate a desire to be represented by the UAW, we will cooperate with all the parties involved to expedite an NLRB election. In addition, we reserve the right to speak out in any manner appropriate when undue provocation is evident in an organizing campaign. (Emphasis added.)
The UAW’s chief negotiator with Dana for 18 years, Donald Rand, testified that the issue of neutrality had “... some position of urgency on that collective bargaining list” for the Union in 1979; and that the letter represented a change of language from the 1976 agreement. It had been strengthened in favor of the union, because of the union’s unfortunate experience in an Oklahoma organizing drive despite the 1976 letter supplement. Mr. Rand’s testimony was that “As a result of that experience, we felt it was needed to strengthen the letter and that is what we have done in the recent contract, improved upon it.” The letter was then highlighted both in speeches and in written materials to the UAW Delegate body in its ratification deliberations, and to the membership of the UAW in obtaining its ratification of the National Master Contract. Mr. Rand testified that he would not have recommended ratification without that neutrality supplement.
The parties have stipulated that the Wix Corporation of Gastonia, North Carolina, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dana. Union negotiator Rand testified that, prior to the letter of supplement “... during the negotiations we specifically referred to the Wix Corporation. After we had the agreement, knowing so well that it covered that situation, then we directed our organizers to become involved in the Wix Plant in Gastonia.”
Accordingly, by letter of December 12, 1979, the UAW Dana Department notified Dana’s Industrial Relations Director:
... that the UAW has begun an organizing drive involving the production and maintenance employees of the Dana Corporation’s Wix facilities located at Gastonia, North Carolina.
We would expect you to advise the Dana Wix Company representatives of the Dana corporation’s position relating to neutrality. Also, we would expect the Wix company representatives at Gastonia to adhere to the letter of neutrality as well as the intent of the parties regarding neutrality during an organizing campaign by the UAW.
The UAW then petitioned the NLRB for an election to determine a collective bargaining agent for the above-identified Wix
On April 28, 1980, President Benny S. Hoyle of Wix Corporation directed a letter to all “Fellow Employees.” That letter stated, most notably:
1. That “Dana is opposed to having the Wix plants become unionized.” Neither this statement, nor Hoyle’s authority to make it, has ever been repudiated by Appellant.
2. That “The Union does not provide job security,” citing 25 to 30% of Dana’s union employees on long and indefinite layoffs, without prospects of return.
3. The hint that the Wix policy of ample overtime work to meet demand may, for unexplained reasons, be supplanted by a rule of frequent hires and frequent layoffs, if the UAW were elected.
4. That a UAW victory will result in renegotiation of ALL pay and benefit plants, “from the ground up.”
On April 30,1980, the UAW filed a grievance protesting Dana’s violation of the neutrality supplement with the Dana Industrial Relations Department Director, pursuant to § 37 of the Master Agreement. By letter of May 2,1980, Dana reiterated its neutrality agreement, adding that it is “applicable to all Dana facilities,” and noting that it would be in the best interest of all concerned to expedite the NLRB election and “conclude this matter.” On May 9, 1980, after failure of the parties to agree, the union appealed directly to the Permanent Arbitrator.
Arbitration of the union’s grievance was first scheduled for May 16, 1980, but the date was cancelled by Dana, because it was unprepared. The hearing was then rescheduled for May 24, but the parties agreed to postpone it on Dana’s express representation that there would be no more violations of the neutrality letter until such time as the hearing could be held.
However, on June 2, 1980, President Hoyle addressed a four-page stream of vitriol to “All Wix Employees” (no longer “Fellows”). The letter opens with the bone-chilling question: “Are you willing to take a risk that we will have a vicious union strike here at Wix in the next year?” It descends thereafter from veiled to explicit threats, with simple anti-UAW statements interspersed. The letter specifically states Mr. Hoyle’s “... hope (that) it is abundantly clear that this company has no intention of yielding to any such strike pressures either now or hereafter;” and that strikers risked loss of their jobs “forever,” because “we have every intention of exercising our right to replace strikers to keep these plants in operation.” (Emphasis in original.)
On June 5, 1980, the union received a copy of the letter; and it demanded immediate emergency arbitration on Friday, June 6th. There was no response from Dana.
On Monday, June 9, 1980, the Union filed its complaint in the District Court, requesting a temporary restraining order enjoining Dana and its agents from violation of the letter agreement by anti-union, anti-UAW communications to Wix employees, pending hearing on the union’s motion for preliminary injunction, and requesting an order compelling Dana to arbitrate the grievance. The District Court, after hearing arguments of counsel for both parties, found that the dispute between the parties concerning defendant’s activities at Gastonia was, “... on its face, a breach of an agreement between plaintiff and defendant and this is arbitrable under the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.” Judge Young further found that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if Dana were unrestrained, inasmuch as the employees would continue to be subjected to anti-union, anti-UAW statements and
The next day, June 10, 1980, President Hoyle delivered himself of an hour-long speech to each of the three shifts of Wix employees who worked, of which a transcript is in the record, and of which the District Judge later wrote:
The evidence left no room for any doubt whatsoever that the defendant had violated the terms of the temporary restraining order. For almost an hour, President Hoyle harangued the defendant’s employees with the most serious of anti-union statements, and dire threats of action that Wix would take against them if the union was recognized and the usual collective bargaining processes were resorted to. If one listens very carefully, it is possible to hear, amidst the torrent of verbiage, a few sentences which could perhaps be construed as pro-Dana, but it is hard to imagine a more complete violation of the temporary restraining order than President Hoyle’s speech.
The court further noted that the special bulletin boards had not been cleared of anti-union propaganda. Mr. Hoyle’s speech included the following statements here pertinent:
1. That unions, particularly the UAW, were no better than communists, and that he would prefer Russia to a union plant.
2. That he would prosecute anyone who taped his talk “to the full extent of the law.”
3. That a union is a “pathway to trouble ... serious trouble”; that the jobs of strikers will be filled with permanent employees, and that strikers “can walk until their knees are bloody.”
4. That one should “never, never predict a short strike, always think in terms of a long strike.”
5. That the UAW not only believes in putting workers on strike, but that they will assess the workers for it, as well: so that this is “not a time to buy a new car or new furniture on the installment plan.”
6. That, if things continue to go well, Wix will “continue to increase your pay and benefits quarterly,” after reference to “the mb pay increase granted you last July.”
7. Finally: “Keep these threats in mind when you sign the authorization card and vote this union in.”
On July 11,1980, the UAW filed a motion requesting that the District Court order Dana to show cause why it should not be adjudicated in contempt of the court’s June 9th Order. The record reflects that counsel for both parties were present at the time of the request, and that the court set its show cause hearing for June 12, 1980, at 8:00 A.M. That, of course, was also Election Day at the Wix plant. Both the union and the District Judge requested that Dana join the UAW in seeking postponement of the NLRB election. Dana refused to so join and the union thereafter, after a six month organization drive, temporarily withdrew its Petition for Election.
On June 12th the contempt show cause was held and the union presented the testimony of several witnesses and a partial transcript of one of Hoyle’s speeches. On June 20, the court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law in the matter, and holding Dana in contempt of the June 9th Order. Inasmuch as the UAW’s delay of the election by withdrawal of its petition
On June 27, 1980, the District Court entered its preliminary injunction on the basis of the evidence taken at the contempt hearing and its finding that Dana’s conduct, if continued, would remove all benefit from the neutrality agreement and render any arbitration a hollow formality. On July 9, 1980, the District Court denied Dana’s motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction and purgation order.
I.
Appellant first argues here that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 104, categorically prohibits the issuance of the injunction which it appeals. We first note that courts were admonished by Congress at § 102 of that law that, in the Act’s interpretation and in determinations of their jurisdiction and authority, “... the public policy of the United States is hereby declared as follows:
Whereas ... the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are hereby enacted.
It is in the context of that stated congressional policy that we must apply the prohibition of § 104 against the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, upon which Dana here relies.
We next note that, without repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Congress, at § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)), has provided that suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements may be brought in any United States District Court having jurisdiction of the parties. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, (1957), Justice Douglas wrote for the court that § 301(a) had authorized the federal courts to specifically enforce, at the instance of a labor union, a provision to arbitrate grievances, and to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of labor contracts. That body of federal law, by the entire tenor of the history of the Act, must include the recognition that an agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for a union’s agreement not to strike. Moreover, Justice Douglas wrote that Norris-LaGuardia presented no bar to injunctive orders to arbitrate, and indeed that § 8 of Norris-LaGuardia (29 U.S.C. § 108) indicated a clear Congressional policy even in that early Act of favoring settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, which rendered unnecessary in § 301 suits the stringent procedural requirements which § 7 of Norris-LaGuardia otherwise made requisite to the entry of an injunction in a labor dispute. Justice Douglas wrote, finally, that:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. (353 U.S. at 457, 77 S.Ct. at 918).
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. (363 U.S. at 582-3, 80 S.Ct. at 1352-53.)
In American Manufacturing, supra, he reiterated his finding of Lincoln Mills that:
There is no exception in the “no strike” clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other. (363 U.S. at 567, 80 S.Ct. at 1346.)
In 1970, through Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199, the court recognized new problems which did indeed lie in the penumbra of statutory mandates, as Justice Douglas had predicted, and through Justice Brennan’s opinion approved a remedy which would effectuate legislative policy. The court, reversing its prior position (of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440, 1962) although Congress had not amended the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provisions since Sinclair, held that those provisions did not preclude a United States District Court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause where the contract contains an arbitration clause enforceable under § 301(a) of LMRA for arbitration of the grievance concerning which the strike was called. The court wrote that:
The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitratic .1. Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions. (398 U.S. at 250, 90 S.Ct. at 1592.)
The court traced the changing concerns of Congress from the early part of this century, when the courts were regarded as allies of management in repression of the nascent labor movement, which fact led to the 1932 enactment of Norris-LaGuardia to correct abuses; through its response in the Wagner Act to management practices which discouraged collective participation; to the NLRB’s § 301(a) provision and its emphasis upon enforcement of collective bargaining contract obligations and administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes; all of which changes were accomplished without extensive revision of older statutes, including the anti-injunction provision of Norris-LaGuardia. The court wrote that, inasmuch as our judiciary is committed to the accordance of full faith and credit to a promise to arbitrate, and a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an employer’s undertaking to submit to arbitration:
Clearly employers will be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically enforceable against them when no similarly efficacious remedy is available to enforce the concomitant undertaking of the union to refrain from striking. On the other hand, the central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the growth and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded — if anything, this goal is advanced — by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook under a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. (398 U.S. at 252-3, 90 S.Ct. at 1593-94.)
The Boys Market decision permits the district court to enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance only under clearly
... [T]he District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether the issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity — whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of the injunction than will the union from its issuance. (370 U.S. at 228, 82 S.Ct. at 1346.)
The Boys Market decision notably includes the finding that:
Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. (Emphasis added.) (398 U.S. at 249, 90 S.Ct. at 1591.).
In subsequent decisions, other circuits have had occasion to affirm the issuance of injunctions which have met all of the criteria enunciated by Boys Market, but which have been directed not at strikes, but at employer self-help measures which were found to undermine the arbitral process to the extent of making arbitration a “hollow formality.” In Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115 (1976), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the employer’s relocation of a plant, pending arbitration. The District Court was held to have appropriately exercised its discretion, within Boys Market constraints, by enjoining employer conduct which would have rendered the arbitral process a “hollow formality,” after which no award could have returned the parties to the status quo ante. The District Court had also correctly determined, as the Steelworkers’ Trilogy directs, that the grievance in question was not specifically excluded from the parties’ arbitration clause, and that the question of the interpretation of the contract must be left to the arbitrator and not decided by the court. The union’s probability of prevailing on the merits, for purposes of equity-balancing for injunctive relief in such cases, was held to be properly measured by the probability that the union will prevail in its contention that the dispute is one for the arbitrator. Accordingly, if there is a genuine dispute with respect to an arbitrable issue, and the probability of irreparable harm falls most heavily on the union, the teaching of Lever Brothers is that such an injunction is properly entered.
In United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s injunction against employer self-help activity which it found would tend to undermine the integrity of the arbitral process to the irreparable injury of the union’s members. The self-help in question was the termination of hospital and insurance benefit premium payments during a labor dispute. The Circuit Court agreed that the Boys Market exception to NorrisLaGuardia was applicable against acts taken or threatened by an employer, under certain circumstances. The facts to be examined on such a claim were held to be: 1) whether the underlying dispute is subject to mandatory arbitration; 2) whether the employer, rather than seeking arbitration of his grievance, is “interfering with and frustrating the arbitral processes which the parties had chosen” (598 F.2d at 1279); and (3) whether an injunction is appropriate under ordinary principles of equity.
This case requires this court to address that same problem, and we agree with the Fourth Circuit’s Lever Brothers holding and with Judge Young, that the Boys Market exception to Norris-LaGuardia is applicable to employer acts which threaten to make “a
In this case, Judge Young’s injunction meets all of the above standards. However, the element of irreparable harm requires further discussion. There is no question but that the harm to the union of this employer’s election-eve conduct would be— and has been — irreparable. While delaying arbitration of the union’s grievance, the employer repeatedly made not only anti-UAW communications, but serious threats to the employees whom union organizers had assured of his promised neutrality. A long organizing drive had been conducted, the entire point of which was to convince North Carolina employees of the strength and efficaciousness of the UAW as their representative in dealings with Wix. An arbitration award cannot restore a lost election. A post-election petition to the NLRB to set the election aside, even if granted, and even if implemented by a Board bargaining order to the employer, would hardly constitute the vote of confidence, show of unity, and mandate for confrontation necessary to enter into negotiations which may well drag on until decertification becomes possible. The 12,000 Dana employees already represented by the UAW have ratified a contract which they would not otherwise have been presented, and have paid with certain, if unknown, concessions as to the terms and conditions of their own employment, for Dana's assurance that precisely these eventualities would not occur. They are bound by a no-strike clause. The union has demonstrated irreparable damage.
Appellant argues, however, that the irreparable damage which it sustains by virtue of an injunction intruding upon rights assured it by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution outweighs all of the above considerations. That argument requires separate discussion.
II.
We must first examine the extent to which Dana’s communications to its employees are protected by the First Amendment under the circumstances of this case, through the directives and public policies expressed by Congress and the Supreme Court concerning First Amendment rights in the labor relations context; and then whether, as Appellant argues, a contractual waiver of the right to make such of its communications as may have been protected is unenforceable.
The National Labor Relations Act, § 8(c), [29 U.S.C. § 158(c) ], provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. (Emphasis added.)
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547, (1969), the Supreme Court held that § 8(c) implements the First Amendment in a labor relations context. Justice Warren noted that an employer’s right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly established, and cannot be infringed by either the union or the Board ... so long as no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit is made. However:
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c). (395 U.S. at 617, 89 S.Ct. at 1941, 23 L.Ed.2d at 580.)
In Gissel, the court found the employer’s statements that the “strike-happy” union would have to enforce its demands by a strike, which would probably result in plant shutdown as had occurred elsewhere in the area; and that the employees would have great difficulty in finding other employment, was speech unprotected by the First Amendment and properly found unlawful by the Board. The court wrote that:
Any balancing of these rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. (395 U.S. at 617, 89 S.Ct. at 1941, 23 L.Ed.2d at 580.)
Gissel further held that First Amendment protection extends even to an employer’s predictions as to the unfortunate effects which he believes will result from unionization: but only insofar as such predictions are based upon objective fact, and concern consequences beyond his control. The employer in that case was found to have had no factual support for his basic assumption that the union, which had not yet even presented one demand, would have to strike to be heard. Such suggestions were not protected speech but threats: and so were the baseless suggestions made that other plant closings in the area were attributable to unionism. The speech found in Gissel to be unprotected by the First Amendment bears a remarkable resemblance to the communications for which appellant here seeks protection.
In Henry Siegel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 417 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir., 1969), cert. den. 398 U.S. 959, 90 S.Ct. 2175, 26 L.Ed.2d 545, (1970), this court had occasion to consider a Gissel situation, without apparent benefit of Justice Warren’s June, 1969, Gissel opinion. The result reached, however, was identical. Judge Combs wrote:
Section 8(c) of the Act gives an employer the right to express his opinion in opposition to the union, also the right to express argument in support of such opinion. But, his expressions may not contain a threat of reprisal. He may not dress up a threat in the language of opinion. Even though his statements may be expressions of opinion only, if their reasonable tendency is coercive in effect, they are violative of Section 8(a)(1). (Emphasis added.) 417 F.2d at 1215.
This court proceeded thereafter to find that the statements of an employer’s agents to employees that they stood to lose by a possible reduction in wages and insurance benefits, and that the “destructive forces of unionism” included “strife, violence, law breaking, hostility between neighbors, and loss of work,” were unprotected by § 8(c). They fell into the category of thinly veiled threats, rather than mere predictions or legitimate argument. Again, there are remarkable parallels between the communications of that case and those before this court.
Indeed, when the pre-injunction communications of Wix President Hoyle are evaluated against the scope of the First Amendment in the labor relations context, under the rule of Gissel and its progeny, it is clear that those communications are beyond the scope of this employer’s First Amendment privilege, regardless of the neutrality agreement which it seeks to dishonor. The April 28th Hoyle letter purported to speak on behalf of Dana and has never been repudiated. It suggested that unionism has caused layoffs in other Dana plants and will at Wix; that overtime will cease and that lower pay and benefits may result from negotiations. Not one of those “predictions” is claimed to be based upon any objective fact. In his letter of June 2,1980, President Hoyle’s suggestions of a “vicious union strike” to which the company has “no intention of yielding,” and which involves the risk of job loss “forever,” are clearly unprotected threats. The speech to the employees of all three shifts on June 10th, after receipt of the injunction, fell com
Accordingly, inasmuch as the caselaw is uniform that communications such as those here in question are unprotected by the First Amendment, are violative of employee rights to free association, and are unlawfully coercive, the irreparable damage to appellant consequent upon an injunction restraining such speech pending arbitration of the neutrality agreement can hardly be held to outweigh the equities presented by the union. The injunction here entered, therefore, is appropriate under the general principles of equity.
Finally, to the small extent that the communications here in question may have retained the mantle of First Amendment protection, Dana had executed a valid waiver of its First Amendment right to such expressions as might be characterized as “anti-UAW,” rather than “pro-Dana,” by its supplement letter to the union of December 2, 1979. The commitment was reiterated by letter of May 2, 1980, in response to union demand. The fact of that undertaking is undisputed either at the district court or here. Its precise application to the facts of this case is a matter for the labor arbitrator. (See “Steelworkers Trilogy” supra.) Its mere existence presented, however, the union’s probability of prevailing to the extent of presenting a legitimate question for the arbitrator under the mandatory arbitration clause of these parties’ contract (See Lever Brothers), and therefore was properly the basis of injunctive relief pending arbitration.
As to the validity of Dana’s factually undisputed waiver of its First Amendment right to make “anti-UAW” communications, this court refers to D. H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124, (1972). In that case, Overmyer had given a cognovit note for certain consideration, waiving notice and hearing prior to entry of judgment, in case of default. On entry of such judgment, the debtor’s appeal was based upon the claim that it could not constitutionally be held to have waived, in advance, its right to due process of law. The court held that due process rights to notice and hearing prior to civil judgment are subject to waiver, and had been waived. Justice Blackmun examined applicable standards for judicial recognition of waivers in the criminal context, where personal liberty rather than property rights are involved (including waivers of the right to counsel, against self-incrimination, and to presence at trial), found that Overmyer’s waiver met those standards, and did not decide whether a lower standard could be applied in civil cases. An accused’s waiver of a constitutional right is required to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made, with full awareness of the legal consequences, to be valid. The controlling facts in holding that Overmyer’s waiver was valid were (1) that Overmyer was a corporation of complex structure and widespread activities; (2) that the contract was not one of adhesion and the case not one of unequal bargaining power or overreaching; (3) that the initial contract had contained no confession of judgment, but the clause was only executed after Overmyer’s delinquency in payment, in consideration for Frick’s forbearance; (4) Overmyer did not contend that it, or its counsel, were unaware of the significance of the note; and (5) Overmyer was not rendered defenseless by the clause, because the judgment obtained could have been vacated upon a showing of valid cause. In the light of those circumstances, Overmyer’s right to due process and hearing was held to have been voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived in advance, with full awareness of the legal consequences. Justice Douglas, in concurrence, wrote that:
Whatever procedural hardship the Ohio confession of judgment scheme worked upon the petitioners was voluntarily and understandingly self-inflicted through the arms-length bargaining of these corporate parties. (405 U.S. at 189, 92 S.Ct. at 784).
This court examined the standard applicable to a claim of waiver of First Amendment rights in Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 1981. While recognizing that Overmyer, supra,
1. No agreement between the parties was entered which was binding as a matter of state law.
2. Insufficient consideration flowed to Sambo’s, Inc., to evidence a valid waiver of its First Amendment right to the appellation of its choice. The only “benefit” received was held to have been approval of a site plan, which could not constitute a consideration as it was an action required by law.
3. There was no “clear and compelling” evidence of a waiver, as was required by the Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, (1967), a case in which the failure to interpose a constitutional defense in the trial court prior to decision was held not to waive invocation of that defense on appeal.
The concurrence in Sambo’s, Inc., was based upon the holding that a contract obtained through assault, fraud, duress, or extortion should not be recognized as binding.
This case meets all of the above-described standards for validity of a waiver, whether Overmyer alone is to govern, or this circuit’s extension of that rule in Sambo’s. The evidence of the contract is clear and compelling, even undisputed. It is a part of a binding collective bargaining agreement, enforceable under § 301(a) of LMRA. Dana has received benefits from its execution, in that a National Master Agreement with UAW was presented for ratification and ratified by 12,000 other Dana union employees which would not otherwise have been presented. It is clear from that testimony that the union has foregone other demands in exchange for the promise of neutrality. This is no contract of adhesion: and there is no disparity in bargaining power. Dana is a large and complex corporation, employing an entire Department of Industrial Relations personnel, as well as an in-house General Counsel staff. The neutrality agreement language here in question was new in 1979, and was a modification of the 1976 supplement, drafted by Dana’s Industrial Relations Director to meet the union’s request for a commitment stronger than that of 1976, which had caused the union difficulties. The parties discussed the UAW’s plans to organize the Wix-Gastonia plant prior to the supplement, and contemplated precisely this situation in its execution. Neither Dana nor its counsel have ever contended a lack of understanding or awareness of the legal effect of the document. Dana is not rendered defenseless by the supplement: every claimed violation can be arbitrated, on demand.
Since December of 1979, Dana has had the benefit of the implemented contractual management of the employment of 12,000 employees. That contract contains a no-strike clause which constitutes an equivalent “waiver” of the First Amendment rights of those employees to peacefully picket and demonstrate. The strong public policy of this nation, as expressed repeatedly by Congress in favor of the free association of employees and collective bargaining, does not permit this court to enforce the First Amendment waiver implicit in a no-strike clause but not that of a corporate promise of neutrality.
Appellant finally argues that the District Court’s temporary restraint and preliminary injunction against the making of “anti-union”, “anti-UAW” communications constituted unlawful prior restraints of Dana’s First Amendment rights. There was no prior restraint. Mr. Hoyle had already published Dana’s views on two occasions before the first order to cease, pending arbitration, and the conduct upon which the Order was founded was clearly violative of both contract, if applicable, and law. The District Court had found the speech unprotected because of the waiver, in a probability sufficient for the entry of a restraining order after review of the evidence and arguments of counsel for both parties. The only governmental action of which Dana can complain is that of the
But if this were to be considered as a prior restraint, it must be held a valid one. Such restraints require careful scrutiny, although they are not invalid per se. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). A court may validly restrain communications which are not protected by the First Amendment. Rodgers v. U. S. Steel Co., 536 F.2d 1001, (3rd Cir., 1976). The restraint must be necessary to prevent “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage” or imminent threat to a competing protected public interest. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir., 1980), aff’d. on other grounds, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). Finally, the restraint must be both narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means available. Carroll v. President and Comrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347,21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). The orders in this case have met all of those criteria. It is noteworthy that, to draw the restraint as narrowly as possible, the district court’s purgation order gave Dana the alternative of cessation of its communications and corrective action, or of payment of accumulating fines.
Dana has no standing here to argue the First Amendment rights of its employees to listen to the communications in question. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953), stated the well-settled rule that “one may not claim standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.”
The District Court’s preliminary injunctive order and contempt order are also affirmed. A show cause hearing on the contempt motion was held on June 12th and the court’s extensive memorandum and order filed June 20th, finding Dana in contempt. None of the court’s extensive findings of fact are cited as clearly erroneous; moreover, it must at all times be remembered that the task of full interpretation and application of the parties’ contract to the situation must be, as it was, left to the arbitrator. Senior Judge Young exercised his discretion in the heat of this labor dispute with a skill which, even in hindsight, we cannot challenge.
AFFIRMED.