Andrew Gielda v. Bangor Township Schools

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1197n.06
No. 11-2149
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Nov 20, 2012
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
ANDREW G. GIELDA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
BANGOR TOWNSHIP SCHOOLS, ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION
Before: ROGERS and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; PEARSON, District Judge.*
BENITA Y. PEARSON, District Judge. Plaintiff Andrew Gielda appeals the district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Bangor Township Schools (Bangor).
Gielda was an employee of the school district for two years, serving as the principal at both a middle
and elementary school. After two years of employment, the school board voted to not renew
Gielda’s contract at a special meeting where Superintendent Tina Kerr testified about Gielda’s
ineffectiveness as a school administrator. Gielda brought this lawsuit in the Eastern District of
Michigan alleging gender discrimination, unfair labor practices, and violations of administrative due
process. The district court granted summary judgment for Bangor on all three claims. The Court
affirms the district court’s judgment. In the court below, Gielda did not establish that the non-
*
The Honorable Benita Y. Pearson, United States District Judge for the Northern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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discriminatory reason offered by the school board for not renewing his contract was a pretext for
gender bias. Likewise, Gielda did not establish that the school board had a discriminatory, anti-
union motive for deciding not to renew his contract.
I. BACKGROUND
Gielda worked in the Standish Sterling Community School System from 1997 to 2007,
during which time he served as a middle school and high school assistant principal. In 2007, Gielda
was hired to be the principal of Christa McAuliffe Middle School within the Bangor Township
School District. Gielda was selected by a hiring committee comprised of, among others,
Superintendent Tina Kerr and Assistant Superintendent Richard Heinrich, who found Gielda to be
qualified for the position. At about the same time, the committee also hired Beth Robb to serve as
the principal of the Bangor Township high school. Gielda testified that he was more experienced
than Robb; however, she received a higher salary due to the position. Both Gielda and Robb
commenced their employment in the summer of 2007.
Gielda contends that he began facing discrimination at the middle school as soon as his
employment started. In his deposition, Gielda testified that Kerr used “snack and chat” and
one-on-one meetings with middle school teachers to receive reports about Gielda, and that he was
the only school administrator whose staff met with Kerr in this manner. Additionally, a female
employee at the school circulated a survey seeking responses regarding teachers’ ability to work with
Gielda, and male employees were reportedly excluded from the survey. Throughout the year, female
employees would call Kerr to complain about Gielda. Cara Barcia, an administrative assistant to
Kerr, testified that this was rarely done by teachers prior to Gielda’s arrival. Gielda also testified
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that, after his involvement in contract negotiations held in October 2007, he was told he would not
receive an annuity and that his pursuit of an annuity had angered Kerr. Finally, Gielda recalled at
least one instance when a female teacher made insubordinate, sexist comments. Gielda testified that
Kerr did nothing when he asked for her help to resolve that problem.
In her deposition, Kerr described Gielda’s first year as principal differently. Kerr testified
that Gielda demonstrated problematic work habits. Gielda only worked twelve days during his first
month on the job. He ignored staff concerns and failed to send an introductory letter to them. The
problems persisted throughout the year. School staff complained that Gielda was unavailable as an
administrator: he frequently left work early, would be dismissive of staff who came to see him in
his office, and did not regularly attend school events. Concerns about Gielda’s leadership and his
interpersonal abilities were expressed by “a number of staff.” Moreover, Gielda’s evaluation rated
him below the required level of performance in 56.6% of the categories.
Prior to the 2008-09 academic year, Kerr decided to move Gielda to the position of principal
at the elementary school. While Gielda claims this was done as part of the continued discrimination
he faced, Kerr testified that the move was intended to help Gielda, as Kerr had a vested interest in
his success because he was the first principal she hired. Thereafter, Gielda and the elementary
school principal, Dianna Tuttle, traded positions.
Gielda contends that the discrimination he faced continued during his year at the elementary
school. In his deposition, Gielda testified that Michelle Goallie, a teacher at the school, confronted
Gielda to inform him that she was to report any issues with him to Kerr. Additionally, Gielda claims
he was asked to relinquish his reserved parking spot for Goallie because she was pregnant. Gielda
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testified that this was disparate treatment because Tuttle, the previous elementary school principal,
was never asked to allow pregnant or injured teachers to use her parking spot.
Kerr testified that Gielda’s unsatisfactory performance as a school administrator continued
even after he was transferred. Gielda scored lower on his performance evaluation than he did during
his time at the middle school. Kerr testified that she held a meeting with Gielda to provide him
concrete ways to improve, but this meeting did not help his deteriorating performance. Additionally,
Gielda had suspended 132 students from the elementary school during his tenure, a substantial
increase compared to 38 suspensions at two other district elementary schools combined. Kerr
averred that Robb’s performance as a high school principal also was not meeting expectations.
Kerr also testified that she had more meetings with staff members at Robb’s school than
Gielda’s. Robb also received low scores on her performance evaluation.
In March 2009, Kerr informed both Robb and Gielda that she would be recommending that
the school board not renew their contracts. Kerr offered an alternative to formal non-renewal: resign
in exchange for receiving positive reviews and letters of recommendation from Kerr and Heinrich.
While Robb elected to resign, Gielda chose instead to discuss his non-renewal with the school board.
On April 23, 2009, the school board conducted a special meeting during which Kerr presented her
recommendation and Gielda had an opportunity to reply. In addition to providing evidence of
Gielda’s performance over the past two years, Kerr also made the following comment concerning
Gielda’s involvement in labor negotiations that took place in October 2007:
On October 10th and 12th, I met with the USW (Admin) team to discuss
negotiations. Mr. Gielda volunteered to be a representative for the administrative
team. These negotiations were tenuous due to Mr. Gielda’s own agenda. He insisted
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that he should be eligible for the 2007-08 increase and annuity payment. This created
some hostility between the team, as well as they felt Mr. Gielda as well as I did that
Mr. Gielda should not [be] eligible for a pay raise after only being on the job for two
months. His salary and contract was adjusted in July when he began his employment
with the district. He still held firm that he thought he should have had the raise, but
the administrative team ignored his own agenda and voted to approve the new
contract.
The board voted unanimously to not renew Gielda’s contract. Subsequently, he was replaced by
Margy Dewey as principal.
Gielda asserts his non-renewal was the culmination of Kerr’s campaign against him. Gielda
notes the testimony of Barcia, who testified that Kerr instructed her to delete a positive review of
Gielda after he did not tender a letter of resignation. Barcia further testified that she was asked by
Kerr to redact portions of a meeting that referenced Robb’s resignation.
On June 25, 2010, Gielda filed a complaint against Bangor in the Eastern District of
Michigan alleging three causes of action. Gielda alleged that his contract was not renewed because
of his gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and the Michigan Elliot
Larson Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”). Gielda also contended that the decision to not renew his
contract violated the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act (“Taft-Hartley”) and Michigan
Public Employment Relations Act (“PERA”) since the decision was based on his involvement in
contract negotiations in October 2007. Finally, Gielda averred that the decision to not renew his
contract violated the Administrator’s Due Process Act.
The district court granted summary judgment for Bangor on all three counts. Specifically,
the district court held that Gielda could not establish that the articulated reasons for the non-renewal
of his contract were a pretext for gender discrimination. Additionally, the district court found that
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no reasonable jury could conclude that Gielda’s participation in labor negotiations influenced the
non-renewal. Finally, the district court noted that the Administrator’s Due Process Act requirement
that an administrator have the opportunity to meet with the school board to discuss non-renewal was
satisfied on April 23, 2009, when Gielda met with the whole school board at his request.1
Gielda appeals to this Court on two separate grounds. First, Gielda contends it was reversible
error that the district court found there was no genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in his
gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Michigan Elliot Larson
Civil Rights Act. Second, Gielda alleges it was reversible error that the district court granted
summary judgment upon his claims arising from the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act
and Michigan Public Employment Relations Act.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard
of review applicable in the district court. Gannt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1045
(6th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In
analyzing a motion for summary judgment, we construe all evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255.
1
The district court also found that Gielda abandoned this claim in his response to
Bangor’s motion for summary judgment.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Gielda’s Gender Discrimination Claims Fail Because He Did Not Prove
Bangor’s Articulated Reason Was Pretextual.
In his first assignment of error, Gielda alleges that the non-renewal of his contract violated
both Title VII and ELCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq and Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101, et seq.
We affirm the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment in regard to these claims.
This Circuit reviews Title VII and ELCRA claims under the same standard. Jackson v.
Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999). In disparate treatment claims involving gender
discrimination, a reviewing court applies a three-step “shifting burden approach.” McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). First, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Next, the defendant
must “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id.
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Finally, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the articulated legitimate reason is merely a pretext for the discrimination. Id.
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). At all times, the plaintiff bears the “ultimate burden
of persuasion” on the fact that the defendant has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). Furthermore, this framework is not to be
applied mechanically but rather on a case-by-case basis with consideration given to the specific facts
of the present case. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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“To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment decision; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or
treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” White v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). In the reverse discrimination context, “a plaintiff satisfies
the first prong of the prima facie case by ‘demonstrat[ing] background circumstances [to] support
the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’”
Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins.,
40 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1994)). When selecting an employee who is similarly situated for
comparison purposes, the comparative employee must be similar “in all relevant respects.”
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 1998), quoted in Wright
v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006). A court must also consider whether the
similarly situated employees “engaged in acts of comparable seriousness.” Bobo v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). By establishing the prima facie
case for discrimination, the plaintiff creates a presumption of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at
254.
When the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate reason,” the defendant
must meet a burden of production. Id. In particular, “the defendant must clearly set forth, through
the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact,
would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.”
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. In evaluating the sufficiency of the articulated reason, a court should find
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that the reason both presents a “legitimate reason for the action” and “frame[s] the factual issue with
sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.”
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56. When the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the plaintiff’s
termination, the presumption of discrimination is dropped. Id. at 255 n.10.
If that burden is satisfied by the defendant, the burden of proving that the proffered reason
was pretextual, or not the true reason for the employment decision, shifts to the plaintiff and merges
with the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 256. In order to prove that the articulated reason of
the defendant is pretextual, the plaintiff may prove that the articulated reasons had no basis in fact,
did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or were insufficient to motivate the employer’s
action. Harris v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 594 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff may also prove pretext “by offering evidence which challenges the reasonableness of
the employer’s decision to the extent that such an inquiry sheds light on ‘whether the employer’s
proffered reason for the employment action was its actual motivation.’” Wexler v. White’s Fine
Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2003), quoted in Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d at
393. Additionally, the plaintiff will fail to meet the burden of persuasion “unless it is shown both
that the [articulated] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Hicks, 509 U.S.
at 515 (emphasis in original). A court should grant summary judgment in discrimination cases when
“the plaintiff only created a weak issue of fact as to whether the defendant’s reason was untrue and
there is ample evidence to support the employer’s position.” Abdulnour v. Campbell Soup Supply
Co., 502 F.3d 496, 504 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chen v. Dow
Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because Chen has not produced evidence from
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which a reasonable factfinder could doubt that she was fired for performance-related reasons,
summary judgment was appropriate on her disparate treatment claim.”).
We assume for purposes of argument that Gielda established a prima facie case. The district
court correctly determined that Bangor articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the non-
renewal of Gielda’s contract. As Bangor correctly points out, there was more than ample evidence
to support the decision to not renew Gielda’s contract due to his performance issues that lasted
almost two years. Gielda received unsatisfactory evaluations as an administrator at both the middle
and elementary schools. His visibility as an administrator was inadequate both during school hours,
as manifest by the number of teacher complaints about his dismissive nature, and after school hours,
where it was demonstrated that he rarely made appearances at appropriate school functions. Kerr
also noted that this behavior did not improve, even after a number of performance reviews and a
transfer to a different school away from teachers allegedly giving Gielda a difficult time. Thus,
Bangor met its burden of production by demonstrating a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment action.
Gielda, moreover, failed to meet the ultimate burden of proving that the articulated reason
for which he was fired was a pretext for gender discrimination. The evidence does not support, nor
does Gielda attempt to argue, that the reason articulated by the school board had no basis in fact.
Nor was the reason insufficient to motivate the non-renewal. As discussed above, Bangor provided
ample evidence that Gielda’s performance as principal at two separate Bangor Township schools
was inadequate and justified its decision to not renew Gielda’s contract. To survive summary
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judgment, Gielda must present sufficient evidence demonstrating that Bangor’s reason did not
actually motivate its non-renewal decision.
Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Gielda, as is required
at summary judgment, Gielda failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to conclude
that he met the ultimate burden of proving that Bangor discriminated against him based upon his
gender. As the district court noted in its memorandum, Gielda attempted to demonstrate pretext by
referring to a number of incidents during his two years as a principal that he alleges reflect gender
bias; yet, none of Gielda’s arguments demonstrate that the school board participated in the
discrimination. Gielda argues that the sexist comments made by a teacher during his year at the
middle school, the evaluation survey that was circulated among female teachers, and the controversy
with the parking spot at the elementary school are indicative of the gender discrimination he faced
from various female employees of the school district. But these examples do not demonstrate that
the school board, an entity that is independent of the teaching staff at both schools where Gielda
worked, discriminated against Gielda because of his gender. It was a middle school teacher, not the
school board, that allegedly directed a sexist comment at Gielda. Gielda has also failed to
demonstrate how the school board was responsible for the survey that was circulated at the middle
school. Similarly, it was a teacher, not the school board, that may or may not have started a
controversy over the elementary school parking spot. The school board did not participate in any
of these events. Biases, if any, that may have been held by the teachers cannot be imputed to Bangor
based upon the record before this Court.
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Gielda also argues that Kerr discriminated against him based upon his gender because she
permitted teachers to report about him and, further, that Kerr’s behavior surrounding his non-renewal
suggests that Gielda’s gender, not his performance, was the actual motivating factor in termination.
Yet again, Gielda has failed to connect the actions of non-school board members to Kerr or Bangor.
There is no reliable evidence that the survey conducted about Gielda actually excluded male
employees. Even if the survey participants were predominantly female, that does not mean their
participation or the motivation for conducting the survey was a consequence of gender discrimination
on the part of the school board. Furthermore, Kerr testified that she never reviewed the survey, she
did not know what the survey said or how it was presented, and the survey was not initiated by her
or the school board. There is also no evidence that the school board relied upon the survey in its
decision not to renew Gielda’s contract, and, even if there were, Gielda does not demonstrate how
that would be probative of gender discrimination in his case.
As for Kerr’s failure to provide Gielda with more time to correct his performance after his
second year review, Gielda does not demonstrate how this proves the district’s reasons were
pretextual. Gielda has not contested the fact that he received negative performance reviews at the
middle school. The issue is not, as Gielda suggests, a matter of having insufficient time to correct
his performance. Indeed, the record shows that Gielda had numerous opportunities to correct the
problems Kerr brought to his attention, but either failed to or chose not to do so. Gielda’s claim that
he did not have enough time to correct his problems after the last of many negative reviews does not
prove pretext.
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Bangor presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue that
it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to not renew Gielda’s contract and that Gielda failed
to show the reason was a pretext to mask gender discrimination. Gielda, in turn, failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the articulated reason given by the school board was
pretextual and not the actual motivating factor for his non-renewal Accordingly, the district court’s
ruling is affirmed with respect to Gielda’s Title VII and ELCRA claims.
B. Gielda’s Unfair Labor Practice Claims Fail as He Did Not Prove that
the School Board’s Decision Was Motivated By His Participation in a
Concerted Activity.
In his second assignment of error, Gielda claims that the non-renewal of his contract was
motivated in part by his participation in the October 2007 contract negotiations, which he alleges
constitutes a concerted activity protected under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq and
PERA, Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.201, et seq. We affirm the district court’s ruling in regard to these
claims.
Section 157 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 158, in relevant part, makes it unlawful for an
employer to either “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title” or, “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3). PERA was written with similar language.
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Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–58, with Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 423.209–210. Because claims under
Taft-Hartley and PERA are virtually identical, both federal and state court decisions may be used for
guidance. See Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n v. Reeths-Puffer Sch. Dist., 215 N.W.2d 672, 675
(Mich. 1974) (“The parties have relied on and we may appropriately look to the federal precedents
for guidance.”).
In determining whether an employee has been wrongfully terminated for engaging in
protected activities, the plaintiff bears an initial burden of showing that the protected activity was
a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision after the employer has stated the employee
was fired for legitimate reasons. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers
of Am. (UAW), AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 574, 585 (6th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff can
successfully establish the protected activity was a “motivating factor,” then the employer must show
that the adverse employment decision would have occurred even if the employee had not engaged
in the protected activity. Id.; see also NLRB v. Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d 785, 797–98 (6th Cir. 1998).
The prima facie case for discriminatory motive requires the plaintiff to show “that (1) the
employee was engaged in activity protected under the Act, (2) the employer knew of the activity, and
(3) animus toward the protected activity motivated the employer’s adverse action.” NLRB v. Consol.
Biscuit Co., 301 F. App’x 411, 421 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ctr. Const. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d
425, 435 (6th Cir. 2007)). The employer’s discriminatory motive may be shown through direct and
circumstantial evidence, ITT Auto. v. NLRB, 188 F.3d 375, 388 (6th Cir. 1999), and a number of
factors may permit the inference of discrimination, including:
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the company’s expressed hostility towards unionization combined with knowledge
of the employees’ union activities; inconsistencies between the proffered reason for
discharge and other actions of the employer; disparate treatment of certain employees
compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses; a company’s
deviation from past practices in implementing the discharge; and proximity in time
between the employees’ union activities and their discharge.
NLRB v. Gen. Fabrications Corp., 222 F.3d 218, 226 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting W.F. Bolin Co. v.
NLRB, 70 F.3d 863, 871 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Applying these principles, it is clear that Gielda cannot establish that Bangor’s alleged
animus towards his participation in the collective bargaining negotiations motivated the school board
not to renew his contract. Gielda has quoted only one paragraph from Kerr’s testimony at the April
23 meeting in support of his Taft-Hartley and PERA claims. This paragraph alone does not reflect
that the school board was hostile towards unionized teachers or administrators. Additionally, the
decision of non-renewal is consistent with the—ultimately unsuccessful—attempts of Kerr to help
Gielda to improve his performance as principal. Notwithstanding Gielda’s assertions to the contrary,
the undisputed evidence reflects that Gielda and Robb were afforded the same options for
comparable unsatisfactory work: both had the option either to resign or to go through a formal
non-renewal process. Robb was terminated differently because Gielda chose not to tender a letter
of resignation as Robb did. Furthermore, Gielda failed to provide evidence showing that the school
board deviated from any past practices, such as allowing a principal more than two years to correct
ongoing performance issues.
Most fatal to Gielda’s claim is the amount of time between his participation in the concerted
activity and the adverse employment decision. The negotiations took place on October 10, 2007.
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The board’s decision to not renew Gielda’s contract was made during the special meeting held on
April 23, 2009, a full eighteen months after the negotiations. At the meeting, Kerr cited Gielda’s
participation in the negotiations, not for the fact that he participated in a concerted activity, but for
the manner in which he participated in the activity and how it is illustrative of his lack of
interpersonal skills. As the district court correctly observed, no reasonable juror could conclude that
Kerr’s comment about Gielda’s behavior during the negotiations led the school board to not renew
his contract for any reason other than Gielda’s persistent inability to cooperate with colleagues.
Furthermore, even if Gielda could somehow establish a prima facie case for discriminatory
motive, Gielda’s claim would still fail because, based upon the record before the Court, Bangor
could readily demonstrate that Gielda’s non-renewal would have occurred whether or not he
participated in negotiations. As discussed above, Gielda received numerous complaints about his
work throughout his two years as a principal. His performance did not improve despite a number
of attempts to correct the problems, including annual performance evaluations and a transfer to the
elementary school. There can only be one reasonable conclusion: the school board would not have
renewed Gielda’s contract after Kerr testified at length about Gielda’s unsatisfactory record whether
or not he belonged to a union or participated in concerted activities.
Bangor demonstrated that Gielda was not renewed as a principal because of his unsatisfactory
performance. Gielda failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue that his participation in
union contract negotiations was a motivating factor in the school board’s decision to not renew his
contract. The sole quoted passage that Gielda relied upon to show discriminatory motive
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demonstrated his ill-suited personality rather than any anti-union bias. The district court’s order is
therefore affirmed with respect to Gielda’s labor practice claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the district court’s order granting summary
judgment for Bangor.
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