Arnette Rodgers v. 36th District Court

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0628n.06
No. 11-2201 FILED
Jul 03, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ARNETTE RODGERS, CARMEN KNIGHT, )
TAMIE RICE, KATRINA TATE-ANDERSON, )
JAUNICE FLOWERS, CHERYL SHARPLEY, )
ANTHONY COOPER, SARAH JENKINS, )
WENDELL FINLEY, ARECIA STEVENS, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
CRYSTAL ALLEN-CRUCE, YOLANDA ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JOHNSON, KEITH CARTER, DORNITA ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
CLEVELAND, ALVITA MOSS, LAURA HILL, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
and YVONNE MALVAUX, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
36TH DISTRICT COURT and )
MARYLIN E. ATKINS, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
Before: DAUGHTREY, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Marylin E. Atkins, chief
judge of Michigan’s 36th Judicial District Court (“the 36th District”), appeals the district court’s
denial of her motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs, who
are former employees of the 36th District, sued the 36th District and Atkins pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. They argue that under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) in
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effect at the time of their terminations, they could be discharged only for “just cause” and that, as
just-cause employees, they had the right to post-termination evidentiary hearings before a neutral
decisionmaker, which they did not receive because the 36th District denied their demands for
arbitration. Atkins asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clear whether
the CBA was in effect at the time the plaintiffs were terminated and, therefore, whether they were
just-cause employees with due process rights. The district court denied Atkins’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to claims brought against Atkins in her individual
capacity, except with regard to three plaintiffs, as to whom the motion was granted. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the district court’s order denying Atkins qualified immunity as to the other
plaintiffs’ claims.
I.
The plaintiffs are former employees of the 36th District who were also members of a
collective bargaining unit represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Council 25 and its affiliated Local 3308 (“AFSCME”).
AFSCME entered into a CBA with the 36th District on behalf of court employees. Article
12 of the CBA provided that employees could be disciplined “only for just cause.” Article 8
described a five-step procedure by which employees could present grievances to the 36th District.
Pursuant to Steps 1 through 3, employees could submit grievances, both orally and in writing, and
meet with representatives from the 36th District to discuss their complaints. At Step 4, employees
could submit their grievances to the Court Administrator or a designated representative, who would
conduct a meeting of the relevant parties. In cases involving suspension or discharge, either party
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could request the other party to produce evidence, including witnesses, at the meeting or “as soon
thereafter as practicable.” If a grievance remained unresolved after Step 4, Step 5 permitted a party
to demand arbitration.
The initial term of the CBA was July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2006. Article 50 addressed the
CBA’s termination:
This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until June 30, 2006.
This Agreement shall continue in effect for consecutive yearly periods after
June 30, 2006, unless notice is given, in writing, by either of the Union or the
Employer, to the other party at least ninety (90) days prior to June 30, 2006, or any
anniversary date thereafter, of its desire to modify, amend or terminate this
Agreement.
If such notice is given, this Agreement shall be open to modification,
amendment or termination, as such notice may indicate on June 30, 2006, or the
subsequent anniversary date, as the case may be.
On March 1, 2006, James Meadows, the 36th District’s interim director of human resources,
wrote a letter to Beverly Harris, the president of AFSCME, notifying her “of the Court’s intent to
modify, amend, or terminate all or parts of the [CBA].” The 36th District and AFSCME later
disputed whether Meadows’s letter was sufficient to terminate the CBA or whether the CBA
remained in effect after June 30, 2006. The parties submitted this issue to an arbitrator and litigated
the issue in Michigan courts. On February 28, 2012, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that
Meadows’s letter did not terminate the CBA. 36th Dist. Court v. AFSCME Local 917, 815 N.W.2d
494, 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d in part on other grounds, appeal denied in part, 821 N.W.2d
786 (Mich. 2012). The parties now agree that the CBA did not terminate until June 2009.
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Between February 2007 and February 2009, the 36th District terminated the plaintiffs for
engaging in a variety of alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs submitted grievances to the 36th District,
and the federal district court found that in all but four cases, the plaintiffs’ grievances were processed
through Step 4. The plaintiffs demanded arbitration, but the 36th District refused to arbitrate. In its
communications to the plaintiffs denying arbitration, the 36th District indicated that “[i]t is the
Court’s position that the March 1, 2006 letter to Local 3308 constituted an effective notice to
terminate the Labor Agreement” and that “the Court has no obligation to proceed to arbitration on
a termination case, where the termination occurred after the June 30, 2006 termination of the Labor
Agreement.” The 36th District reiterated this position in its communications with arbitrators
requesting that the plaintiffs’ grievances not be scheduled for arbitration.
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against the 36th District and Atkins under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were terminated from their positions without due process of law.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment to the 36th District and dismissed
claims for damages brought against Atkins in her official capacity on the basis of sovereign
immunity. It denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity as to claims brought against Atkins in her individual capacity, except with regard to
plaintiffs Yolanda Johnson, Yvonne Malvaux, and Donnita Cleveland, as to whom the motion was
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granted.1 Atkins now appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to the other
plaintiffs’ claims.
II.
“The appeal of a denial of qualified immunity is an interlocutory appeal that this Court hears
as a final decision of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant to the ‘collateral order’
doctrine.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985)). We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Walker v. Davis, 649 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment is proper where no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, we construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability “when a reasonable official
in the defendant’s position would not have understood his or her actions to violate a person’s
constitutional rights.” Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720, 729 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)). “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government
officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
1
The district court held that Johnson and Malvaux, who were fired after the CBA terminated
in June 2009, did not retain property interests in their employment protected by the Due Process
Clause. It also held that Malvaux and Cleveland failed to pursue arbitration and, as a result, they
waived their post-termination due process rights.
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insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry for determining whether
an official is entitled to qualified immunity. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A court must consider (1)
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the injured party, a constitutional right
has been violated; and (2) whether that right was clearly established. Id. In Pearson v. Callahan,
the Supreme Court held that while the sequence set forth in Katz is often appropriate, it is not
mandatory, and courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis to address first. 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
In Feathers v. Aey, we established a three-part test for evaluating qualified immunity
defenses:
First, we determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred.
Second, we consider whether the violation involved a clearly established
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Third, we
determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence “to indicate that what
the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly
established constitutional rights.”
319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (citations omitted)); see also Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 n.2 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting that while some panels of this court simply apply Saucier’s two -step approach, “the
three-step approach may in some cases increase the clarity of the proper analysis”).
Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity by alleging facts sufficient to show
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that the official’s act violated clearly established law at the time that it was committed. Simmonds
v. Genesee Cnty., 682 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2012). “To defeat the qualified immunity bar, a
plaintiff ‘must present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant
committed the acts that violated the law.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir.
1994)). “To make out a genuine issue of material fact, plaintiff must present significant probative
evidence tending to support her version of the facts, evidence on which a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for her.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 913 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007)).
A.
First, we consider whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation occurred. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In
order to establish a procedural due process claim, the plaintiffs must show that (1) they had life,
liberty, or property interests protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) they were deprived of these
protected interests; and (3) the state did not afford them adequate procedural rights. Women’s Med.
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716
(6th Cir. 1999)). The plaintiffs were deprived of any property interests they had in their employment
when they were terminated, so we address only the first and third requirements of a procedural due
process claim.
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i.
We first ask whether the plaintiffs had property interests in their employment protected by
the Due Process Clause. Baird, 438 F.3d at 611. Property interests are not created by the
Constitution. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). “[T]hey are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.” Id. “A property interest can be created by a state statute, a formal
contract, or a contract implied from the circumstances.” Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389
F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2004). In order to have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have
more than “an abstract need or desire for it” or “a unilateral expectation of it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
“He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id.
A statute or contract providing that employees may be disciplined or terminated only for “just
cause” creates a property interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39
(1985) (holding that a state statute providing that civil service employees could be dismissed only
for “misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office” created a property interest in continued
employment); Singfield, 389 F.3d at 566 (holding that a CBA providing that “[n]o employee shall
be discharged or suspended without just cause” created a property interest in continued employment);
Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a CBA
providing that a teacher may be suspended only for “just cause” created a property interest in
continued pay and benefits); Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
CBA prohibiting teachers from being transferred within a school district except on a showing of
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“good cause” and “extenuating circumstances” created a property interest in continued employment
in a particular position). Therefore, the CBA created a property interest in the plaintiffs’ continued
employment.
Atkins argues that the district court failed to recognize that the plaintiffs’ property interests
were contingent upon the CBA’s “just cause” provision. Her argument is without merit. The district
court explicitly stated that the CBA was the source of the plaintiffs’ property interests. It held that
the plaintiffs who were terminated prior to June 30, 2009—while the CBA was still in
effect—possessed property interests in their continued employment, but the plaintiffs who were fired
after the CBA terminated did not. Therefore, the district court did not err.
ii.
Next, we ask whether Atkins provided the plaintiffs with adequate procedural protections.
Baird, 438 F.3d at 611. “Although the existence of a property interest is defined by state law, the
procedures that must be followed in depriving an individual of that property interest are defined by
the federal Constitution.” Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541).
The “‘root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “that an individual be given an
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 542 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). “This principle requires
some kind of a hearing prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected
property interest in his employment.” Id. (quotations marks and citations omitted). This hearing,
although required, “need not be elaborate.” Id. at 545. A public employee with a constitutionally
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protected interest in his employment “is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him,
an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id.
at 546; Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 494 (6th Cir. 1990). A public employee is
not entitled to a neutral decisionmaker at a pre-termination hearing. Duchesne v. Williams 849 F.2d
1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc). This is because the purpose of a pre-termination hearing “is
not to ‘definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge,’ as would be the case at the later formal
hearing.” Id. at 1007 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545).
“[T]he required extent of post-termination procedures is inextricably intertwined with the
scope of pre-termination procedures.” Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d
270, 273 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48). If a public employee
receives only “an abbreviated pre-termination hearing, due process requires that a discharged
employee’s post-termination hearing be substantially more ‘meaningful.’” Id. “At a minimum, this
requires that the discharged employee be permitted to attend the hearing, to have the assistance of
counsel, to call witnesses and produce evidence on his own behalf, and to know and have an
opportunity to challenge the evidence against him.” Id. In cases where an employee receives an
abbreviated pre-termination hearing, “the opportunity for a post-deprivation hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker . . . is required for due process.” Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 596 (6th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis removed). “Where there is a system of post-termination procedures available to the
employee that includes a neutral decisionmaker and/or arbitration, coupled with a pretermination
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‘right of reply’ hearing, then the employee has received all the process due under the Constitution.”2
Id.
Atkins argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs did not receive
pre-termination hearings. The district court made contradictory statements on this point. It
acknowledged that “the Plaintiffs were provided with fairly substantial pre-termination procedures,
including (1) pre-termination meetings, (2) meetings where the termination decision was made, and
(3) in all but four cases, the submission of the Plaintiffs’ grievances through Step 4 of the CBA.” The
district court also stated, however, that “the Plaintiffs did not receive any due process before being
terminated.” Such inconsistency is troubling, but Atkins’s argument ultimately is irrelevant. The
plaintiffs do not challenge the pre-termination process that they received. They argue that they did
not receive hearings before a neutral decisionmaker because Atkins denied their post-termination
demands for arbitration. This is enough to establish a constitutional violation under Farhat.
Atkins also argues that the plaintiffs are required to exhaust available administrative and state
court remedies, such as Michigan Employment Relation Commission or Wayne Circuit Court
remedies, before they can demonstrate that they were deprived of their property rights without due
process. In Mitchell, this court considered when a plaintiff is required to show that available state
2
In Mitchell v. Fankhauser, which was decided a few months after Farhat, we held that an
employee who received an abbreviated pre-termination hearing and no post-termination hearing was
denied due process. 375 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 2004). We suggested in dicta that two hearings are
not always required to satisfy due process, acknowledging that “[i]f the pre-termination hearing is
more ‘meaningful,’ as described in Carter, then no post-termination hearing would be necessary.”
Id. We need not address the possibility that a single, comprehensive pre-termination hearing before
a neutral decisionmaker could satisfy due process, as it is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not
receive such a hearing prior to their terminations.
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procedures are inadequate to compensate him for a deprivation of property in order to state a claim
under § 1983. 375 F.3d at 481. After an extensive survey of this court’s sometimes contradictory
precedent, we concluded that a plaintiff need not demonstrate the inadequacy of state processes in
order to bring an action under § 1983 “where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant
to established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized conduct.” Id. at 482 (quoting
Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 843 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 512, 532
(1984))); see also Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 315 (finding that the rule requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to
demonstrate the inadequacy of a state’s post-deprivation corrective proceedings, established in
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), applies “only where the deprivation complained of is random
and unpredictable, such that the state cannot feasibly provide a predeprivation hearing”).
Atkins characterizes the plaintiffs’ claims as challenges to the 36th District’s unauthorized
refusals to arbitrate their grievances. However, the plaintiffs were not terminated randomly or
without authorization, but in conformity with the 36th District’s established procedure. At the time
of the plaintiffs’ terminations, the 36th District consistently denied the plaintiffs’ demands for
arbitration, purportedly because the 36th District’s representatives believed that they had no duty to
arbitrate in light of their belief that the CBA had terminated. Because the plaintiffs challenge actions
taken pursuant to established state procedure, they are not required to plead and prove the inadequacy
of administrative and state court remedies in order to state a claim under § 1983.
In sum, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that all three
elements of a procedural due process claim are met and that a constitutional violation occurred.
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B.
Second, we consider whether the constitutional violation involved a clearly established right
of which a reasonable person would have known. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848. In order for a
constitutional right to be “clearly established,” “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to
say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (citation omitted);
Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 580 (6th Cir. 2002). “When conducting an inquiry to determine
whether a constitutional right is clearly established, the law of our circuit requires us to look first to
decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this Court and other courts within our circuit,
and finally to the decisions of other circuits.” Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir.
1991). “[A]n action’s unlawfulness can be apparent from direct holdings, from specific examples
described as prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court employs.” Hensley v. Gassman,
693 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848).
Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that public employees who
may be fired only for “just cause” have property interests in their continued employment protected
by due process. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39; Singfield, 389 F.3d at 566; Jefferson, 360
F.3d at 587. Farhat, which was decided years prior to the plaintiffs’ terminations, establishes that
the opportunity for a post-termination evidentiary hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is required
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for due process. 370 F.3d at 596. Therefore, the violation here involved a clearly established
constitutional right of which a reasonable person in Atkins’s position would have known.
C.
Finally, we consider whether Atkins’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the
plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional rights. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848. Atkins argues that the
district court erred by failing to consider the circumstances at the time that she acted in determining
whether her actions were objectively unreasonable.
The objective legal reasonableness standard requires courts to “analyze[] claims of immunity
on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to determine whether a reasonable official in the defendant’s
position could have believed that his conduct was lawful, judged from the perspective of the
reasonable official on the scene.” Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41); Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Whether qualified immunity applies turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the official’s
action, viewed on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.”). The district court properly concluded that
Atkins’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the question of whether she acted reasonably. See, e.g.,
Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 912 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[Q]ualified immunity is an objective rather
than a subjective inquiry.”). The district court erred, however, by failing to consider whether a
reasonable official in Atkins’s position would have understood that she was violating the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights in light of the circumstances at the time. We now consider whether Atkins’s
actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in which she acted.
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Atkins argues that at the time that the plaintiffs were terminated, it was unclear (1) whether
the CBA remained in effect, and (2) how the CBA’s termination would have affected the plaintiffs’
status as just-cause employees under Michigan law. Atkins argues that the 36th District’s refusal to
provide the plaintiffs with post-termination hearings before a neutral decisionmaker was not
objectively unreasonable, since it was not obvious that the plaintiffs were just-cause employees who
were entitled to this additional measure of process.3 We need not address how the CBA’s termination
would have affected the plaintiffs’ status as just-cause employees under Michigan law because the
plaintiffs allege facts sufficient to show that a reasonable official in Atkins’s position would not have
thought that the CBA was properly terminated. The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, demonstrate that a reasonable official would have known that the CBA was still in effect
during the time period in which the plaintiffs were terminated, that the plaintiffs were just-cause
employees under the CBA, and that it was improper to deny their demands for arbitration.
Atkins points to evidence that she argues shows that it was objectively reasonable for her to
believe that Meadows’s March 2006 letter to Harris terminated the CBA. First, an August 10, 2006,
letter from Harris to Meadows regarding the 36th District’s cancellation of scheduled contract
negotiations acknowledged that “AFSCME Local 3308’s contract expired on June 30, 2006,”
3
Atkins also argues that under Michigan law an agreement to arbitrate grievances only
survives the expiration of a CBA, when the dispute concerns the kinds of rights that vest during the
term of the contract, and that the right not to be discharged except for just cause does not vest, citing
County of Ottawa v. Jaklinski, 377 N.W.2d 668 (Mich. 1985). Atkins contends that she reasonably
believed that the CBA terminated, and, therefore, that the plaintiffs had no contractual right to
arbitration at the time their demands were denied. Whether the plaintiffs had a contractual right to
arbitration under the CBA is a separate question from whether they were just-cause employees with
due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. The latter question is the only question that is
relevant to the qualified immunity analysis.
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suggesting that AFSCME considered the CBA to have terminated and, therefore, that it was
reasonable for Atkins to treat the CBA as terminated as well. Second, an April 12, 2008, letter from
AFSCME’s attorney to a mediator also stated that the parties’ agreement “expired on June 30, 2006.”
Third, on August 24, 2009, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the CBA had expired and that
the plaintiffs in that case had not demonstrated that they had a continuing right to arbitration.4
The plaintiffs counter that with the exception of the August 24, 2009, Michigan Court of
Appeals ruling, which was reversed a month later on a motion for reconsideration, every arbitrator
and state court to consider the issue during the relevant time period found that the CBA was not
properly terminated and remained in effect. Moreover, the plaintiffs argue that it was obvious that
Meadows’s letter did not terminate the CBA under the plain terms of the contract. Article 50
required two steps to terminate the CBA: (1) written notice of intent to terminate the agreement, and
(2) some further action to terminate the contract:
This Agreement shall continue in effect for consecutive yearly periods after
June 30, 2006, unless notice is given, in writing, by either of the Union or the
Employer, to the other party at least ninety (90) days prior to June 30, 2006, or any
anniversary date thereafter, of its desire to modify, amend or terminate this
Agreement.
If such notice is given, this Agreement shall be open to modification,
amendment or termination, as such notice may indicate on June 30, 2006, or the
subsequent anniversary date, as the case may be.
4
Under Article 50, the CBA was to continue after its initial term of July 1, 2001 to June 30,
2006 unless it was effectively terminated by either of the parties. Thus, the CBA could not really
“expire”— it either terminated or continued. It is unclear what AFSCME representatives and the
Michigan Court of Appeals meant when they used the term “expired”: that the CBA’s initial term
had passed or that the CBA was no longer in effect. To the extent that AFSCME representatives and
the Michigan courts treated the CBA as terminated, this may be relevant to whether Atkins was
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
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First, the plaintiffs argue that Meadows’s March 2006 letter expressed “the Court’s intent to
modify, amend, or terminate all or parts of the [CBA]” but did not specify which of those three
options the 36th District intended to pursue. Second, the plaintiffs contend that even if Meadows’s
ambiguous letter did express the 36th District’s intent to terminate the CBA, the 36th District took
no further action to terminate the contract. The Michigan Court of Appeals accepted these arguments
when it held recently that Meadows’s letter did not terminate the CBA:
The first paragraph of article 50 must be understood in light of the second paragraph
that explicitly states the effect of providing notice. “If such notice is given, this
Agreement shall be open to . . . .” The second paragraph indicates that the 90-day
notice is required to preserve the right to modify, amend, or terminate the agreement
on June 30, 2006, or a subsequent anniversary date. The 90-day notice of the “desire
to modify, amend or terminate” the agreement is not itself effective as a modification,
amendment, or termination of the CBA. Rather, the CBA in this case contemplates
some additional action. [The 36th District] does not point to any further action it took
to terminate the agreement. An affidavit from [AFSCME’s] staff representative states
that [the 36th District] “has never communicated in writing that it has terminated the
collective bargaining agreement.” Therefore, the March 1, 2006, letter did not
terminate the CBA because it only referenced an intent to modify, amend, or
terminate.
Furthermore, [the 36th District’s] contention that the March 1 letter resulted in
termination of the CBA ignores the ambiguity of the language in the letter. The letter
referenced [the 36th District’s] intent to “modify, amend or terminate all or parts of
the Labor Agreement . . . .” A notice to terminate must be clear and explicit . . . . A
notice of modification is not a notice of termination and does not affect termination
of the contract. When a party provides a notice that refers to an intent to both modify
and terminate without specifying which one, the ambiguity of the notice destroys its
effectiveness for any purpose . . . .
36th Dist. Court, 815 N.W.2d at 506-07(quoting the reasoning of a prior panel of the court in a
related case, 36th Dist. Court v. AFSCME Local 3308, No. 291643, 2010 WL 2540940, at *2–3
(Mich. Ct. App. June 24, 2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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Rodgers, et al. v. 36th District Court, et al.
No. 11-2201
We hold that the plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to lead a jury to conclude that it was
objectively unreasonable for an official in Atkins’s position to believe that the CBA terminated and,
therefore, that it was objectively unreasonable to fire the plaintiffs and deny their demands for
arbitration. Because the plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact on this point, it would be inappropriate to grant summary judgment to Atkins on the
basis of qualified immunity.
III.
Atkins argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because she merely supervised
Meadows, who handled day-to-day human resources matters, including the plaintiffs’ terminations
and the 36th District’s refusals to arbitrate. She argues that the plaintiffs have not shown that Atkins
encouraged or condoned constitutional violations, as required for her to be liable under § 1983 on a
supervisory liability theory.
The district court found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent of
Atkins’s involvement with the decisions to terminate the plaintiffs and to deny their demands for
arbitration. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider “a district court’s summary judgment order
insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact
for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). The only exception is “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,
370 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that “where the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to
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Rodgers, et al. v. 36th District Court, et al.
No. 11-2201
reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on
interlocutory appeal”) (quoting Wysong v. Heath, 260 F. App’x 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2008)).
The district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact
rested, in part, on an e-mail from Atkins to judges and magistrates discussing the plaintiffs’
terminations. Atkins argues that the e-mail is hearsay evidence, which cannot be considered at the
summary judgment stage, and suggests that the plaintiffs have presented no admissible evidence
demonstrating Atkins’s involvement with the plaintiffs’ terminations. Atkins’s argument fails for
two reasons. First, Atkins’s e-mail is not hearsay, because it is not being offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted therein (that the terminated plaintiffs would not be returning to work). See Fed.
R. Evid. 801(c) (defining “hearsay” as an out-of-court statement that “a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). The plaintiffs offer the e-mail to
demonstrate Atkins’s awareness of and involvement with the decisions to terminate the plaintiffs and
deny arbitration. Second, the district court’s decision also rested on documents from Meadows
suggesting that he lacked authority to make decisions on critical issues. Therefore, the district court’s
determination that there is a reasonable dispute as to Atkins’s involvement with the decisions to
terminate the plaintiffs is not based solely on hearsay, and its conclusion is not “blatantly and
demonstrably false.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 370 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We lack
jurisdiction to consider Atkins’s argument.
IV.
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Rodgers, et al. v. 36th District Court, et al.
No. 11-2201
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Atkins’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
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Rodgers, et al. v. 36th District Court, et al.
No. 11-2201
Martha Craig Daughtrey, concurring. I write separately only to note that we do not have to
reach the question of whether a reasonable official would have known that the CBA was still in effect
at the time the plaintiffs were terminated, because even if a reasonable official would not have known
that the contract was still in effect, Atkins still would not be entitled to qualified immunity. Under
clearly established Michigan law, at the expiration of a labor contract employers may not unilaterally
alter those “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” designated to be
mandatory subjects of bargaining unless and until the parties have reached an impasse in their
contract negotiations. Port Huron Educ. Ass’n MEA/NEA v. Port Huron Area Sch. Dist., 550
N.W.2d 228, 234 (Mich. 1996) (quoting M.C.L. § 423.215(1)). “This prohibition against unilateral
action prior to impasse serves to foster labor peace and must be liberally construed.” Local 1467,
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Portage, 352 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). Grievance and
arbitration procedures are mandatory subjects of bargaining under Michigan law, just as they are
under federal law labor law. County of Ottawa v. Jaklinski, 377 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Mich. 1985).
Hence, a reasonable official in Atkins’s position should have known that, even if the contract had
expired, the plaintiffs were nonetheless entitled to the grievance procedures mandated by the CBA,
at least until an impasse had been reached in the contract negotiations between the union and the 36th
District.
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