United States v. Rene Rodriguez

FILED
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Nov 12, 2013
File Name: 13a0966n.06 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
No. 11-3922
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
RENE RODRIGUEZ, ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
) DISTRICT OF OHIO
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
OPINION
Before: ROGERS, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Rene Rodriguez appeals a judgment of
conviction and a corresponding sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment for one count of conspiracy
to distribute cocaine and marijuana and a separate count for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The sole issue that he raises is the propriety of the district
court’s admission into evidence of certain statements of one of Rodriguez’s alleged co-conspirators
through the testimony of another alleged co-conspirator.1 Rodriguez contends that the district court
failed to determine whether the statements satisfied the foundational requirements of Federal Rule
1
In the “Summary of the Argument” portion of his brief, Rodriguez also contends that he
“was denied his due process right to a fair trial because the Government engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct by vouching for the truthfulness of Government witnesses who entered into plea
agreements[,]” but no mention of this allegation is to be found anywhere else in the brief.
Accordingly, we consider the issue waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 10.
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United States v. Rodriguez
of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(2)(E) and that its decision to admit the statements into evidence was,
therefore, erroneous. The Government counters that Rodriguez waived his current challenge to the
statements when his counsel withdrew an objection to them at trial and, if not, that there was no
plain error in their admission into evidence.
We conclude that, under our precedents, the Government has the better argument today, and,
for reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
I.
In November 2010, Rodriguez was charged with two counts of criminal conduct in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C. § 846: (1) conspiracy to distribute
more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana from 2005 to 2009 and
(2) conspiracy to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in May 2010. Rodriguez pleaded not
guilty to the charges, and his jury trial began on January 24, 2011.
Over the course of several days, a number of Rodriguez’s alleged co-conspirators, including
Nicholas See, Robert Martin, Mark Kitsos, and Andrew Arnold, testified to his involvement in the
charged conspiracies. In all, more than twenty witnesses testified against Rodriguez. Additionally,
See, Martin, Kitsos, and Arnold all pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine or marijuana
in amounts that ranged from “more than 5 kilograms” to 150 kilograms of cocaine and from 1,000
to 3,000 kilograms of marijuana.
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During See’s testimony, Rodriguez’s counsel made—and subsequently withdrew—the
objection at issue in this appeal, which is reflected in the following exchange between the
Government prosecutor (AUSA), See, Rodriguez’s counsel (RC), and the district judge:
AUSA: Now, between 2005 and 2006, did you ever talk with Rob Martin or
Mark Kitsos about where they were receiving their cocaine?
SEE: Yes.
AUSA: Did you talk to them about where they were receiving their
marijuana?
SEE: Yes.
AUSA: Now, what did they tell you about that? First of all, who did you talk
to first about it?
SEE: Mark originally.
AUSA: What did Mark tell you about it?
RC: Objection.
JUDGE: Basis?
RC: Hearsay.
JUDGE: Sidebar.
[During sidebar:]
JUDGE: You object to what Martin said.2 Is that right?
RC: Right.
JUDGE: Isn’t Martin one of the coconspirators [sic, throughout]?
AUSA: He’s a coconspirator for the purpose of this conversation.
JUDGE: The basis of your objection is hearsay. Is that right?
RC: Right.
2
As the Government observes, (Br. at 7 n.2), the portion of See’s testimony to which
Rodriguez’s counsel objected concerned Kitsos’s alleged statements rather than Martin’s, but the
misstatement is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal.
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AUSA: It’s not hearsay because it’s a coconspirator statement.
JUDGE: Why would it not come in under the coconspirator statement?
RC: There hasn’t been an evidentiary basis for it. If he’s going to testify,
then I will withdraw the objection.
JUDGE: Well, in the Sixth Circuit, there are a number of ways that you can do
it. All the government has to do to establish through its presentation
of evidence is by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a
conspiracy, then you can allow the coconspirator—I could have a
mini hearing, or I could take the evidence as it’s been presented and
determine based on the evidence presented that there is some
evidence of a conspiracy.
Now, there has been some evidence presented thus far that there are
a number of individuals involved in this distribution chain.
RC: If I may, if these individuals are going to be called as witnesses, then
I’m not going to object, because—
JUDGE: Are they being called?
AUSA: Mr. Martin and Mr. Kitsos, we need their testimony to corroborate
the existence of the conspiracy.
JUDGE: They’re going to be called as witnesses?
AUSA: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE: You withdraw the objection?
RC: I withdraw the objection.
JUDGE: The objection is withdrawn. Please continue.
(R.E. # 92, PageID # 679-81.)
In its guilty verdict, the jury attributed 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 100 kilograms
or more of marijuana to Rodriguez on the first count against him and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine
on the second count. On August 12, 2011, the district court found that Rodriguez qualified as a
career offender and sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment. Rodriguez timely appealed.
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II.
Appellate review is, of necessity, limited to issues addressed by the court below. Poss v.
Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 663 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)).
This rule serves several purposes, among them enabling litigants to offer all the evidence they
believe relevant to the issues and preventing them from being prejudiced by final decisions “of
issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120
(quotation omitted). Although the rule is not a jurisdictional bar, we will deviate from it only “‘in
exceptional cases or particular circumstances, or when the rule would produce a plain miscarriage
of justice.’” Poss, 260 F.3d at 664 (quoting Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 838
F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988)); accord Fifth Third Bank v. Lincoln Fin. Sec. Corp., 453 F. App’x
589, 596 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his court has generally focused on whether the issues was properly
raised before the district court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Forfeited issues are one such
exception, and we review them for plain error. E.g., United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157 (6th
Cir. 1996).
Forfeiture occurs when a party fails “to make the timely assertion of a right.” United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). This is distinct from waiver, which is the “‘intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d
1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 733). Rights that a party waives “are not
reviewable” on appeal. Id.
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The Government contends that, in withdrawing his objection to See’s testimony about
Kitsos’s statements, Rodriguez’s counsel waived any challenge to the testimony on appeal.
(Appellee Br. at 13.) But the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in which we have
found waiver. In Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1088, and United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176,
182 (6th Cir. 1990), for example, we determined that counsel “agree[d] in open court with a judge’s
proposed course of conduct and then charge[d] the court with error in following that course.” Here,
the district judge did not make a finding as to the admissibility of See’s challenged testimony, only
implying that he was likely to find the testimony admissible. Additionally, Rodriguez’s counsel did
not explicitly concede that the testimony was admissible.
By contrast, in United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2006), we applied plain
error review to factually similar circumstances. In Chambers, defense counsel’s objection to a
police officer’s testimony about the hearsay statements of a third-party witness was at issue. Id. at
455. We concluded as follows:
[D]efense counsel initially objected, but then withdrew his objection. The district
court clarified that there was no objection to the testimony, defense counsel
responded, “let it roll,” and [the officer] proceeded to testify regarding [the third
party’s] statements. Because counsel withdrew the exception, this Court reviews the
admissibility of the hearsay statements for plain error.
Id.
In Chambers, we did not characterize defense counsel’s conduct as either forfeiture or
waiver, see id., but by applying plain error review we either construed it as forfeiture or decided to
review it notwithstanding, see Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1088 (“[W]e do not foreclose appellate
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review for plain error when the interests of justice demand otherwise[.]” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). Like defense counsel in Chambers, Rodriguez’s counsel objected to
testimony and then withdrew the objection without explicitly conceding admissibility. We therefore
apply plain error review in this case as well, under which Rodriguez bears the burden of proof.
United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 831-32 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Plain error exists only “where there is [1] an error [2] that is plain, [3] that affects the
defendant’s substantial rights and [4] that, in our discretionary review, seriously affects the
fundamental fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Sanders, 404 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). This generally means that the error “must have been
prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S.
at 734 (citation omitted).
Here, assuming arguendo that the district court’s admission of See’s testimony about
Kitsos’s statements was plainly erroneous, Rodriguez still would have to prove that it affected his
fundamental rights and the outcome of the proceedings. This would require him to overcome the
remainder of See’s testimony, the testimony of Kitsos, Martin, and Arnold, and the testimony of the
Government’s other witnesses. Rodriguez contends that See’s testimony “identified [him] as the
source of cocaine and marijuana which See was receiving from Robert Martin and Mark Kitsos” and
improperly bolstered their subsequent testimony. (Appellant Br. at 17.) But this claim, if credited,
does not demonstrate prejudice. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Martin and Kitsos were only two of
more than twenty witnesses who implicated Rodriguez in the charged conspiracies, (see supra Part
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I), and See, like Martin, Kitsos, and all of the other witnesses who testified after him, was subject
to cross-examination, cf. United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)). Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine how See’s
testimony about Kitsos’s statements adversely could have affected either Rodriguez’s substantial
rights or the proceedings in which Rodriguez was convicted. See Sanders, 404 F.3d at 984.
Further, it is not at all clear that the district court’s admission of Kitsos’s statements through
See’s testimony was erroneous in the first place. As the district judge noted during the sidebar,
(Page ID # 681), to properly admit the statements into evidence under FRE 801(d)(2)(E), he needed
only find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) Rodriguez was part
of the conspiracy, and (3) Kitsos’s statements were made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United
States v. Warren, 578 F.3d 320, 335 (6th Cir. 2009). When Rodriguez’s counsel objected, the
district judge already was persuaded that “there ha[d] been some evidence presented thus far that
there [we]re a number of individuals involved in this distribution chain.” (R.E. # 92, Page ID #
681.) Under these circumstances, there likely was no error of any kind, and there certainly was no
plain error, in the district court’s admission of See’s testimony about Kitsos’s statements.
Accordingly, Rodriguez’s challenge must fail.
III.
Because the only challenge that Rodriguez raises on appeal does not demonstrate plain error,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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