United States v. Ronald Finch

BATCHELDER,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority as to all issues except the question of the coerced confession. As to that issue, I concur in the majority’s holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s actions in response to the officers’ threat to arrest all of the occupants of the house were the functional equivalent of a confession that was involuntarily made. And, I concur in part in the majority’s reversal of the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the defendant’s confession. However, because I believe that the confession as it relates to ownership of the cocaine must be distinguished from the cocaine that was obtained from that confession, I would remand to the district court for a determination of whether the discovery of the cocaine was inevitable despite the coerced confession.

Evidence obtained from a coerced confession may still be admissible against a defendant if the discovery of the evidence was inevitable. In Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that evidence obtained unlawfully will not be suppressed if the government can prove that the evidence inevitably would have been obtained through lawful means. 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (discovery of murder victim’s body by volunteers inevitable despite illegally obtained confession). The Court explained that “if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Id. A panel of this Court in United States v. Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir.1990), noted the requirements for application of the inevitable discovery rule:

(1) a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means but for the police misconduct; (2) that the police possessed the leads making the discovery inevitable at the time of the misconduct; and (3) that the police were actively pursuing [an] alternative line of investigation prior to the misconduct.

Id. (quoting United States v. Webb, 796 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.2d 846 (1987)).

This inevitable discovery rule may very well apply here since the officers entered the house with both probable cause and pursuant to a valid search warrant. The police lawfully could have searched the rafters in the garage under that warrant, and there is a “reasonable probability” that the cocaine would have been found by them. The police knew that they were searching for cocaine, and they were in the process of searching pursuant to the valid warrant at the time that defendant confessed. This ease is unlike the situation in which the police enter a home without probable cause and without a valid search warrant and then obtain evidence unlawfully through a coerced confession or otherwise. Buchanan, 904 F.2d at 356 (drugs would not have been found without warrant-less entry of home without probable cause). See United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1103 (5th Cir.1991) (inevitable discovery rule applied where police on way to get warrant).

If the inevitable discovery rule does apply here, then the cocaine evidence would be admissible against Finch. However, the unlawfully obtained confession still must be suppressed, and accordingly the defendant’s act of showing the police the cocaine, which we have held is the equivalent of a confession that he owned the cocaine, could not be used at trial.

The government bears the burden of proving that the inevitable discovery rule applies. United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc) (citing cases). The government did not address the issue on appeal because the defendant’s brief did not squarely raise the issue of a coerced confession; rather the defendant’s brief was directed toward the officers’ failure to give him his Miranda warnings. Although the issue of an involuntary confession was raised generally in defendant’s motion to suppress, neither the government nor the district court raised the issue at the trial level. Therefore, I would remand the case to the district court to make findings as to whether the cocaine is admissible against Finch because the officers inevitably would have found it under the valid search warrant that they were in the process of executing at the time of the confession. See United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.1991) (remand to examine inevitable discovery exception since no record made at district court). If the district court determines that the inevitable, discovery rule does apply to the cocaine, I would hold that the district court nevertheless should permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because his confession, which goes to his ownership of the admissible cocaine, must be suppressed.

Accordingly, I would reverse the district court in that the confession was involuntarily given and thus must be suppressed, but remand on the issue of whether the cocaine is admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.