Sylvia James v. Hilliard Hampton

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0108n.06
No. 12-1453 FILED
Jan 30, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SYLVIA JAMES, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
HILLIARD HAMPTON, THE CITY OF INKSTER, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
DAVID JONES, DEBORAH GREEN, PAMELA ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
ANDERSON, PAUL FISCHER, THE JUDICIAL ) MICHIGAN
TENURE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF )
MICHIGAN, and VALDEMAR WASHINGTON, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: COLE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; GWIN, District Judge*
GWIN, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Sylvia James, a now-former state-court judge,
sues the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission and various state and local officials that removed
her from office. She sued in federal court though related matters were then before Michigan
administrative bodies and Michigan courts. Citing the then-ongoing state disciplinary proceedings
against James, the district court invoked Younger and Burford abstention and dismissed the lawsuit.
The Younger and Burford doctrines counsel federal courts against interfering with state legal
proceedings.
*
The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.
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While we agree that this case qualifies for Younger abstention, we nonetheless reverse the
district court’s dismissal. Instead of dismissing the case, the district court should have stayed the
case until the state proceedings had concluded because James sought money damages in addition to
equitable relief. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual Background
In this case, James seeks a federal forum to review acts of the Michigan Judicial Tenure
Commission (JTC) when it investigated and disciplined her. On September 7, 2010, Hilliard
Hampton, the City of Inkster’s mayor, and the Inkster City Council hired David Jones, an attorney,
to investigate James, who was then a state-district-court judge. In February 2011, after conducting
an investigation, Jones filed a grievance with the JTC alleging that James abused her office.
The Michigan Constitution establishes the nine-member JTC to oversee the discipline of
Michigan’s judiciary. Mich. Const. art. 6 § 30. The Commission includes five judges, two attorneys
and two lay persons. Id. When the Commission receives a grievance, it “direct[s] that an
investigation be conducted to determine whether a complaint should be filed and a hearing held.”
Mich. Ct. R. 9.207(B). If the Commission files a formal complaint, it then conducts a hearing, which
“must conform as nearly as possible to the rules of procedure and evidence governing the trial of
civil actions in the circuit court.” Mich. Ct. R. 9.211(A). The Michigan Supreme Court may appoint
a master to conduct this hearing and issue a report. Mich. Ct. R. 9.210; 9.214.
Upon “[t]he affirmative vote of 5 commission members who have considered the report of
the master and any objections” the Commission may recommend to the Michigan Supreme Court
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that a judge be removed from office. Mich. Ct. R. 9.220(A). The Michigan Supreme Court then
review[s] the record of the proceedings and file[s] a written opinion and judgment,
which may accept or reject the recommendations of the commission, or modify the
recommendations by imposing a greater, lesser, or entirely different sanction. When
appropriate, the Court may remand the matter to the commission for further
proceedings, findings, or explication.
Mich. Ct. R. 9.225. Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court may, if cause is shown, order that further
evidence be taken and added to the original record.” Mich. Ct. R. 9.224(E). The Michigan system
thus gives the Michigan Supreme Court the ultimate authority over judicial discipline. Importantly,
the Michigan system also affords parties the ability to offer additional evidence to the Michigan
Supreme Court. See id.
On October 26, 2011, the JTC filed a complaint against James. The complaint alleged that
James misappropriated public funds, violated various employment provisions governing Michigan’s
courts, neglected her official duties, and made deceptive statements to the JTC. Retired Judge Ann
Mattson served as the Master.
On January 17, 2012, the Master conducted a pretrial hearing, and, on January 23, 2012, a
full hearing began.1 The parties dispute whether the Master stopped James from raising
constitutional claims, including the claims that her office safe was searched and that potentially
exculpatory materials in that safe were destroyed.2
1
Neither party filed with either this Court, or the district court, a complete transcript of the
apparently voluminous proceedings before Michigan’s judicial system, making our account of events
inevitably incomplete.
2
In particular, they dispute how the following colloquy during the January 23, 2012, hearing
should be understood:
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Meanwhile, on January 20, 2012—three days after the preliminary hearing before the Master,
and three days before the full hearing began—James filed this action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In six counts, she alleged violations of her constitutional
rights, her right to certain documents, as well as defamation and “political conspiracy.” She sought
injunctive relief against the JTC proceedings, as well as damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
On April 5, 2012, the district court dismissed the case. The court held that Younger
abstention, or, in the alternative, Burford abstention, required it to refrain from ruling on James’s
claims while the state proceedings remained ongoing. This appeal followed.3
James argues that the district court should not have dismissed her complaint. She says that
Younger and Burford abstention are inappropriate because no case was pending in state court when
The Master: You wanted to make a request to make a request.
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: I wanted to request the opportunity to make a record on the
Federal Constitutional Issues, which in this proceeding thus far have not been
addressed, and—
The Master: We have talked about that at the bench.
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: We have talked about that at the bench, and my understanding
is that you have declined to allow me to make that record.
The Master: Yes, I have declined to allow you to make a record about that, but not
to make the record that you requested to make.
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: Thank you, yes. And that we will end these proceedings on
Monday at 1:00 and that—
The Master: At this point, I’ll make a further record on that.
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: You’ll make that. Okay.
James says that this colloquy shows that the state proceedings foreclosed her from presenting her
federal claims. Appellees say otherwise.
3
Meanwhile, on May 27, 2012, the Master finalized her findings, and, on July 31, 2012, the
Michigan Supreme Court issued an opinion removing James from office. See In re James, 821 N.W.
2d 144 (Mich. 2012).
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she filed this action. Furthermore, she says that the state proceedings did not provide an adequate
opportunity to raise her constitutional claims. She also claims that even if abstention was
appropriate, the district court should have stayed proceedings rather than dismissing her complaint
because she seeks damages in addition to equitable relief.
In response, Appellees Judicial Tenure Commission of the State of Michigan, Paul Fischer,
Deborah Green, and Valdemar Washington (“State Defendants”) say that the district court correctly
found that the criteria for abstention were met. They alternatively argue that Eleventh Amendment
immunity protects them from suit. Defendants Hilliard Hampton, the City of Inkster, David Jones,
and Pamela Anderson (“Inkster Defendants”) likewise say that Younger and Burford abstention are
appropriate. Furthermore, the Inkster Defendants say that James’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and that Noerr-Pennington immunity insulates them from suit for
some claims.
II. Analysis
“Younger v. Harris and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). Thus, where a state proceeding deals with issues involved in the federal
court suit, the federal court abstains until the conclusion of the state proceeding. A three-part test
controls when such abstention is appropriate: “(1) there must be on-going state judicial proceedings;
(2) those proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Squire v. Coughlan, 469
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F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). We review a district court’s decision
to abstain de novo. Id.
A. Younger Abstention
This case falls within this Court’s existing Younger abstention jurisprudence. We break no
new ground to find that when James filed this lawsuit, there were ongoing state judicial proceedings
that involved important state interests. We acknowledge some uncertainty regarding whether James
was prevented from raising constitutional claims in the January 27, 2012, hearing. But we cannot
conclusively determine that, at the time this lawsuit was filed, James would have no adequate
opportunity to raise her federal claims at some point during the state proceedings. Accordingly, we
agree with the district court that abstention was appropriate.
We evaluate the propriety of a district court’s decision to abstain as of the date the lawsuit
was filed. See Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 925 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“‘[T]he proper time of reference for determining the applicability of Younger abstention is the time
that the federal complaint is filed.’ Under this rule, if a state proceeding is pending at the time the
action is filed in federal court, the first criteria for Younger abstention is satisfied.”) (quoting Zalman
v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir.1986)). That is, we consider whether there were ongoing
state judicial proceedings, implicating important state interests when James filed her complaint. If
so, then abstention is appropriate.
1. “On-going state judicial proceedings”
The proceedings before the Judicial Tenure Commission are “judicial in nature.” Middlesex
Cnty., 457 U.S. at 433-34; see also O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008); Squire,
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469 F.3d at 555-56. James apparently concedes this point as she does not contest it in her briefing.
Still, James says that the state disciplinary proceeding “was not currently pending when this
case was filed.” As she would have it, the state proceeding did not begin until January 23, 2012, the
date that the JTC complaint hearing on the merits commenced, and three days after she filed this
lawsuit.
For Younger abstention purposes, state law controls the determination of when the state
proceedings began. See O’Neill, 511 F.3d at 643. Michigan’s Supreme Court has yet to squarely
address when Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings begin. But in considering Ohio’s judicial
regulatory scheme, we explained that “the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the filing of a grievance
is the beginning of the judicial process.” Id. We see no reason to question that result. We agree
with the district court that the state proceedings against James began before her January 20, 2012,
district-court filing, and most likely with the filing of the JTC’s formal complaint on October 26,
2011.4 Accordingly, we find that the state judicial proceedings were ongoing when James filed this
lawsuit.
4
In a rhetorical flourish, James says that “[i]f the mere filing of the JTC’s formal complaint
was the start of the judicial proceedings for the purposes of Younger abstention, Judge James would
have had no opportunity to bring her Federal Constitutional claims to the attention of the Federal
Court because she did not even know such claims definitively existed until the JTC filed its
complaint.” Indeed, the point of Younger abstention is a “national policy forbidding federal courts
to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Younger itself concerned a plaintiff’s attempt to enjoin the
enforcement of a state statute that he claimed was unconstitutional. James’s argument here contests
not so much the filing dates, but Younger’s third prong, the availability of relief in the state
proceedings.
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2. “Important state interests”
James does not challenge that JTC proceedings involve an important state interest. We have
already recognized that a state’s interest in disciplining its judges is an “important state interest” for
purposes of Younger abstention. Squire, 469 F.3d at 556. We need not revisit that determination.
3. “Adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges”
Finally, Younger abstention requires that “[a] plaintiff must have ‘an adequate opportunity
in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.’” Squire, 469 F.3d at 556 (quoting Berger
v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993)). That is, “[u]nless state law clearly
bars the imposition of the constitutional claims,” abstention is appropriate. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 425 (1979); see also Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir. 1996). And the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that the state procedurally barred the presentation of her claims. See
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987); Moore, 442 U.S. at 432; Feiger, 74 F.3d at 746.
“[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings,
a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence
of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15. Thus the relevant question
is not whether James raised her claims in the state proceeding, but whether state law clearly
foreclosed her from so doing at the time she filed this lawsuit. It did not.
Appellant’s JTC hearing was required to “conform as nearly as possible to the rules of
procedure and evidence governing the trial of civil actions in the Circuit court [of Michigan].” Mich.
Ct. R. 9.211(A). Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court reviews the JTC’s findings. On review,
“[t]he Supreme Court may, if cause is shown, order that further evidence be taken and added to the
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original record. Mich. Ct. R. 9.224(E). Accordingly, we find that James could have raised her
federal constitutional claims in the state proceedings either at her JTC hearing or during judicial
review of the JTC decision.5
James relies on her attorney’s January 27, 2012, colloquy with the Master to claim the
contrary. She quotes, in particular, the Master’s statement, “I have declined to allow you to make
a record about that, but not to make the record that you requested to make.” Within the context of
months of state proceedings, this statement means little. Whatever else may be said of this
statement, it does not “clearly bar the imposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore, 442 U.S. at
425 (emphasis added). Indeed moments later, the Master said, “I’ll make a further record on that.”
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that James was completely foreclosed from raising her federal
claims in state court when she filed this lawsuit. Since all three conditions for Younger abstention
were met, the district court properly abstained from reaching the merits of James’s complaint.
B. Remedy
While abstention is appropriate, “a federal court’s discretion to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction does not extend so far as to permit a court to dismiss or remand, as opposed to stay, an
action at law.” Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 448 F.3d 910, 913 (6th Cir. 2006);
see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (“[F]ederal courts have the
5
We also note that James’s briefing in the Michigan Supreme Court suggests not that she was
foreclosed from arguing constitutional issues in the Michigan Supreme Court, but instead that she
declined to do so. See Brief for James, In re James, 821 N.W. 2d 144 (Mich. 2012) (No. 143942),
2012 WL 2935926. Yet we leave it to the district court to more fully consider this issue when the
state proceedings conclude.
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power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being sought
is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”); Gray v. Bush, 628 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In the
context of a complaint seeking ‘both equitable [relief] and money damages,’ as in this case, ‘a
federal court’s discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction does not extend so far as to permit
a court to dismiss or remand, as opposed to stay, an action at law.’”) (quoting Superior Beverage
Co., 448 F.3d at 913). Instead, “[t]he District Court should stay [the] federal lawsuit to protect
against the possibility that [Appellant] could be deprived of the opportunity to present the merits of
her damages claims in state court.” Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (6th
Cir. 1998).
For relief, James seeks an “[a]ward [of] damages, attorneys’ fees and costs against the
Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff in an amount in excess of $75,000 and to the extent permitted
by federal and state law.” This monetary demand is sufficient to warrant a stay and not dismissal
in this case.
The State Defendants quote Eidson v. State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services
for the proposition that “a district court deciding to abstain under Younger has the option of either
dismissing the case without prejudice or holding the case in abeyance.” 510 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 866 (6th Cir. 2006)). Taken out of context, this
quotation oversimplifies our precedents. Eidson actually held that “prerequisite to obtaining any . . .
tolling relief . . . is the timely filing of the § 1983 action that will prompt abstention during the
pendency of related state proceedings.” 510 F.3d at 641. In other words, a party might lose a § 1983
claim if the district court dismisses the proceeding and the statue of limitations then runs during the
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course of the ongoing state proceedings.
The above quotation from Eidson comes from Coles v. Granville. 448 F.3d at 866. Coles
likewise concerned a considerably more complicated context than the broad discretion State
Defendants propose. First, Coles relies on Carroll. And Carroll held that “the District Court should
have stayed, not dismissed, Carroll’s complaint” because it contained damages claims. 139 F.3d at
1075. Second, Coles went on to say that plaintiff “has no injury necessary to make his case ripe for
federal review. On this basis alone, the district court's dismissal without prejudice, in lieu of
abstention, was not an abuse of discretion.” 448 F.3d at 866. Thus, Coles is best read in conjunction
with our other precedents for the proposition that when a plaintiff’s claim is not yet ripe, Younger
abstention permits dismissal and does not require holding in abeyance.6 Because Defendants have
not argued that James’s claims are not ripe, we do not address this argument.
As this Court has said before, “[r]equiring the District Court to stay rather than dismiss
damages claims may be an empty formality under the facts of this case.” Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075.
Admittedly, “[t]he District Court may have nothing left to do but clear the case number off of its
6
Such a reading also comports with MacDonald v. Village of Northport, 164 F.3d 964 (6th
Cir. 1999). We have previously explained the reach of MacDonald,
This Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the case because “the
Burford abstention doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment created ‘grounds together’
to dismiss [the] case.” The MacDonald court explicitly recognized that Quackenbush
held that “a dismissal based on abstention is appropriate only where the relief sought
is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”
Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 448 F.3d 910, 914 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted) (quoting MacDonald, 164 F.3d at 973, 969 n.4).
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docket once the state proceedings conclude.” Id. Yet if James prevails on her claims in the state
proceedings, then her action would still be pending, and she would not have to contend with statutes
of limitation defenses. See id.; Adrian Energy Assoc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 481 F.3d 414,
425 (6th Cir.2007). These concerns compel us to reverse the district court’s judgment and remand
the case.
This case illustrates the propriety of this course. The district court, evaluating the state
proceedings at an embryonic stage, found that James would have numerous further opportunities to
address her constitutional claims in the state proceedings. See James v. Hampton, No. 2-10273,
2012 WL 1154303, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. 2011).7 By abstaining, it avoided interfering with the state
proceedings, assuming instead that the state would give James an opportunity to raise any federal
claims. At the conclusion of the state proceedings, with the entirety of the state record in front of
it, the district court can evaluate whether James was in fact foreclosed from raising her constitutional
claims. It may also find grounds to dismiss the case, such as preclusion. But staying the case,
instead of dismissing it, precludes any statute of limitations issues and avoids any difficulties of
service.
Moreover, because the district court will evaluate other potential grounds for dismissal on
remand, we need not reach them today. Even in abstention cases, “we generally do not reach issues
not ruled upon by the district court.” Adrian, 481 F.3d at 420; see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at
7
Indeed, to the extent that James alleges violation of her rights under Cleveland Board. of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984), these claims may not have been ripe until she
was removed from office, which did not occur until after she filed her opening brief in this case.
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731. Indeed, because abstention is an abdication of jurisdiction, not an exercise thereof, it would be
improper to reach the alternate grounds for affirmance proposed by Appellees. Cf. Coughlan, 511
F.3d at 641 (“Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather based on ‘strong
policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n
v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986)).
For similar reasons, we need not consider Burford abstention. Our previous decisions
abstaining from cases entangled with state judicial disciplinary proceedings against judges rely on
Younger. See, e.g., O’Neill, 511 F.3d at 643; Squire, 469 F.3d at 553. There is no reason to depart
from that course today. Where abstention is appropriate, both doctrines require a district court to
stay a complaint seeking money damages. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731; Carroll, 139 F.3d at
1076. This case’s disposition would remain the same.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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