Leonard R. McGUIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by attorney Gerald Benjamin from a reduction in attorney fees claimed after Benjamin successfully represented a claimant in a social security disability benefits case. Benjamin and the claimant were parties to a twenty-five percent contingent fee contract. The benefits awarded amounted to $21,924.50, and Benjamin claimed a fee of $3,969.50, supported by recapitulated time records indicating 31% hours of work.¹ This results in an hourly rate, if one is computed, of $125 per hour. The district court found the time spent to be reasonable, but only awarded $3,175. In its order, the court stated:

It should be noted that the amount, which has been approved by this Court, is less than that requested by McGuire’s counsel. While this Court believes that the time, which was expended by Benjamin on behalf of his client, was reasonable, the standard rate of fees for attorneys within this geographical area for work in a case of this kind is $100.00 per hour.

Neither the Secretary nor the claimant contested the fees originally claimed by Benjamin. The Secretary has filed no brief on appeal and has indicated that there is still no objection to the original fee request.

This case is a companion case to Royzer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 900 F.2d 981 (6th Cir.1990), decided this date, involving attorney Benjamin and a similar fee reduction request. We reversed in Royzer and we believe the opinion in that case is controlling here. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for the entry of a fee award in the amount originally claimed.

1 . The fee sought by Benjamin computes to only eighteen percent of the accrued benefits ultimately received by the claimant. This is explained by regulations promulgated by the Secretary as to the cut-off point for computing attorney fees, as well as our decision in Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529, 538 (6th Cir.1972), where we held: “In no event should the fee exceed 25% of the past-due benefits that would have been due if judgment had been rendered within three months of the submission of the Secretary’s reply brief_”