Jeremy Garrett v. Belmont County Sheriff's Dep't

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 10a0205n.06
No. 08-3978 FILED
Apr 01, 2010
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JEREMY GARRETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
BELMONT COUNTY SHERIFF’S SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
DEPARTMENT; BELMONT COUNTY JAIL,
Defendants-Appellees.
/ OPINION
BEFORE: SILER, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Jeremy Garrett, an Ohio state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the July 9, 2008 sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
All facts are taken from the complaint and from Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) since those were the facts considered by the district
court in its order. Plaintiff alleges that his wife was incarcerated or detained by the Belmont County
Sheriff’s Department (“Belmont”) and was placed on suicide watch while in Belmont’s custody
No. 08-3978
because she had attempted suicide. She was subsequently released on “probation/bond” for some
time; while on release, she again attempted suicide. (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 5, Pl.’s Obj. to R&R, 2).
Plaintiff further alleges that Belmont placed his wife in a mental facility where she continued to
threaten to commit suicide through letters to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s wife was again released on bond
and then succeeded in committing suicide shortly thereafter.
Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly tried to get prison guards and other officials working for
Belmont to investigate the matter when his wife sent him numerous letters between February 6,
2006, and February 28, 2006 threatening to commit suicide. He alleges that, instead of investigating
the matter, Defendants mocked him and ignored his request for help. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that
he and his children suffered emotional distress because of the loss of their loved one, resulting from
Defendants’ conduct.
Plaintiff was incarcerated by Belmont at all relevant times and is scheduled to remain
incarcerated until 2012. He and his wife have six children, and the pleadings fail to make clear their
current situation now that Plaintiff’s wife is deceased. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, burial
costs, counseling costs, and an investigation of the prison guards and sheriff’s employees implicated,
the county jail, and the sheriff’s department (collectively “Defendants”).
Plaintiff filed a complaint, proceeding pro se, on May 9, 2008, along with a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis in district court, alleging Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
violations raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on
June 19, 2008 when the magistrate judge filed a R&R recommending that Plaintiff’s case be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R on June 27, 2008 and the district court entered an order on July
9, 2008 adopting the magistrate judge’s R&R with some additional reasoning. This timely appeal
followed, which resulted in the case being remanded to the district court to determine whether
Plaintiff could proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. On February 5, 2009, the district court entered
an order directing partial payments for filing fees on appeal and certifying that the appeal is not being
taken in good faith, and on August 6, 2009 the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for counsel
on appeal. Plaintiff also appeals the denial of his request for counsel on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se litigant’s claim
at the pre-docketing screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim.
Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007). All well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
must be accepted as true at this stage of the litigation. Id. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (Courts must “consider the factual allegations in [the] complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”). Pro se complaints are to be held “to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and should therefore be construed
liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712
(6th Cir. 2004). Liberal construction of pro se complaints can include additional allegations set forth
in objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R at the discretion of the district court and this Court. See
Ratliff v. United States, 999 F.2d 1023, 1026 (6th Cir. 1993) (construing additional allegations in pro
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se petitioner’s objections to magistrate judge’s R&R as part of allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel in habeas corpus proceeding); Sellers v. Morris, 840 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
Because the complaint initially appears on its face to raise claims related to Plaintiff’s prison
conditions due to the prison guards’ alleged actions ignoring his requests for assistance, at first
glance it would appear that the restrictions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) would
apply. This Circuit has held that district courts have no discretion to allow leave to amend to avoid
sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir.
1997). However, the PLRA did not abrogate the discretion to liberally construe pro se complaints.
See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (continuing to liberally construe pro se
complaints from prisoners under PLRA). Because this Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations once
liberally construed are best interpreted as falling outside the scope of the PLRA, our Circuit’s
limitation on the authority to grant leave to amend is no longer applicable. See Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 203-05 (2007) (discussing the policy goals of PLRA as specifically targeting prisoner
lawsuits regarding prison conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (“The court shall on its own motion
or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983]. . . .”) (emphasis added).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges essentially two claims that are both actually better understood as raised in
his capacity as the legal representative of his deceased wife: 1) an Eighth Amendment claim for
failure to provide appropriate medical treatment on behalf of his wife; and 2) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on substantive due process for failure to assist his wife when she was
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suicidal. While Plaintiff might also be claiming that his own constitutional rights were violated by
the prison and its employees, especially in light of the damages sought, taking both his complaint
and objections to the R&R together, his arguments are primarily directed at the two claims on behalf
of his wife. On both claims, the district court erred by failing to liberally construe Plaintiff’s
complaint to argue a theory upon which relief could be granted – namely that Belmont and the other
Defendants failed to provide proper medical treatment and were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
wife’s life during the time in which she was in state custody, particularly in the mental institution.
Instead, for both claims, the district court found that since Mrs. Garrett was released on bond at the
time of her suicide, the state did not have a special relationship with her and she was not in custody;
therefore, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
A. Standing
As an initial matter, this Court must consider whether Plaintiff is raising a claim based on
an infringement of his own constitutional rights or of his wife’s rights. In this Circuit “a § 1983
claim is ‘entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.’” Barber v. Overton,
496 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir.
2000)); see also Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 242 (6th Cir. 1984). Therefore, only the victim or
her estate’s representative may bring a § 1983 claim, and “no cause of action may lie under § 1983
for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly
suffered personally by the victim’s family members.” Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357. Those kinds of
injuries are appropriately raised in a state tort law cause of action.
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Plaintiff alleges some injuries that would not be cognizable as § 1983 claims under Barber
and Claybrook, namely, Plaintiff’s and his children’s distress at the loss of their loved one. See
Barber, 496 F.3d at 457-58; Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357-58. The district court implicitly construed
the complaint as bringing a cause of action implicating Mrs. Garrett’s constitutional rights as well.
However, interpreting Plaintiff’s claim as raising Mrs. Garrett’s constitutional rights as her estate’s
representative, the question then becomes whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he is the
legal representative of her estate. Again, construing his complaint liberally, Plaintiff has clearly
alleged that he is Mrs. Garrett’s surviving spouse. Under Ohio law, if Mrs. Garrett died intestate and
all of her children are also Plaintiff’s children, which Plaintiff also alleges, then Plaintiff would be
entitled to the entire estate as the surviving spouse. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2105.06(B) (2009).
As the sole person entitled to inherit under Ohio intestacy law, Plaintiff is the most appropriate legal
representative of the estate. Therefore, since Plaintiff did allege that he is her spouse and that Mrs.
Garrett is deceased, this Court interprets that allegation as sufficient to state a claim that Plaintiff is
the legal representative of Mrs. Garrett’s estate.
B. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation for failure to give appropriate medical
attention to his wife. In order to state a claim under this theory, Plaintiff must show that his wife was
a prisoner, that she had a serious medical condition, and that Defendants displayed a deliberate
indifference to her health. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1976) (deliberate indifference
can be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
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treatment once prescribed.”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-04 (1991) (reiterating the deliberate
indifference standard articulated in Estelle). The seriousness of the medical condition at issue is
usually considered an objective inquiry. Prison officials must provide medical care to prisoners and
protect prisoners from conditions that might cause future harm. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
33 (1993) (prison officials violate Eighth Amendment if they do not protect prisoners from harms
of second-hand smoke). The deliberate indifference standard is analyzed as a subjective prong:
Plaintiff would need to show that Defendants in fact knew of his wife’s medical condition, should
have concluded a substantial risk existed, and actually drew that conclusion. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994). If prison officials reasonably respond to the risk, they will not be held
liable even if ultimately the harm is not avoided. Id. at 844. Deliberate indifference requires more
than simple medical malpractice, and has been described as “an unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
Plaintiff alleges through his additional allegations in the objections he filed that his wife was
a prisoner in the custody of Belmont when she first attempted suicide. She was then released on
bond, attempted suicide again, and was returned to the custody of Belmont when placed in a mental
institution. Finally, she was released again from the mental institution, and then she committed
suicide in “the exact way she said she would.” (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 5, Pl.’s Obj. to R&R, 2).
The district court seems to have assumed that Plaintiff’s claims only related to his attempts
to get assistance for his wife from prison guards after his wife was released the second time, ignoring
the likelihood that his claim also includes an allegation that it was deliberate indifference to release
Mrs. Garrett from the mental institution in the first place. Perhaps this assumption has its roots in
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Plaintiff’s original complaint that did not include the information about Mrs. Garrett’s relationship
to Belmont. A more complete reading of Plaintiff’s allegations would include those alleged in his
filed objections or the district court should have allowed leave to amend to include such allegations.
Therefore, construing the complaint to include the factual allegations about Mrs. Garrett’s
confinement by Belmont in prison and in the mental institution, Plaintiff’s allegations should be
understood to include the claim that his wife was in custody when her Eighth Amendment rights
were violated.
The district court also seems to have assumed that Belmont was required to release Mrs.
Garrett from the mental institution or that they did not have any duty to continue to hold her.
However, these assumptions seem to contradict the factual allegations Plaintiff added to his
objections. Both times Mrs. Garrett was released, Plaintiff alleges that she was on bond. If the state
had the authority to place Plaintiff’s wife in the mental institution because of her suicide attempt
while on bond, it is unclear why they would not have had the authority and the duty to continue to
hold her in that institution through the duration of her probation/bond if proper medical care while
in state custody (i.e., while in the mental institution) would have included continued confinement.
While Belmont might be able to prove that it was required to release Plaintiff’s wife and/or that they
had no duty to continue to place her in the mental institution because it was not medically necessary,
Plaintiff has alleged that his wife was in the custody of Belmont at the mental institution and that she
did not receive necessary medical assistance but instead was released.
The district court found that Mrs. Garrett was not in custody at the time of her suicide and
so did not address the other two parts of the claim that must be addressed in order for Plaintiff to
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survive the review of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint show quite clearly that Defendants were aware of Mrs. Garrett’s suicidal nature and the
fact that she was suffering from a serious medical condition. Plaintiff has further alleged that
Defendants “ignored and mocked” the threats of suicide Plaintiff received from his wife, from which
it seems plausible that Plaintiff could prove the subjective prong of deliberate indifference. (Dist.
Ct. No. 2, Compl. ¶ 1). Construing Plaintiff’s complaint to include the allegations added in his filed
objections and reading those allegations liberally, we find that Plaintiff has alleged that his wife was
denied appropriate medical care while in Belmont’s custody either because her suicidal ideation was
not treated sufficiently or because she should not have been released from the mental institution.
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim should have survived the failure to state a claim analysis.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff also alleges a related Fourteenth Amendment claim arguing that his wife’s
substantive due process rights were violated when Defendants failed to take action to protect Mrs.
Garrett, knowing of her suicidal ideation. Generally, there is no constitutional duty for “a state or
local government entity to protect its citizens from private violence, or other mishaps not attributable
to the conduct of its employees.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Svs., 489 U.S. 189,
193-94 (1989) (internal citations omitted). However, there are two recognized exceptions to that
general rule. The first is where there is a special relationship between the state and the plaintiff,
which usually arises only when the state restrains an individual’s liberty. Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of
Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 910-11 (6th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases in which courts have found such a
special relationship and noting that it was only in cases of imprisonment and commitment to a
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mental institution). The second, and less common, exception is where the danger faced by a plaintiff
is state-created, i.e., the state took actions, or failed to take actions, that created or increased the risk
of exposure to private violence. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir.
1998). The district court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under either theory.
Once a person is no longer in state custody, the state no longer has a special relationship that
falls within the exception that gives rise to a duty to protect that person. Bynum v. City of Magee,
Miss., 507 F. Supp. 2d 627, 633 (S.D. Miss. 2007). It was on this basis that the district court
dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on the theory of a special relationship. Bynum also held that the
“Constitution does not impose upon a city a duty to hold a suicidal individual for the sole purpose
of providing him with medical care.” Id. However, in addition to not being binding on our Circuit,
Bynum is distinguishable from this case because in Bynum, the deceased had not been placed in a
mental institution by the state and then released, nor was the decedent subject to the supervision of
the state through probation or bond, as in this case. Plaintiff’s wife was in state custody – both
incarcerated and in a mental institution – for some of the relevant time, during which time the state
had a duty to protect her from suicide. See Heflin v. Stewart County, Tenn., 958 F.2d 709, 716 (6th
Cir. 1992).
Additionally, since Plaintiff has alleged that his wife was released on bond both times, it
seems apparent from the allegations that the state maintained authority to confine Mrs. Garrett,
confirmed by her alleged commitment to the mental institution; consequently, if proper medical
treatment required continued commitment to that institution, the state could have confined her on
the basis of her probation in addition to her suicidal ideation. It is, of course, possible that
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Defendants could assert viable defenses to Plaintiff’s claim, such as that they no longer had the
authority to confine his wife in the mental institution or they did sufficiently respond to her threats
of suicide, but those defenses are not before this Court since this case was dismissed before
Defendants were served and before they filed any responsive pleadings.
The district court was correct in finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for the state-
created danger exception since he alleged no facts that would tend to support a theory that
Defendants acted in any way that created or increased the risk of suicide. For this theory of relief,
Plaintiff’s case is very similar to Bynum, where police came upon a suicidal person and were called
to assist him several other times, because in the instant case Plaintiff’s wife was suicidal throughout
her interactions with Defendants and Defendants did nothing to encourage those tendencies and in
fact tried to assist her by putting her on suicide watch and in a mental institution. See Bynum, 507
F. Supp. 2d at 634-35.
The information about Mrs. Garrett’s relationship with Belmont was presented for the first
time in Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R. However, the district court was presented with that
information and still dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The district court erred in not
construing Plaintiff’s allegations to include a claim that Mrs. Garrett’s constitutional rights were
infringed while she was in the custody of Belmont, i.e., while she did have a recognized special
relationship with Defendants. In other words, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim that
Defendants violated Mrs. Garrett’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from suicide when
she was released from the mental institution instead of continuing her treatment while she was on
probation/bond.
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D. Plaintiff’s Complaint Was Improperly Dismissed
Plaintiff’s pleadings, when liberally construed, state a claim based on the theory that
Plaintiff’s wife was in state custody – either incarcerated or held in the mental institution
involuntarily – at the time when the appropriate medical attention was not given to her, resulting in
her release and opportunity to commit suicide. Since the facts as Plaintiff alleged are sufficient to
support that theory, Plaintiff should have been able to proceed past the initial pre-screening process
in this case on both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. This case is best understood as
raising Mrs. Garrett’s constitutional rights asserted by Plaintiff as Mrs. Garrett’s estate’s
representative. If Plaintiff’s wife had a special relationship with Defendants at the time when the
alleged deprivation of medical care took place, then Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief based on
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. While Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, may not
have included all of the specific factual allegations usually required to show that he is his wife’s legal
representative and that he was raising her claims, it seems quite apparent that he intended to raise
her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Because this Court allows pro se litigants some
leeway in pleading standards, this litigation should proceed to resolve whether the factual
underpinnings of Plaintiff’s claims might be proven.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim for failure to state a claim and REMAND with instructions to the district court to permit
Plaintiff to proceed as the legal representative of his wife’s estate, to permit the filing of the
complaint, and to consider whether to appoint counsel to assist Plaintiff in this matter. If the district
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court deems it necessary and proper, Plaintiff should be given leave to amend to clarify his legal
theory of raising his wife’s constitutional claims as the representative of his wife’s estate and to
sufficiently allege the required factual allegations to support that theory since that claim is not
covered by the PLRA.
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SILER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this
case for the reasons stated hereafter.
First, there is a valid issue concerning standing on the part of Jeremy Garrett, the plaintiff.
As the majority concluded, “a §1983 claim is ‘entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged
constitutional tort.’” Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Claybrook v.
Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, only the victim or her estate’s
representative may prosecute a § 1983 claim and “no cause of action may lie under [§] 1983 for
emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered
personally by the victim’s family members.” Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357. As the majority correctly
observes, Garrett does not declare in the complaint that he is prosecuting this action as the fiduciary
of his wife’s estate. Instead, he seeks relief based on injuries that he suffered as a result of her death.
Although Garrett might be entitled to the entire estate as the surviving spouse under Ohio law, he
is still not the legal representative of the estate, who must be appointed by a court. Nevertheless,
because the issue of standing was not raised nor discussed in the district court, I believe that it would
be more appropriate to discuss the case on the merits.
Therefore, my second point of disagreement concerns the merits of the dismissal of the
complaint by the district court. The dismissal of a complaint by the district court under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) is reviewed de novo. Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007).
As a threshold matter, Garrett must allege some state action upon which to ground his § 1983
claim. He argues that the defendants knew his wife was suicidal when they took her into custody.
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He reasons that by taking her into custody, the defendants assumed the duty to hold her and to
provide her with mental health treatment. He takes the position that by releasing her from custody
after she had attempted suicide and over the objections of Garrett and other family members, the
defendants violated due process.
However, the Due Process Clause does not impose upon the state an affirmative duty to act.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Thus, the “State’s
failure to protect an individual against private violence”—including violence directed toward one’s
self—does not violate due process. Id. at 197. However, we have recognized two exceptions to the
DeShaney rule: (1) the “special relationship” exception, and (2) the state-created danger exception.
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998).
Neither exception applies here. The fact that Mrs. Garrett was released from custody prior
to her suicide is fatal to the “special relationship” exception. Id. A suicidal person does not have
a constitutional right to remain in custody indefinitely for her own protection. See DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 201 (noting that “the State does not become the guarantor of an individual’s safety by having
once offered him shelter”). “Liability under the state-created-danger theory is predicated upon
affirmative acts by the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed
to private acts of violence.” Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066. Garrett claims that the defendants acted
affirmatively when they released his wife from custody even though she was suicidal. However, no
facts suggest that the defendants made Mrs. Garrett vulnerable to “any danger to which she was not
already exposed,” i.e., her own suicidal tendencies. Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907,
913 (6th Cir. 1999). The defendants arguably knew that Mrs. Garrett was potentially suicidal when
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they released her from custody, but they did not create that risk—it was ever present. See Jones v.
Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating a failure to act is not an affirmative act under
the state-created-danger theory”). The majority opinion suggests that there may be a constitutional
claim under the Eighth Amendment that Mrs. Garrett was not given medical attention while she was
in state custody. However, the complaint filed in this case does not make such an allegation. Garrett
is not claiming that his cause of action is based upon cruel and unusual punishment to his wife while
she was in jail, but that it was cruel and unusual punishment for her to be released on bond.
Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal in this case.
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