Sturm v. Superintendent of Indian River Juvenile Correctional Facility

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0159n.06
No. 12-3360
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Feb 13, 2013
BRYAN CHRISTOPHER STURM, ) LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN RIVER ) COURT FOR THE
JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ) SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
) OHIO
Respondent-Appellee. )
OPINION
BEFORE: CLAY, GILMAN and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Bryan Christopher Sturm, adjudicated delinquent
in Ohio on two counts of murder, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied
the petition, but certified two issues for appeal. The issues presented on appeal in this tragic case
are whether the Ohio courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in denying Sturm’s
claims (1) that his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was violated by the trial
court’s admission of his confession; and (2) that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the district court’s
analysis of the two claims and therefore affirm the denial of habeas relief.
Sturm v. Superintendent of Indian River Juvenile Correctional Facility
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I. BACKGROUND1
The deceased bodies of twelve-year-old Bryan Sturm’s grandmother and aunt, Nancy Tidd
and Emma Tidd, respectively, were found sitting in the living room of the grandmother’s home in
the evening hours of November 22, 2004. Each woman had suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the
head. Within hours, the investigation focused on Sturm at his home in nearby Lower Salem.
Detective Mike Warden of the Washington County Sheriff’s Department, who was acquainted with
Sturm’s father, began questioning Sturm at about 11:50 p.m., with the father’s permission and in his
presence. The questioning took place in an unmarked police cruiser parked outside the Sturm
residence. Warden advised Sturm that he was not under arrest, did not have to speak with the police,
and could leave at any time. Sturm said he understood.
In response to questioning, Sturm acknowledged that he had not gone to school that day. He
had slept in until about 1:00 p.m. and then “huffed” gasoline. Sturm said his stepbrother gave him
a ride to his grandmother’s house. There he received permission to use a .410 shotgun for target
practice in the backyard. After getting in an argument with his grandmother, Sturm said he called
his uncle for a ride home. Detective Warden had reason to believe Sturm had actually received a ride
home from a motorist who reported having pickedup a shirtless boy walking along State Route 530
early that evening. The motorist had dropped his rider off in Lower Salem. Believing that Sturm
1
As to the fact summary that follows, drawn largely from the opinion of the Ohio Court of
Appeals, there is no dispute. In the Matter of Bryan Christopher Sturm, No. 05CA35, 2006 WL
3861074 at *2-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2006).
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was lying about how he got home, Warden asked Sturm’s father for permission to continue the
questioning outside his presence. Sturm’s father stepped out of the vehicle and granted permission.
Warden confronted Sturm about his apparent untruthfulness. Following a few more
questions, Sturm confessed to having shot his aunt and his grandmother. He explained that his
grandmother started “putting him down.” When he raised the shotgun, his aunt intervened and
grabbed the gun. The shotgun accidentally fired, striking his aunt in the side of the head. Sturm said
he then reloaded and shot and killed his grandmother. He left the shotgun there in the laundry room
and started walking through the woods behind the house, eventually getting a ride home.
At this point in the interview, about 12:19 a.m.,Warden read Sturm his Miranda rights and,
after obtaining a written waiver, tape-recorded Sturm’s statement. Sturm was arrested, taken into
custody and detained in the Washington County Juvenile Center, charged with being delinquent
based on two counts of aggravated murder.
Prior to trial, Sturm moved to suppress the statement he gave to Detective Warden,
contending that it was elicited during custodial interrogation before he had been advised of his
Miranda rights. The Washington County Juvenile Court concluded that Sturm was not in custody
when he gave the confession and denied the motion. In February 2005, Sturm was tried by a jury
in the juvenile court and was found delinquent on two counts of murder. A blended sentence was
imposed. Sturm was committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services until he reaches the age
of twenty-one. Thereafter, he is subject to two consecutive prison terms of fifteen years to life, a
sentence which is stayed, however, pending successful completion of the juvenile disposition. The
adjudication was affirmed on direct appeal. Sturm, 2006 WL 3861074. Sturm’s motion for post-
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conviction relief was denied by the juvenile court without a hearing on November 15, 2007. This
ruling, too, was affirmed. In the Matter of B.C.S., No. 07CA60, 2008 WL 4823572 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 29, 2008). After the Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Sturm filed his petition for
habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The petition was
denied on February 24, 2012, but the district court certified two issues for appeal.
Sturm contends the district court erred in denying his claims that the Ohio Court of Appeals
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding first, that he was not in custody when
he gave his confession, and second, that he had not been denied effective representation. As to the
former issue, Sturm contends that both courts failed to properly consider his age in determining
whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to terminate the conversation with
Detective Warden and exit the police cruiser. As to the latter issue, Sturm insists that his trial
counsel’s failure to obtain and call expert witnesses in support of his defense cannot be considered
sound trial strategy, was substandard representation, and resulted in prejudice. Sturm contends
counsel should have consulted and obtained experts to testify regarding coerced/false confessions,
firearm ballistics, crime scene reconstruction, and DNA evidence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s legal conclusions and rulings on mixed questions of law and
fact de novo, and review factual findings for clear error. Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 301
(6th Cir. 2011). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the federal
courts may not grant habeas relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state courts
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unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ only
if the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question
of law, or if the state court decided the case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).
Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal court may grant the writ only if the
state court identified the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. Id. “[A] federal habeas court
may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id.
at 411. Rather, to warrant habeas relief, the application must be found to be “objectively
unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling was “so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011).
“AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.’” Renico v.
Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). This
standard is designed to be difficult to meet because habeas relief is reserved for “extreme
malfunctions” in the state criminal justice system. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
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In analyzing whether a state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of
“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, we look to the holdings of the Supreme Court’s
decisions as of the time that the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38,
44–45 (2012).
B. Custody
Petitioner Sturm correctly argues that if he was “in custody” when he first gave his
confession to Detective Warden without having been Mirandized, then his confession should have
been suppressed. The Ohio Court of Appeals, the last Ohio court to decide the merits of Sturm’s
claim in a reasoned opinion, held that he was not in custody when he first gave his incriminating
statement to Warden and that the statement was properly admitted as evidence against him. The
district court’s denial of Sturm’s habeas petition is based on its adoption of a Report and
Recommendation by the magistrate judge. The district court concluded that the Ohio Court of
Appeals’ ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
The district court correctly identified the governing standards under clearly established
federal law. In short, whether a person was in custody, triggering the need for advisement of
Miranda rights, is an objective inquiry. Considering all the surrounding circumstances, the question
is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have perceived that he was “deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
A person is deemed to have been in custody if he was either under arrest or his freedom of movement
was restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112
(1995). This objective determination does not depend on the subjective perceptions of either the
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person being questioned or the interrogating officer. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323
(1994). The actual mindset of the particular suspect plays no role in the assessment. Yarborough
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004). Rather, the inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have felt free to leave. Id. at 663.
Applying these standards, the district court summarized the undisputed factual findings that
formed the basis for the Ohio Court of Appeals’ ruling. The court noted in particular that Sturm
voluntarily agreed to speak with Detective Warden in the unmarked vehicle with his father’s
permission and in his father’s presence; that Warden expressly advised Sturm that he did not have
to speak with the police and was free to get out of the car and walk away at any time; that Sturm said
he understood; and that the interview lasted only about thirty minutes before Warden advised Sturm
of his Miranda rights and recorded his statement. The district court summed up its ruling as follows:
Based on these facts, the Magistrate Judge is unable to conclude that the state
appellate court’s decision rejecting Petitioner’s claim contravened or unreasonably
applied federal law, or constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts in view
of the evidence presented. As noted by the state appellate court, the record fails to
reflect use of coercive or threatening police techniques or an atmosphere such as
would cause a reasonable person to understand he was not free to leave. Petitioner
voluntarily dressed and accompanied police to the unmarked car with his father to
speak with them. The period of time during which Petitioner was questioned by
police was relatively brief. While two police officers accompanied Detective
Warden, one of those was physically removed from and uninvolved with Petitioner’s
interview, and the other left the vehicle for a brief period during the time that
Petitioner confessed. Moreover, police requested permission of Petitioner’s father,
who was present during the initial portion of police questioning, and available
outside of the car during the time that Petitioner confessed and later provided a taped
statement. The record provides no indication that Petitioner did not understand that
he was free to leave and could go at any time without speaking to police.
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R. 14, Report and Recommendation at 21-22, Page ID ## 3290-91. The district court thus found no
error in the Ohio Court of Appeals’ ruling that Sturm was not in custody.
Sturm insists the Ohio Court of Appeals’ ruling is clearly unreasonable because it fails to
adequately consider his young age in assessing whether a reasonable person in his situation would
have felt free to leave the police vehicle. Citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011),
he contends that a suspect’s age is a factor within the totality of circumstances that must be
considered in making the custody determination. Indeed, the holding of J.D.B. is succinctly stated:
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.
Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that
commonsense reality, we hold that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda
custody analysis.
Id. at 2398-99. Sturm acknowledges that J.D.B. was decided after the Ohio Court of Appeals’ ruling
in 2006, but contends that it reflects the law which had already become clearly established at the time
of the court’s ruling.
The objective reasonableness of the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision is measured against the
Supreme Court’s precedents as of the time the court rendered its decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44.
We reject the notion that J.D.B. reflects the clearly established law at the time of the Ohio Court of
Appeals’ ruling. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in J.D.B. demonstrate that prior Supreme
Court decisional law provided that failure to consider a minor suspect’s age as part of the Miranda
custody analysis was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405, 2412, 2417. Specifically, in Alvarado, in 2004, the Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief, concluding the state court’s failure to consider age was not
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objectively unreasonable. The Alvarado Court observed that “[o]ur opinions applying the Miranda
custody test have not mentioned the suspect’s age, mush less mandated its consideration.” 541 U.S.
at 666.
Alvarado represented the state of the law at the time of the Ohio Court of Appeals’ ruling.
It follows that failure to explicitly consider Sturm’s age would not have rendered the Ohio Court of
Appeals’ custody analysis objectively unreasonable. Yet, in any event, the Ohio Court of Appeals
clearly did not fail to consider Sturm’s age. The court correctly recognized that the custody
determination was an objective inquiry. Sturm, 2006 WL 3861074, at *8. It recognized its
responsibility to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. Id. Further, referring to Ohio law, the
court defined the totality of the circumstances as including, among other things, the age of the
suspect. Id. After recounting the salient facts, the court explained its analysis in detail,
demonstrating that it did not just pay lip service to this standard, but actually and meaningfully
considered Sturm’s youth. “Although Sturm was young,” and “despite his young age,” the court
held the record clearly supported the finding that he was not in custody. Id. Twice the court stated
its conclusion: “When viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable juvenile in Sturm’s
position would not have believed that he or she was in custody at the time of the interview.” Id.(emphasis added).
Thus, although the teaching of J.D.B. was not available to the Ohio Court of Appeals, and
although the clearly established federal law did not require the court to consider Sturm’s age in
making its custody determination, the Ohio Court of Appeals clearly did so. We therefore find no
merit in Sturm’s argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision is flawed for lack of
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consideration of his age. Nor has Sturm demonstrated that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ custody
assessment was otherwise contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.
Sturm argues that the court failed to adequately consider the impact of Warden’s “coercive”
interrogation techniques on a twelve-year-old’s perception of his freedom to leave. Sturm has not
identified record support for a finding that he was subject to coercion. Yes, the length and manner
of questioning are factors bearing on the custody determination. United States v. Panak, 552 F.3d
462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). The Ohio Court of Appeals considered these factors. It noted that the
interviews “were of relatively short duration,” and that there was no evidence that the interviews
were “harsh or intense,” no evidence that Sturm suffered from any “physical deprivation or
mistreatment,” and no evidence that he was “threatened or induced to confess.” Sturm, 2006 WL
3861074, at *8. Warden did tell Sturm he was lying about how he got home from his grandmother’s
house and asked Sturm whether it was possible that the shotgun went off accidentally, striking his
aunt and grandmother. These expressions of Warden’s views could have influenced how a
reasonable juvenile in Sturm’s position might have perceived his freedom to leave. See Stansbury,
511 U.S. at 326. However, Warden’s confronting of Sturm on the untruthfulness of his story about
how he got home was quite mild, hardly coercive. And the “minimization” suggestion of a possible
accidental shooting was not so threatening or misleading as to have affected a reasonable juvenile’s
belief that he was still free to leave, as he had been expressly assured with his father standing by.
Accordingly, we cannot find that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ assessment of these factors was
objectively unreasonable.
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Sturm correctly points out that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ analysis included mention of
considerations beyond the scope of the proper objective inquiry. The court took note of record
evidence indicating that Sturm had a “high IQ” and had “prior experience with police questioning.”
Sturm, 2006 WL 3861074, at *8. The court viewed this evidence as indicating that, despite his
young age, “Sturm possessed a high enough level of intelligence and maturity to understand the
officers.” Id. Sturm’s prior experience with the police was deemed to bolster that conclusion. Id.The court’s mention of these considerations was consistent with the Ohio law requirement that the
suspect’s “mentality and prior criminal experience” be considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. Such considerations are “improper,” however, under federal law. Alvarado, 541
U.S. at 666–69 (observing that such “contingent psychological factors” implicate the suspect’s
subjective state of mind, something beyond the knowledge of the interrogating officer charged with
responsibility for deciding when Miranda warnings should be given).
Yet, despite the Ohio Court of Appeals’ mention of these subjective considerations, its
holding on the custody issue, iterated twice, is clearly stated as an objective determination. The
reference to subjective considerations was ostensibly designed to satisfy the requirements of state
law and buttress the conclusion that Sturm was not manifestly handicapped or otherwise not within
the class of “reasonable juveniles.” Any apparent inconsistency in the court’s analysis is
insignificant, falling far short of the “extreme malfunction” needed to warrant habeas relief under
deferential AEDPA review. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. We thus find no cognizable error in the
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Ohio Court of Appeals’ holding that Sturm’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
was not violated and that his confession was properly admitted into evidence.2
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In the second claim certified for appeal, Sturm contends the representation he received from
trial counsel was constitutionally deficient, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. Sturm contends there was no reasonable strategic reason for counsel’s failure
to seek appointment of experts to rebut the prosecution’s case—experts on false confessions, firearm
ballistics, DNA evidence, and crime scene reconstruction. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the
juvenile court’s denial of this claim in a carefully reasoned opinion. B.C.S., 2008 WL 4823572. In
denying habeas relief, the district court quoted the appellate court’s opinion in great length, agreeing
with its conclusion that Sturm had failed to show that he was prejudiced by any deficiencies in his
counsel’s performance.
In determining that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ denial of Sturm’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the district
court correctly summarized the governing standards established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance
2
Finding no cognizable error in the Ohio Court of Appeals’ determination that Sturm was not
in custody when he first confessed to Warden, we need not address Sturm’s contention that the
subsequent Miranda warnings were ineffective to cure the earlier failure to Mirandize, per Missouri
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Because Sturm was not in custody when he first confessed, there
was nothing improper in Warden’s earlier failure to Mirandize that needed to be “cured.” Seibert
applies only to a statement given during prewarning custodial interrogation. See id. at 604–05;
United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 979 (7th Cir. 2012).
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was “deficient,” i.e., “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and that the deficiency
resulted in “prejudice,” i.e., “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687–88, 694.
Both prongs of the test must be met to justify relief. Hence, a reviewing court need not determine
whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Id. at 697. If a claim must be denied for lack of a
showing of sufficient prejudice, then the court need not also “grade counsel’s performance” by
scrutinizing its adequacy. Id.
Sturm had presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the juvenile court in a post-
conviction motion, supported, inter alia, by affidavit of his trial counsel, Raymond H. Smith.
Smith’s affidavit indicates that budget limitations in the Washington County Branch of the Ohio
Public Defender’s Commission played a role in his failure to obtain confessions, ballistics, and crime
scene reconstruction experts. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding counsel’s performance
neither deficient nor prejudicial. See B.C.S., 2008 WL 4823572, at *8. The juvenile court dismissed
Attorney Smith’s insufficient-funds explanation as a disingenuous post-hoc rationalization of a
competent, experienced attorney still zealously advocating for his client. Id. The juvenile court
observed that counsel could have had unlimited resources at his disposal in this double-homicide
prosecution of a twelve-year-old. Recalling that counsel had pushed the State to a quick trial, the
court concluded that the decision to forego the use of experts was a purposeful part of his trial
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The Ohio Court of Appeals faulted the juvenile court for rejecting defense counsel’s affidavit,
calling it an unwarranted failure to give due deference. Yet, upon accepting the averments of
counsel’s affidavit to be true, the Ohio Court of Appeals nonetheless held the juvenile court’s error
was harmless. With thoroughness and clarity, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that, despite any
deficiency in counsel’s performance, the failure to obtain experts did not prejudice the defense. Id.at *13–15. This conclusion was driven by recognition that Sturm’s confession, properly admitted
in evidence and not shown to be coerced or false or unreliable, “was powerful and damaging
evidence against Sturm.” Id. at *15. The court acknowledged that there were inconsistencies
between Sturm’s story and the physical evidence, or lack thereof, at the scene, and recognized that
Sturm’s confession “did not ‘exactly mirror’ the evidence.” Id. The court noted, however, that
defense counsel brought many of these inconsistencies to the jury’s attention through cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses and in closing argument. Further, the court emphasized that
Sturm confessed to shooting his aunt and grandmother; that his confession placed him in the
grandmother’s home at the time of the murders; that the confession included details only the shooter
could have known; that Sturm admitted taking steps to destroy forensic evidence; and that his
behavior immediately following the shooting was consistent with guilt. Id. The court also noted that
Sturm had not recanted his confession and had essentially affirmed it during a psychological
evaluation as recently as two weeks prior to trial. Id. at *13.
We find nothing unreasonable in the Ohio Court of Appeals’ application of the Strickland
standard in concluding that Sturm has not shown prejudice. To the contrary, its analysis is in all
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respects thorough and judicious. Like the Ohio Court of Appeals, we are troubled by the possibility
that the defense strategy was handicapped by unreasonably tight financial constraints. A more
thorough investigation by defense experts addressing inconsistencies between Sturm’s confession
and the physical evidence at the scene would seem to have been advisable. Yet, given Sturm’s
confession, which has not been shown to be unreliable and which Sturm has never formally recanted,
there is no basis for concluding that the defense was prejudiced by any shortcomings in defense
counsel’s performance.
Sturm insists that the outcome of the trial could have been different if his trial counsel had
utilized experts who would have created questions about the integrity of the prosecution’s case by
highlighting the lack of ballistics evidence, the lack of DNA evidence, the failure of the police to
preserve evidence at the crime scene, and the psychological dynamics that could have contributed
to a false confession. In the face of Sturm’s confession, however, and other evidence corroborating
it, Sturm’s present argument amounts only to speculation, not a “reasonable probability” of a
different outcome. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 791–92 (to establish Strickland prejudice,
likelihood of a different result must be shown to be substantial, not just conceivable); Sowell v.
Anderson, 663 F.3d 783, 399–800 (6th Cir. 2011) (despite deficiencies in defense counsel’s
investigation, no prejudice was shown where petitioner failed to show how a more thorough
investigation would have produced evidence undermining confidence in the verdict); Baze v. Parker,
371 F.3d 310, 322 (6th Cir. 2004) (speculation is insufficient to make out a successful claim of
prejudice).
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Further, as Strickland makes clear, the prejudice focus is not merely on outcome
determination. Cognizable prejudice consists of a showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. “Thus, an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to
whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). “To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the
outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to
which the law does not entitle him.” Id.We acknowledge that Sturm’s confession—even though voluntarily given, properly admitted
in evidence, and not expressly repudiated—is not necessarily conclusive of his guilt. See Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688–89 (1986). If the confession were shown to be insufficiently
corroborated or otherwise unworthy of belief, the jury would have been at liberty to disregard it. Id.Sturm has failed to demonstrate, however, that the substance of his confession was so lacking in
corroboration as to render it unworthy of belief. We concur in the Ohio Court of Appeals’
assessment that any questions the defense might have better raised through expert testimony fall
short of establishing a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
In the face of Sturm’s confession that he shot his aunt and his grandmother—a confession not
recanted and not shown to be false or unreliable—we cannot find that counsel’s failure to better
utilize experts to challenge the prosecution’s proofs rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or
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undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict. We therefore reject Sturm’s second claim of error as
well.
III. CONCLUSION
Applying the highly deferential standard of review prescribed by AEDPA, we concur in the
district court’s determination that the Ohio courts’ decisions on the two claims certified for review
were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The
district court’s judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus is therefore AFFIRMED.
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