Howard v. Whitbeck

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0008n.06
Filed: January 5, 2007
No. 05-2368
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JAMES L. HOWARD, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
WILLIAM C. WHITBECK, Chief ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Judge of the Michigan Court of )
Appeals; MAURA D. CORRIGAN, )
Chief Justice of the Michigan ) OPINION
Supreme Court, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
_______________________________________)
Before: SILER, MOORE, and BALDOCK,* Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Former Michigan prisoner James L. Howard
(“Howard”) appeals from the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees
William C. Whitbeck (“Whitbeck”), Chief Judge of the Michigan Court of Appeals, and Maura D.
Corrigan (“Corrigan”), Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. Howard brought a challenge
to MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963, which requires prisoners to pay certain filing fees, arguing that
the provision denied prisoners their fundamental right of access to courts and violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. While this appeal was
*
The Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
pending, Howard was released on parole. Because Howard’s parole has rendered his appeal moot,
we VACATE the district court’s February 7, 2005 judgment and REMAND the case to the district
court with instructions to dismiss it as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has come before us on appeal. We set forth the factual
background of this case in detail in our prior opinion, Howard v. Whitbeck, 382 F.3d 633 (6th Cir.
2004) (“Howard I”), and we therefore repeat only the basic facts here.
On September 20, 2000, Howard and two other prisoners, James Tomzek (“Tomzek”) and
Stuart Trosky, filed suit in Ingham County Circuit Court complaining of environmental tobacco
smoke in prison. On September 12, 2001, the suit was dismissed. Howard and Tomzek filed an
appeal as well as a motion to waive the initial partial filing fee required by MICH . COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2963. Chief Judge Whitbeck of the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the waiver motion on
February 26, 2002. Howard filed an application to the Michigan Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the filing fee, and also filed a motion to waive fees on that application.1 Chief
Justice Corrigan denied Howard’s waiver motion on March 25, 2002. Howard then attempted to file
a motion in the Michigan Court of Appeals challenging the filing fee, but the motion was returned
to him because he no longer had an appeal pending.
On June 11, 2002, Howard filed a complaint in the federal district court, requesting a
declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction against Chief Justice Corrigan and Chief Judge
Whitbeck requiring them to accept his appeals. The district court granted the defendants’ motion
1
Tomzek paid the filing fee and pursued his appeal, which was ultimately dismissed for
failure to comply with certain procedural requirements. Tomzek v. Dep’t of Corrs., 672 N.W.2d 511(Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
2
to dismiss. On appeal, we reversed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district
court correctly decided that it did not have jurisdiction over Howard’s as-applied challenge to MICH .
COMP. LAWS § 600.2963 under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but that Howard’s complaint also
alleged a facial challenge over which the district court did have jurisdiction. Howard I, 382 F.3d at
640. We noted that Howard’s facial challenge might be barred by res judicata and remanded to the
district court to determine the res judicata effect of the state-court orders and for further proceedings.
Id. at 641-42.
On February 7, 2005, the district court determined that res judicata did not bar Howard’s
facial challenge because “the Michigan Supreme Court dismissed his application without ruling on
the merits of the issues he claims to have raised.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 232 (Dist. Ct. Opinion
After Remand at 8). However, the district court concluded that Howard’s claim of denial of access
to courts could not be raised as a facial challenge and dismissed his due process and equal
protections claims on the merits. Howard’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he timely
appealed.
During oral argument, we raised questions as to Howard’s standing to bring a facial challenge
to MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963, and Howard’s counsel informed the court that Howard had been
released on parole, raising mootness concerns. We requested and received supplemental briefing
from both parties on standing and mootness. The parties agree that Howard has indeed been released
on parole.
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II. ANALYSIS
“‘[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Ford v. Wilder, 469 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). “The test for mootness is whether the relief
sought would, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” McPherson v. Mich.
High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“[T]hroughout the litigation, the plaintiff
must have suffered , or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have “no authority to render a decision upon moot questions or to declare rules of law that
cannot affect the matter at issue” and therefore do not have jurisdiction if Howard’s appeal is moot.
Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 971 (2002).
Howard’s facial challenge to MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963, the only part of Howard’s suit
remaining after our decision in Howard I, seeks a declaratory judgment that the statute is
unconstitutional on its face and, additionally or alternatively, an injunction preventing the statute
from being applied to Michigan prisoners. Because Howard has been released on parole and the
Michigan statute does not apply to parolees, any such declaration or injunction would not make a
difference to Howard’s current legal interests. Accordingly, Howard’s appeal is moot.
Howard raises a number of arguments attempting to avoid this necessary conclusion, but to
no avail. First, Howard argues that, if we declare the Michigan statute unconstitutional, he could ask
the Michigan Court of Appeals to re-open his original appeal pursuant to MICH . CT . R. 7.203(B)(5).
4
Rule 7.203(B)(5) states that the Michigan Court of Appeals “may grant leave to appeal from: . . .
any judgment or order when an appeal of right could have been taken but was not timely filed.”
MICH . CT . R. 7.203(B)(5). It is not at all clear that the Michigan Court of Appeals would be more
likely to allow Howard to re-open his original appeal if we invalidated MICH . COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2963, and speculation that the court might do so does not suffice to create a live controversy.
Howard also argues that he continues to suffer damage to his health because he was exposed
to secondhand smoke while in prison, that he has never been compensated for that damage in part
because the Michigan statute denied him an opportunity to appeal the dismissal of his initial suit, and
that this case therefore presents a live controversy with continuing damages. However, we must look
to the relief sought, and Howard’s present suit does not seek damages. Howard seeks facial
invalidation of the filing-fee statute, which would not yield him any compensation or in any way
prevent further damage to his health from his previous exposure to secondhand smoke.
Howard also urges us to consider the damage to his health a “collateral consequence” of the
fact that he was denied an opportunity to appeal the dismissal of his initial suit. In support, Howard
points us to the line of Supreme Court precedents holding that, because “most criminal convictions
do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences,” a convict’s challenge to his conviction does
not become moot when he is released from prison. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968); see
also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8-11 (collecting cases). The difference between the criminal context and
the case at hand, however, reconfirms our decision here. The relief that a convict seeks, to have his
conviction overturned, would, if granted, eliminate the collateral consequences associated with that
conviction. The relief that Howard seeks here, facial invalidation of the Michigan filing-fee statute,
would have no effect on the collateral health consequences that he allegedly suffers.
5
Finally, Howard argues that his appeal is not moot because we should revisit our decision
in Howard I and reinstate his as-applied challenge to MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963. The “law of
the case” doctrine generally precludes us from reconsideration of an issue, but we have stated that
we will reconsider a prior ruling in some instances, such as “where a decision is clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice.” Hanover Ins. Co. v. Am. Eng’g Co., 105 F.3d 306, 312 (6th
Cir. 1997). Howard contends that the district court’s determination on remand that res judicata did
not apply because the Michigan courts did not rule on the merits of his claims conflicts with our
conclusion in Howard I that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied. Howard’s argument conflates
res judicata principles with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Howard I, we concluded that the
Michigan courts made discretionary judicial decisions by deciding not to grant Howard fee waivers.2
Howard I, 382 F.3d at 640-41. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from hearing
Howard’s claims complaining of injury caused by those state-court decisions. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
2
MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(7) states:
For purposes of this section, the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration cannot be the sole
basis for a determination of indigency. However, this section shall not prohibit a
prisoner from commencing a civil action or filing an appeal in a civil action if the
prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee. If
the court, pursuant to court rule, waives or suspends the payment of fees and costs
in an action described in subsection (1) because the prisoner has no assets and no
means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee, the court shall order the fees and
costs to be paid by the prisoner in the manner provided in this section when the
reason for the waiver or suspension no longer exists.
MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(7). MICH . CT . R. 2.002(D) further provides: “If a party shows by
ex parte affidavit or otherwise that he or she is unable because of indigency to pay fees and costs,
the court shall order those fees and costs either waived or suspended until the conclusion of the
litigation.” Thus, it appears to us that the Michigan courts have the discretion to waive fees that
would otherwise be required by MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.2963. Accordingly, the Michigan courts
made discretionary judicial decisions by deciding not to grant Howard fee waivers. Howard I, 382
F.3d at 641.
6
Because Howard’s appeal is moot, we must decide whether to vacate the district court’s
February 7, 2005 judgment, from which he appeals. “When a civil case becomes moot pending
appellate adjudication, ‘[t]he established practice . . . in the federal system . . . is to reverse or vacate
the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.’” Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)). “Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through
happenstance—circumstances not attributable to the parties—or . . . the ‘unilateral action of the party
who prevailed in the lower court.’” Id. at 71-72 (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner
Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994)). In the context of this case, Howard’s parole can best be
described as “happenstance,” as neither Howard nor the defendants ordered his parole. Accordingly,
we vacate the district court’s February 7, 2005 judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Because this case is moot, we VACATE the district court’s February 7, 2005 judgment and
REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot.
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