Deal v. Hamilton County Department of Education

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0011n.06
Filed: January 7, 2008
No. 06-6123/6214
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MAUREEN DEAL; PHILLIP DEAL, Parents, On )
Behalf of Zachary Deal, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
) TENNESSEE
HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF )
EDUCATION, )
Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant.
Before: MARTIN, SILER, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. This case arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”). Maureen and Phillip Deal (the “Deals”) brought this action against the Hamilton County
Department of Education (the “School System”) on behalf of their son, Zachary, who has been
diagnosed with autism. A different panel of this court previously held that the School System
committed procedural violations under the IDEA and thereby deprived Zachary of a “free and
appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th
Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Deal II]. In Deal II, our court remanded to the district court to determine the
appropriate level of reimbursement for the Deals and whether the School System also committed
substantive violations of the IDEA. The Deals argue that the district court committed the following
errors on remand: (1) finding the School System’s proposed educational plans were substantively
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appropriate for Zachary; (2) denying the Deals full reimbursement for the home-based services they
provided; (3) reducing the award of attorneys’ fees to the Deals; and (4) refusing to award the Deals
certain litigation expenses, particularly expenses for electronic legal research. The School System
cross-appeals and argues that the Deals were entitled, at most, to nominal reimbursement. We
AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is detailed in the previous opinion from this court and
will not be repeated here. Id. at 845-47. That opinion also describes the administrative proceedings
and initial district court decision. Id. at 847-49. The Deal II court held that the School System
committed procedural violations of the IDEA, that these violations denied Zachary a FAPE, and that
the Deals were entitled to reimbursement. Id. at 859, 866. In Deal II, the court further ruled that in
deciding whether the School System’s proposed educational programs were adequate, the district
court must evaluate Zachary’s individual abilities and give “due deference to the ALJ’s findings.”
Id. at 865. The Deal II court remanded and instructed the district court to determine the appropriate
level of reimbursement for the Deals; it also authorized the district court to consider whether the
School System committed a substantive IDEA violation. Id. at 866.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether IDEA violations have been committed, a district court applies a
“modified de novo” standard of review. Under this standard, “a district court is required to make
findings of fact based on a preponderance of the evidence contained in the complete record, while
giving some deference to the fact findings of the administrative proceedings.” Knable ex rel. Knable
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v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001). We review the district court’s findings
of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, and we review its conclusions of law de novo. Deal II,
392 F.3d at 850 (citing Knable, 238 F.3d at 764). “Mixed questions of law and fact, including the
question of whether a child was denied a FAPE, are reviewed de novo.” Id.
The district court’s determination of an appropriate amount of reimbursement is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See Ms. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267, 273 (1st
Cir. 2004). The award of attorneys’ fees is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1993).
DISCUSSION
A. Substantive IDEA Violations
The Deal II opinion stated the general rule that “a school district is only required to provide
educational programming that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to derive more than de
minimis educational benefit.” Deal II, 392 F.3d at 861. The Deal II court then noted that, “[T]here
is a point at which the difference in outcomes between two methods can be so great that provision
of the lesser program could amount to denial of a FAPE.” Id. at 862. The court went on to adopt
the view that “the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in
relation to the potential of the child at issue.” Id.
Having been instructed to carefully consider Zachary’s individual abilities, the district court
appropriately began its analysis on remand with an examination of Zachary’s potential. Deal v.
Hamilton County Dep’t Educ., No. 1:01-cv-295, slip op. at 3-9 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 3, 2006)
(Memorandum Decision) [hereinafter Deal III]. As mentioned previously, the district court must
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accord due deference to the administrative findings; however, “[t]he more that the district court relies
on new evidence, . . . the less it should defer to the administrative decision.” Alex R., ex rel. Beth
R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004); see also
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of the Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that where the district court hears additional evidence it is “free to accept or reject the
agency findings depending on whether those findings are supported by the new, expanded record”).
The district court was entitled to rely on the additional expert testimony that contradicted the
ALJ’s findings and much of the testimony before the ALJ. As a result, the district court’s findings
regarding Zachary’s skills and potential are not clearly erroneous. See Deal III, slip op. at 3-9.
Additionally, the district court noted that Zachary’s home program was not identical to the treatment
received by children in the Lovaas study, and it therefore cannot be expected to produce the same
results. Id. at 19. Based on the district court’s findings, we cannot say the home program was so
superior to the School System’s program that refusal to fund the home program constituted denial
of a FAPE.
As for whether the substantive program offered by the School System would have provided
Zachary with a FAPE, different methodologies may be appropriate for treating autism and provide
a FAPE as long as the student’s individual needs are considered and the program is reasonably
calculated to provide educational benefit. See Dong ex rel. Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty.
Sch., 197 F.3d 793, 803-04 (6th Cir. 1999). In light of the additional testimony heard by the district
court, we agree that the preponderance of the evidence supports the district court’s determination that
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the School System’s IEPs were reasonably calculated to offer Zachary a meaningful educational
benefit.
B. Reimbursement
In Deal II, our court held that the Deals were entitled to reimbursement for the home-based,
ABA services they provided to Zachary and instructed the district court to “weigh the equities and
determine the appropriate level of reimbursement.” Deal II, 392 F.3d at 866. The Deals argue they
are entitled to full reimbursement based on this court’s decision in Deal II and the purposes of the
IDEA. On the other hand, the School System asserts the Deals should receive only a nominal
amount in light of the ruling that it offered Zachary a substantively appropriate program. The district
court found that the Deals’ reasonable expenditures on ABA services were $50,409.95. Deal v.
Hamilton County Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:01-cv-295, 2006 WL 2854463, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 1,
2006). The district court considered the substantive appropriateness of the School System’s program
as an equitable factor and ultimately awarded the Deals half of their reasonable expenditures, or
$25,204.98. Id. at *5. It did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the reimbursement
award.
C. Attorneys’ Fees & Litigation Costs
The district court discussed in great detail the appropriate rates and number of hours for each
of the three law firms that represented the Deals, as well as analyzing the Deals’ degree of success
at each stage of the litigation. Id. at *9-20. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees in this case, nor did it abuse its discretion in
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denying the Deals’ request for certain litigation expenses, including electronic legal research, travel
expenses, and overtime meals.
AFFIRMED.
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