Young v. Oakland County

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0271n.06
Filed: April 19, 2006
No. 05-1162
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL YOUNG, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
OAKLAND COUNTY, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
___________________________________________
BEFORE: NELSON, SUHRHEINRICH, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In this action alleging employment discrimination on account of race in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”), and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”),
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (2001), plaintiff Michael Young claims that defendant Oakland
County, Michigan, discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to interview and hire
him for the position of Chief Community Corrections Field Operations Manager. The district court
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c). We affirm.
I.
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
The following factual background is taken from the district court’s concise and thorough
recitation of the facts as set forth in its opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment:
Defendant uses an equal employment opportunity policy, an affirmative action
policy, and a system of merit rules for filling vacancies in county positions.
Following these policies, Defendant announced an opening for the position of Chief
Community Corrections Field Operations on January 14, 2002. Although experience
with the criminal justice system was not listed as a requirement for obtaining the job,
the description quite clearly indicated that, as alluded to by the position’s title, a
great portion of the job dealt with the criminal justice system. The description was
as follows:
Under limited direction, is responsible for supervising Pretrial
Service unit employees and support staff. Reviews reports
concerning the status of inmates housed in the Oakland County Jail.
Assists the court in the more complex bonding considerations and
other alternatives. Prepares and presents regular reports based on
program statistics to appropriate officials. Monitors the Pretrial
Services program budget. Responds to and initiates correspondence
to a variety of individuals within the criminal justice system.
Participates in developing, implementing, and updating policies and
procedures for the consistent operation of Pretrial Services including
the customized database Pretrial on Line [sic]. Assists with
establishing long range goals and strategies for the division. Assists
the manager in the development of the division budget and in the
presentation to the Board of Commissioners and related committees.
Assists the manager in the development of the state grant application.
Functions as a liaison concerning the Pretrial Services Program to
various committees and agencies.
Def. Mot., Ex. 3. As the job description indicates, the position of Chief Community
Corrections Field Operations requires more than mere interaction with the criminal
justice system, or even the managing of criminal justice employees. The position is
responsible for the formation of policies and procedures and the actual development
of the Pretrial Services. Whoever is hired must serve as Pretrial Service’s liaison to
other agencies, be responsible for inmates in the Oakland County Jail, and assist the
-2-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
Oakland County Court with complex bond issues. Needless to say, criminal justice
experience would be a significant asset in such a position.
The position’s minimum qualifications, however, were a master’s degree in public
or business administration, criminal justice, social work, sociology, psychology, or
related areas; and at least four years full-time case work or related work experience
involving interviewing, investigating and counseling practices, procedure and
techniques, and a valid driver’s license. Id. Experience in the criminal justice field,
then, was not listed as a requirement as such.
Plaintiff, who has a master’s degree in business administration and twenty-one years
of employment at General Motors Corporation, applied for the position on March 1,
2002. Initially, Plaintiff was rejected because he did not meet the minimum
qualifications. In response to this rejection, Plaintiff hand delivered a letter which
he characterized as a formal appeal. Defendant replied in writing that Plaintiff’s
application was rejected because he appeared to lack the required caseload and
counseling experience. The letter explained that Plaintiff’s application would
nevertheless be accepted, because Defendant would consider information Plaintiff
had submitted in a prior application. Plaintiff has applied for numerous positions
with Defendant, but has only obtained one interview to date.
Defendant then asked Plaintiff to complete the next step in the process, which was
a training and experience questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of four
questions. Based on the completed questionnaire, Plaintiff was informed on
March 28, 2002, that he had passed the Chief Community Corrections Field
Operations examination with a final score of 100 and his “rank on the eligible list
[was] ‘Top Five.’” Pl. Resp., Ex. G. According to Defendant, anyone who answered
yes to all four questions received a score of 100 and was placed on the “Top Five”
list. In fact, there were twenty-nine candidates who scored 100 on the exam and
were placed in what Defendant calls the “Top Five” eligible list.
According to Defendant, the names on the “Top Five” list are not ranked and are
listed in random order, and the fact that Plaintiff’s name appeared second on the list
had no meaning. Of the twenty-nine “Top Five” candidates, there were nine
Caucasian females, nine Caucasian males, six African American females, four
African American males, and one male of unidentified race. Six persons were
interviewed for the position. All six interviews were conducted on March 25, 2002.
The interviews were conducted before Plaintiff finished proving his eligibility.
Plaintiff first appeared on the eligible list when it was in its fourth revision, which
-3-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
revision was sent out on April 3, 2002. Defendant’s merit rules allow for the best
candidate to be hired at any time during the interview and hiring process.
Of the six interviewed, three were African American females, two were Caucasian
males, and one was a Caucasian female. Three of the six had no direct criminal
justice experience. Ultimately, one of the six, a Caucasian male, Robert Gatt, was
hired. Mr. Gatt’s application materials demonstrated that he possessed extensive
experience in the criminal justice system, whereas Plaintiff’s application materials
demonstrated that he possessed no experience in the field. Defendant maintains that
it has an obligation to hire the best candidate for the job regardless of race or any
other factor.
Defendant believes that the “Top Five” misnomer is what caused Plaintiff to believe
that he was passed over for the position on account of his race. Plaintiff, himself,
sees no reason other than race why he could be placed in the top five yet not receive
an interview when Defendant interviewed six candidates. Plaintiff points out that the
Affirmative Action report prepared by the county for both 2001 and 2002 indicates
that the classification and department for which Plaintiff applied had not met the goal
for utilizing minorities. However, Defendant’s obligations under its affirmative
action policy are not requirements, but goals. Furthermore, the information on race
supplied by the candidates is used for statistical purposes only, and those making the
hiring decision are not informed of a candidate’s race prior to the interview, though
they do know generally that minorities have applied.
II.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and defendant was duly notified of a
forthcoming investigation. Nevertheless, the EEOC district director subsequently advised defendant
that the investigation was being terminated because plaintiff had requested a “notice of right to sue.”
On June 12, 2003, plaintiff filed the present action in district court, alleging race
discrimination in violation of Title VII and Michigan’s ELCRA arising out of his attempts to gain
employment with defendant and its failure to hire him. Following the close of discovery, defendant
-4-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed
plaintiff’s case with prejudice, ruling that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of direct
discrimination and, also, failed to carry the prima facie burden required of the alternative method
of demonstrating discrimination by the presentation of circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the
district court held that, in light of his extensive criminal justice background, Gatt was better
qualified for the vacant position than plaintiff, who had no such experience; thus, plaintiff was
unable to make the requisite showing that he was similarly situated in all relevant aspects of his
employment circumstances with Gatt. The district court further concluded that even if plaintiff
satisfied his prima facie burden, defendant articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
hiring Gatt, namely, his superior qualifications, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that this reason
was pretextual. Plaintiff now timely appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant.
III.
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Black v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2002). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the district court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. Detroit Water Team Joint Venture v. Agric. Ins. Co., 371 F.3d 336, 338 (6th
Cir. 2004). “[O]nce the movant of a summary judgment motion satisfies its burden by
-5-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial if it is to withstand summary judgment.”
Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 832 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
omitted). A dispute over a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Accordingly, when a reasonable jury could not find that the nonmoving party is entitled to
a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252; Cox v. Ky. Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
IV.
In Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003), this Court
reiterated the well-established standard of proof required in Title VII cases:
To avoid a grant of summary judgment on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must either
provide direct evidence of discrimination or establish a prima facie case, which
creates an inference of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. Talley v.
Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A
prima facie case requires a plaintiff to show (1) that he is a member of a protected
class; (2) that he applied for, and did not receive, a job; (3) that he was qualified for
the job; and (4) that a similarly-situated person who was not in the plaintiff’s
protected class received the job. Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160,
1166 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Tex. Dep’t of Comty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253-54 & n.6, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
-6-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
at issue. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817). If the defendant satisfies that burden, then the burden
of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered
reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804, 93 S. Ct. 1817). “A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that the
proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s
challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.”
Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 434 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dews
v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)).
The same test is applied to claims of unlawful race discrimination under Michigan’s ELCRA.
Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003); Hazle v. Ford Motor
Co., 628 N.W.2d 515, 520-21 (Mich. 2001).
Here, there is a dearth of direct evidence showing discrimination. With regard to a case
based on circumstantial evidence, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff has satisfied the first two
elements of a prima facie claim pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework: (1) he is a member
of a protected class, and (2) he applied for, and did not receive, a job. Despite defendant’s argument
to the contrary, the district court found that plaintiff had established the third prima facie element,
i.e., that he was qualified for the position, but concluded that plaintiff failed to adequately
demonstrate the fourth, similarly-situated prong of a prima facie case, opining in pertinent part:
Although Plaintiff met the minimum qualifications for the position, so did twenty-
three other candidates who had made it on to the final eligibility list. Consequently,
Defendant asserts that it was allowed to form additional qualifications and review the
application materials for those additional qualifications. Barbara Hankey, who
performed the interviews and the final hiring decision, and was promoted from the
position herself, made it her goal to fill the position with someone who had criminal
justice experience.
-7-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
Whether or not creating additional requirements is an acceptable procedure, the
Court concludes that while Plaintiff has established that he was initially qualified for
the job, he has not established that he was similarly situated with Mr. Gatt, the
person whom Defendant decided to hire. It is obvious that the position of Chief
Community Corrections Field Operations Manager entails working within the
criminal justice system. A candidate with criminal justice experience is simply more
qualified than a candidate with no such experience, and the two are not similarly
situated.
Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant could not know whether Mr. Gatt was more
qualified than Plaintiff without interviewing Plaintiff lacks merit. The application
procedures prior to the interview stage provided ample opportunity to discover the
type of work experience possessed by each candidate. Plaintiff lacked any criminal
justice experience and, given the position’s job description, no reasonable jury could
conclude that Plaintiff was similarly situated with Mr. Gatt when it came to selecting
the most qualified candidate for the position of the Chief of Community Corrections
Field Operations. Thus, Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of
discrimination.
We agree. In Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994), we
explained that in order to be considered “similarly situated” for purposes of creating an inference
of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must “prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment
situation are ‘nearly identical’ to those of the [non-minority] employee[] who he alleges [was]
treated more favorably” (emphasis added). “Courts . . . should make an independent determination
as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiff’s employment status and that of the non-
protected [successful applicant].” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Rubber & Tire Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352
(6th Cir. 1998).
Here, where the value of a criminal justice background in relation to the position at issue is
self-evident, the district court properly determined that plaintiff was not similarly situated to Gatt,
whose employment application indicated that he not only met the general criteria for the position,
-8-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
but also was a police sergeant with twenty-seven years of experience on the police force. Plaintiff
had no such experience. The factor of criminal justice experience, while not mentioned in the job
announcement as a specific requirement for the job, is certainly a “relevant” consideration in the
discretionary hiring process for the position of Chief Community Corrections Field Operations
officer. As we recently noted in Browning v. Dept. of the Army, 436 F.3d 692, 696-97 (6th Cir.
2006):
[T]his court has held that employers are not rigidly bound by the language in a job
description. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1987). As explained in Wrenn,
employment-discrimination laws do “not diminish lawful traditional management
prerogatives in choosing among qualified candidates,” and an employer has “great
[ ] flexibility in choosing a management-level employee.” Id. at 502 (holding that
an employer can consider factors external to a job description when selecting among
qualified candidates (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Wrenn court further
held that “the employer’s motivation, not the applicant’s perceptions, or even an
objective assessment [ ] of what qualifications are required for a particular position,”
is key to the discrimination inquiry. Id. at 502. See also Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1297 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1998), where the D.C. Circuit observed
that[:]
“reasonable employers do not ordinarily limit their evaluation of applicants to a
mechanistic checkoff of qualifications required by the written job descriptions.
Obviously, they will take additional credentials into account, if those credentials
would prove useful in performing the job.”
Here, defendant followed all requirements of the merit system rules and affirmative action
and equal employment opportunity policies in the hiring process for the Chief of Community
Corrections Field Operations position. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendant improperly
judged the qualifications of the candidates or made the hiring selection with underlying illegal
motivations. Although plaintiff alleges Title VII and ELCRA mandated that he be afforded an
-9-
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
interview, there simply is no such requirement. The department head, Ms. Hankey, acted within
“lawful traditional management prerogatives in choosing among qualified candidates.” Wrenn, 808
F.2d at 502. In doing so, she winnowed down the application pool to the most qualified candidates
and interviewed six applicants, three of whom were minorities. She unequivocally testified that she
chose not to interview plaintiff in light of his complete lack of criminal justice experience.
Conversely, Gatt’s extensive criminal justice background tipped the scales heavily in his favor.
It is readily apparent from the record that Gatt was better qualified for the position than
plaintiff. “So long as its reasons are not discriminatory, an employer is free to choose among
qualified candidates.” Id. at 502. See, e.g., Nickell v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 16 F.
App’x 401, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (concluding that because the plaintiff was less
qualified in all relevant respects for the vacant position than the successful applicant, he failed to
demonstrate that he was similarly situated and thus did not make out a prima facie Title VII case),
cert. den. 536 U.S. 922 (2002); cf., White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 243-44
(6th Cir. 2005), and Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691-92 (6th Cir. 2004) (both concluding in
context of failure to promote discrimination claims that because the successful candidates had
superior experience and qualifications regarding material and relevant aspects of vacant job
openings, plaintiffs were not similarly situated to successful candidates as required to meet the
fourth prong of the prima facie burden). Under the present circumstances, summary judgment was
appropriately granted to defendant.
- 10 -
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendant.
- 11 -
No. 05-1162
Young v. Oakland County
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in judgment. It seems to me that the
plaintiff probably carried his not-very-arduous burden of establishing a prima facie case. Three of
the six people selected for job interviews had never worked in the criminal justice system, and that
fact, coupled with the failure of the county to list criminal justice experience as a requirement for
the job, suggests to me that the county itself assumed that a qualified applicant without criminal
justice experience could be comparable to a qualified applicant with such experience. The county
articulated a legitimate reason for its final selection, however, and I agree with the district court that
the stated reason was not shown to have been a pretext for race discrimination. This conclusion is
consistent with our recent decision in Browning v. Dept. of the Army, 436 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2006),
a case that was resolved at the final stage of the burden-shifting analysis. I would affirm the
judgment in the present case on the same basis.
- 12 -