United States v. Stephanie Corsmeier

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0534n.06
FILED
No. 11-3506
Aug 02, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
v. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
STEPHANIE CORSMEIER,
Defendant-Appellee.
/
BEFORE: MARTIN, CLAY, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The government appeals the sentence imposed by the district court upon
Defendant’s plea of guilty to a single violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. In a written plea agreement
(“Plea Agreement”), Defendant and the government agreed that “a sentence that includes an 18-
month term of imprisonment is the appropriate disposition of this case.” The district court accepted
the agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and after
considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sentenced Defendant to “a total term of 18
months imprisonment,” consisting of three months in prison followed by fifteen months in a halfway
house as a condition of supervised release. The government now appeals on the basis that the district
court breached the Plea Agreement.
No. 11-3506
By sentencing Defendant to confinement in a federal prison for three months followed by
confinement in a halfway house for the next 15 months, for a total of 18 months of confinement, the
district court satisfied its obligation under the Plea Agreement. To the extent the phrase “term of
imprisonment” is ambiguous as to the type of confinement that should be imposed, the district court
properly resolved this ambiguity in favor of its “independent obligation to exercise its discretion”
to fashion an appropriate sentence. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011) (plurality)
(discussing the district court’s “independent obligation to exercise its discretion” to fashion an
appropriate sentence); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3582; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005).
Accordingly, there being no error to complain of, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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No. 11-3506
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Criminal Procedure Rule 11(c)(1)(C) states that
a sentencing recommendation set forth in a plea agreement “binds the court once the court accepts
the plea agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The district court in this case “accept[ed] the Rule
11(c)(1)(C) agreement entered into by the parties[.]” Statement of Reasons at 5. That agreement
stated that “a sentence that includes an 18-month term of imprisonment is the appropriate disposition
of this case.” Plea Agreement ¶ 3. A person subject to a “term of imprisonment” is “committed to
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier released
for satisfactory behavior[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a). Thus, per the plea agreement here, Corsmeier
should have been committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 18 months. But the district
court’s judgment provides: “The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States
Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of THREE (3) MONTHS.” (Emphasis in
original.)
The district court does not have discretion to violate Rule 11(c)(1)(C). See, e.g., Freeman
v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 2011 WL 2472797 at *9 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (the “very purpose of (C) agreements” is to “bind the district court and allow the
Government and defendant to determine what sentence he will receive”); United States v. Mandell,
905 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1990) (“once the district court accepts the plea agreement, it is bound
by the bargain”). Here, the district court’s judgment violates Rule 11(c)(1)(C) because it commits
Corsmeier to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for three months rather than 18. That she will
spend 15 months in a halfway house during her term of supervised release does not change the fact
of the violation, because she will not be in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during that time.
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No. 11-3506
Corsmeier’s sentence is contrary to law. I would vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand for resentencing consistent with the plea agreement. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
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