Sterling-Ward v. Tujaka

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0526n.06
Filed: July 25, 2007
No. 06-1505
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DARITA STERLING-WARD, Next
Friend of Sharonda Sterling, a minor
ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellant, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
EDWARD TUJAKA; MICHAEL
ALMERANTI; LISA MONTICCIOLO,
Defendants-Appellees.
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BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Darita Sterling-Ward, next friend of Sharonda Sterling, sued
Defendants Edward Tujaka, Michael Almeranti, and Lisa Monticciolo, police officers with the City
of Grosse Pointe (collectively “Defendants”), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
based on Defendants’ arrest of Sharonda for disorderly conduct. The district court granted summary
judgment to Defendants and denied summary judgment to Plaintiff.
On appeal, Plaintiff claims that the district court incorrectly ruled as a matter of law that
Defendants’ entries into Plaintiff’s home were consensual, and that Defendants were otherwise
entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on unlawful entry. Plaintiff also
asserts that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on unlawful arrest
on the grounds that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Sharonda for disorderly disturbance
under the City of Grosse Pointe’s Code of Ordinances. Third, Plaintiff contends that the district
court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s state law tort claims of false arrest/imprisonment, assault and
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and supervisory liability.
Having had the benefit of oral argument and having reviewed the parties’ briefs and
applicable law, we find that we have little to add to the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned
opinion dated February 14, 2006. Plaintiff cannot now create a genuine issue of fact for trial because
her counsel conceded at oral argument in the district court that Sharonda did not ask the officers to
leave during the first visit and conceded that she was not contesting the first entry. Thus, the district
court’s holding that Defendants’ first entry was based on both Nicole Saleh’s apparent authority and
Sharonda’s implied consent remains valid. That ruling also supports the district court’s conclusion
that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the second entry, given the apparent
authority and implied consent from Saleh and Sharonda provided Defendants the first time they
entered the home. Plaintiff’s other contentions are without merit for the reasons stated by the district
court.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.