United States v. Boyd

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0829n.06
Filed: November 14, 2006
No. 05-6451
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
DETROIT BOYD, ) OPINION
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; and REEVES, District
Judge.*
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. With its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), the Supreme Court altered the federal sentencing landscape. Federal district courts must now
treat the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) as advisory, not mandatory, and
must “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Federal appellate courts, meanwhile, review sentences under a
“reasonableness” standard of review.
On his appeal from his sentence for felony possession, Detroit Boyd argues that the district
court confused the different roles of sentencing and appellate courts, and simply looked to whether
*
The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, sitting by designation.
No. 05-6451
United States v. Boyd
a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range would be reasonable. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm his sentence.
I.
On March 11, 2003, a jury convicted Boyd of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced Boyd to 120 months of imprisonment
(the statutory maximum) and three years of supervised release. On appeal, a panel of this court
reversed and remanded for resentencing because the district court had sentenced Boyd under a
mandatory-Guidelines scheme, in violation of Booker. United States v. Boyd, No. 03-6127, slip op.
at 2 (6th Cir. June 9, 2005). On remand, the district court held another sentencing hearing, at the
conclusion of which it imposed the same amount of imprisonment and supervised release.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
As noted above, we review Boyd’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Cruz, 461
F.3d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2006). We afford a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range
with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Id. In contrast, in its role at sentencing, the district
court
must appreciate the advisory nature of the [G]uidelines, must calculate the
[G]uidelines’ recommendation correctly and must consider the § 3553(a) factors in
exercising [its] independent judgment about what sentence to impose, United States
v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006), though “[s]uch consideration, . . .
-2-
No. 05-6451
United States v. Boyd
need not be evidenced explicitly” in some mechanical form, [United States v.]
Williams, 436 F.3d [706,] 708 [(6th Cir. 2006)].
Id.
Boyd challenges neither the district court’s understanding of the advisory nature of the
Guidelines, its Guidelines range calculation, nor any particular part of the district court’s weighing
of the various § 3553(a) factors. Rather, Boyd claims that the district court labored under the
erroneous legal perception that it had to impose what it believed to be a “reasonable” sentence in
light of the sentencing factors.
Upon review of the record, we find no reversible error. Initially, we note that Boyd’s
sentence fell within the calculated Guidelines range (100-125 months, truncated to a statutory
maximum of 120 months), and is therefore presumptively reasonable. During the sentencing
hearing, the district court spent considerable time going through the relevant sentencing factors,
including: (a) the advisory Guidelines range (§ 3553(a)(4)(A)); (b) the nature and circumstances of
the offense (§ 3553(a)(1)); (c) Boyd’s extensive criminal history (§ 3553(a)(1)); (d) his mental
problems and the need for treatment (§ 3553(a)(2)(D)); and (e) the court’s duty to protect the public
(§ 3553(a)(2)(C)). In the end, the district court placed considerable weight on Boyd’s long criminal
history and his need for supervised mental health treatment in sentencing him to ten years’
imprisonment. The district court’s comprehensive analysis of the sentencing factors “certainly
allows for intelligent appellate review.” United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).
-3-
No. 05-6451
United States v. Boyd
Boyd correctly points out, however, that the district court went on to state at the end of the
hearing that the sentence was “reasonable.” Of course, as explained above, “a district court’s job
is not to impose a ‘reasonable’ sentence” but rather “to impose ‘a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of section 3553(a)(2).” United States v. Foreman, 436
F.3d 638, 644 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006). Yet, “[m]erely by saying that the sentence he wishes to impose
is ‘reasonable,’ a district judge does not necessarily commit reversible error.” Cruz, 461 F.3d at 754;
cf. United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We decline to conclude that by using
the term ‘reasonable’ or by acknowledging that the appellate court will apply a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness to a sentence, the district court is itself applying that presumption.”).
The district judge here “did not take his eye off the central sentencing considerations before him,”
Cruz, 461 F.3d at 755 – i.e., the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including a properly
calculated Guidelines range. The district court’s sole reference to its belief that the sentence was
“reasonable” was, at most, a minor procedural error. See id. at 755-56. As this technical error did
not affect the district court’s application of the sentencing factors or the exercise of its independent
judgment, it was harmless.
III.
Accordingly, we affirm Boyd’s sentence.
-4-