Robert Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0090n.06
No. 20-5143
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Feb 12, 2021
ROBERT YOUNG, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CAMPBELL COUNTY, KENTUCKY et al., )
) OPINION
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Robert Young was formerly incarcerated
at the Campbell County Detention Center (“CCDC”) in Kentucky. During his detention, he
sustained serious injuries from an assault by another inmate named Papa Ka. After his release, he
brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Campbell County, CCDC’s Jailer James
Daley, in his official and individual capacities, and several of CCDC’s deputies and sergeants
violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care and protection from serious harm in jail.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and Young challenges that
decision on appeal. Because Young did not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether his injuries resulted from a policy, custom, or act of Campbell
County or Jailer Daley, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Jailer Daley, in his official capacity, and Campbell County. Because Young also did not put forth
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Deputies Matthew
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
Fassler, Ryan Henning, and William Snider, Sergeants Jacob Lohr, Anna Mischell, and Lamieka
Wright, and Jailer Daley acted with deliberate indifference toward any risk of serious harm posed
by Ka or any need for medical care evinced by Young, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in their favor as well. However, because Young did establish a genuine issue
of material fact on his claim against Deputy Jacob Denney, we REVERSE the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Deputy Denney, and REMAND this case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Young, the party opposing the
summary judgment motion. The instant case involves several individual Defendants and their
encounters with Young and Ka, the inmate who assaulted Young, as well as the policies and
customs of the CCDC and their effects on inmate safety.
A. The Campbell County Detention Center Prisoner Classification Procedures
At the time of Young’s detention, Jailer Daley ran the CCDC. He was responsible for
developing the facility’s prisoner classification system and had final authority over inmate
classification and housing assignments. 501 Ky. Admin. Regs. 3:110 (2016); R. 54-10
(Classification and Housing Policy at 6) (Page ID #1072). Jailer Daley promulgated a written
classification policy and post orders that guided classification officers’ implementation of the
policy. R. 54-10 (Classification and Housing Policy); R. 54-11 (Classification Post Order). The
policies and guidelines made classification officers responsible for ensuring that “all inmates are
correctly classified using the established guidelines of the facility and assigning housing locations
based on those findings.” R. 54-11 (Classification Post Order at 1) (Page ID #1073). At all
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relevant times during this case, CCDC had three classification officers: Deputy Theresa Plummer,
Deputy Bernard Henke, and Deputy Henry Webber. None of them was ever named a party to this
suit.
Upon a person’s arrival for booking at CCDC, classification officers were required to
examine their background and conduct an interview to complete the classification process.
Classification officers verified whether the person previously stayed in CCDC or whether the
person had any other state incarcerations, and the officers collected relevant charge history and
records of disciplinary action. Id. at 2 (Page ID #1074). During the in-person interview, the
officers also questioned the person about their disciplinary history during previous incarcerations,
their medical history, whether the person had any friends or family at the facility, and whether the
person had any issues with an individual or specific population type at the jail. R. 45 (Plummer
Dep. at 54–56) (Page ID #576). Based on the information gathered, classification officers assigned
the person a classification of minimum, medium, or maximum and noted whether the person had
any special needs. R. 54-11 (Classification Post Order at 2) (Page ID #1074).
Classification officers also were responsible for reclassifying inmates “either due to a
request made by the inmate or a change in the inmate’s charge/behavior status.” Id. at 4 (Page ID
#1076). To monitor changes in an inmate’s behavior, the classification officers reviewed all
incident reports generated by the officers supervising the inmates. R. 45 (Plummer Dep. at 102–
08) (Page ID #588–89). Jail officials could recommend that an inmate be reclassified, usually by
submitting a request in an incident report or an email or by speaking directly to the classification
officers. Id. at 78–79 (Page ID #582). However, classification officers alone had the authority to
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determine whether reclassification was necessary, which was generally at their discretion. Id. at
79–80 (Page ID #582).
B. Ka’s Detention and His Assault of Young
On March 17, 2016, police brought Young to CCDC due to a probation violation, and
classification officers assigned him a minimum classification level. R. 38-3 (Young Admission
Report at 1) (Page ID #198); R. 38-4 (Young Primary Classification at 2) (Page ID #202). Officers
arrested Ka and brought him to CCDC on April 7, 2016, on charges of drug possession and
possession of a handgun. R. 54-3 (Ka Release Report & Assessment at 1) (Page ID #1007).
Classification officers assigned Ka a minimum classification level. Id. at 2 (Page ID #1008). Ka
and Young did not share a cell until sometime in early June 2016.
Before Ka shared a cell with Young, CCDC deputies had disciplined Ka on several
occasions, mostly due to Ka’s failure to follow CCDC’s rules or officials’ orders. See, e.g., R. 38-
10 (Incident Report); R. 38-11 (Incident Report); R. 38-12 (Incident Report); R. 38-13 (Incident
Report); R. 38-14 (Incident Report); R. 38-16 (Incident Report). However, a few incidents were
more serious and took place over the course of several days. On May 13, 2016, Sergeant Lohr
investigated a request from an inmate named May who shared a cell with Ka. May asked the
officers to remove him from the cell because “Ka was making comments about his family and
threatening to take commissary from him.” R. 38-15 (Incident Report at 1) (Page ID #215).
Another inmate related a similar accusation. Id. at 2 (Page ID #216). However, other inmates told
Sergeant Lohr that May was the one causing problems. Id. at 1 (Page ID #215). After completing
the investigation, Sergeant Lohr moved Ka to another cell but did not levy any restrictions against
him “due to [inmate’s] lack of proof of the accusations.” Id. at 2 (Page ID #216); R. 44 (Lohr Dep.
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at 65–67) (Page ID #548). On May 15, 2016, Sergeant Mischell submitted a report detailing how
Ka was found kicking the wall of his cell; after being restrained, Ka twice turned aggressively
toward deputies as they led him to the main hall and placed him in a safety chair due to his
continued resistance. R. 38-17 (Incident Report at 3) (Page ID #220). Five days later, on May 20,
2016, Sergeant Mischell “responded to an active fight call” involving Ka and another inmate. R.
38-18 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #222). When Sergeant Mischell arrived, deputies had
handcuffed Ka and the other inmate and deployed pepper spray to stop them from fighting. Id.Both inmates received ten days in isolation, and Sergeant Mischell recommended that Ka be
“reclassified due to multiple incidents with jail staff and other inmates.” Id. The classification
officers did not reclassify Ka at that time.
Starting in early June 2016, Ka and Young shared cell 220 in back pod 2 (“BP2”). At some
point, Ka stole commissary items from Young. R. 40 (Young Dep. at 40) (Page ID #417). Young
did not confront Ka about the stolen items, but another inmate took them from Ka and gave them
back to Young. Id. at 40–41 (Page ID #417). At around 1:00 p.m. on June 15, 2016, Ka and
another inmate named Chapman forced Young into the cell’s shower to fight Ka over the
commissary items. Id. at 42–45 (Page ID #418); R. 54-9 (Investigation Emails at 2) (Page ID
#1064).1 Ka punched Young in the eye, and they fell on the floor with Ka falling on and injuring
Young’s knee. R. 40 (Young Dep. at 51–52) (Page ID #420). Ka continued to beat Young, and
1
The email notes the date of the assault as Wednesday, June 16, 2016. Young also testified that the assault
took place on June 16, although his complaint alleges that the assault occurred on June 15. The district court assumed
the assault happened on June 15, and Defendants on appeal, without waiving any rights, assume the same. Appellee’s
Br. at 8 n.1.
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at some point, Young lost consciousness. Id. at 52–53 (Page ID #420). After the fight, Young
limped back to his bunk with a bruised face and black eye. Id. at 54, 56 (Page ID #421). For the
next three days, Young mostly slept or was unconscious, did not speak with any jail employee,
and rarely left his bed, except to use the bathroom. Id. at 56–62 (Page ID #421–23). Chapman
brought Young his meals. Id. at 57–59 (Page ID #421–22). Although Chapman did not physically
prevent Young from asking for help, Young felt that Chapman’s continuous presence by Young’s
bed deterred Young from approaching jail staff to ask for help. Id. at 59–62 (Page ID #422–23).
Finally, at around 7:00 a.m. on June 18, Deputy Shawn Hartman performed a medical pass
and called for Young to receive his medication, but Young did not get out of his bunk. R. 60
(Hartman Dep. at 67) (Page ID #1606). Deputy Hartman then asked Young to come fill out a
refusal form and, as Young approached, Deputy Hartman noticed Young’s black eye and limp. Id.Deputy Hartman notified his supervisor, Sergeant Lohr, and then took Young to booking. Id. at
70 (Page ID #1609). While at booking, Young told Sergeant Mischell that he had been in a fight
with Ka, and she sent Young to the medical staff for treatment. R. 40 (Young Dep. at 67) (Page
ID #424). As the shift supervisor, Sergeant Mischell continued to investigate the incident,
disciplined the inmates involved, and informed her superiors about the results of her investigation.
R. 54-9 (Investigation Emails at 2–3) (Page ID #1064–65).
CCDC medical staff x-rayed Young’s leg and provided him with crutches and aspirin. R.
40 (Young Dep. at 70–71) (Page ID #425). They scheduled Young an appointment at a hospital,
and medical staff at the hospital diagnosed Young with and treated him for a fractured knee. R.
38-24 (Imaging Report at 1) (Page ID #231). Young also told CCDC medical staff that he thought
he suffered from a concussion. R. 40 (Young Dep. at 68) (Page ID #424). Although a nurse
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No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
listened to Young’s symptoms and agreed that it sounded like Young might have had a concussion,
neither CCDC medical staff nor an outside medical provider examined Young for a concussion.
Id. at 69, 77 (Page ID #424, 426). Young also never talked to any outside medical provider about
his concussion. Id. at 77 (Page ID #426).
During these same three days, Defendants Denney, Fassler, Henning, Snider, Lohr,
Mischell, and Wright had a variety of opportunities to observe and interact with Young based on
their respective duties. These duties included performing headcounts of inmates, passing out meals
and medicine, and generally observing BP2 to ensure that inmates complied with CCDC rules and
that no unusual or significant events had occurred. See, e.g., R. 54-13 (Inmate Supervision Policy
at 1) (Page ID #1086); R. 54-15 (Headcount Post Order at 1) (Page ID #1096). During headcounts,
inmates stay in their bunks and “[o]ne deputy will call inmate names while the second deputy
visually acknowledges and scans the armband of each inmate.” R. 54-15 (Headcount Post Order
at 2) (Page ID #1097). “Inmates must respond both verbally and physically.” Id. However,
sometimes the scanners did not work, or inmates did not have wristbands. R. 58 (Fassler Dep. at
14) (Page ID #1386). On those occasions, deputies would visually check the wristbands or simply
do a physical count. Id. at 14, 17 (Page ID #1386, 1389). During observation scans, a deputy
conducts a “visual inspection of each cell area” and observes “inmates’ behavior and appearance
for unusual or questionable situations” like “bruises or cuts on an inmate’s face or arms.” R. 54-
13 (Inmate Supervision Policy at 1) (Page ID #1086). None of the individual Defendants recalled
seeing Young with injuries prior to the morning of June 18, 2016.
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C. Procedural History
Young filed a complaint against Defendants Denney, Fassler, Henning, Snider, Lohr,
Mischell, Wright, and Daley in their individual capacities and against Defendants Campbell
County and Jailer Daley, in his official capacity, alleging, inter alia, § 1983 claims of deliberate
indifference due to their failure to protect Young from inmate violence and their failure to provide
medical care.2 R. 1 (Complaint) (Page ID #1). Discovery proceeded, and Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Young failed to put forth sufficient
evidence to show that they violated his constitutional rights and, even if they did, that Defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity. R. 38 (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page ID #156). The district
court agreed and held that Young had not put forth sufficient facts that would permit a reasonable
juror to find a constitutional violation had occurred; the court concluded that all individual
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that the municipality also was not liable.
Young v. Campbell County, No. 2:17-cv-97, 2020 WL 411710, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2020).
Young timely appealed. R. 71 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #1847).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review district court grants of summary judgment de novo. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
County, 390 F.3d 890, 894–95 (6th Cir. 2004). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, this
2
Young voluntarily dismissed several other CCDC officers from this suit, see R. 31 (Order of Voluntary
Dismissal) (Page ID #143), and Young conceded in his response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that
several Defendants should be dismissed from certain claims. R. 54 (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 44)
(Page ID #1004).
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court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.” B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2001). To defeat
a summary-judgment motion, the non-movant must put forward “evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Klepper v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir.
1990) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to carry this burden, but in considering a summary-judgment motion,
courts ‘may . . . inquire into the plausibility of circumstantial evidence.’” Bard v. Brown County,
970 F.3d 738, 748 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994)).
We evaluate Young’s claims against the CCDC officials in their individual capacity under
the framework of qualified immunity. The framework uses a three-part test, “which requires us to
determine (1) whether a constitutional right was violated; (2) whether that right was clearly
established and one of which a reasonable person would have known; and (3) whether the official's
action was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503,
511 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
“Whether qualified immunity applies to an official’s actions is a question of law that [we] review[]
de novo.” Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 2001).
B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
Young alleges a claim under § 1983, arguing that Sergeants Lohr and Mischell and Jailer
Daley, in their individual capacities, were each deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of
serious harm posed by housing Ka with nonviolent inmates like Young. To assert a cause of action
arising under § 1983, Young must claim that the actions of a state government official deprived
him of a constitutional right. The Supreme Court has held that “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate
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indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). To sustain a deliberate-indifference claim based
on officials’ failure to protect an inmate from a substantial risk of serious harm, a plaintiff must
prove both an objective and a subjective element. Id. at 834, 837.
To satisfy the objective component, Young must show that “he [was] incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834. Defendants do not contest that
Young’s claim satisfies the objective component. Clearly, Young suffered from serious harm after
being housed with Ka. Young’s contention that CCDC failed to reclassify Ka and the undisputed
evidence that Young was the victim of an attack from Ka suffices to fulfill the objective component
of this analysis. See Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that “while a prisoner does not need to demonstrate that he has been the victim of an actual attack
to bring a personal safety claim,” such evidence will suffice).
Young argues that the district court erred when it ruled that Young failed to put forth
sufficient evidence to satisfy the subjective component. A plaintiff satisfies the subjective
component by showing that a jury could reasonably infer that “(1) ‘the official being sued
subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to the prisoner,’ (2) the official
‘did in fact draw the inference,’ and (3) the official ‘then disregarded that risk.’” Richko v. Wayne
County, 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016), (quoting Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437,
446 (6th Cir. 2014)). A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant’s
subjective knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. However, “prison officials who actually knew
of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Because we
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determine each official’s liability based solely on the official’s own knowledge and actions, we
consider each defendant separately. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011).
1. Sergeant Lohr
Young argues that Sergeant Lohr’s one encounter with Ka establishes that Sergeant Lohr
had substantial knowledge of Ka’s threat to other inmates. Specifically, Sergeant Lohr knew that
two inmates accused Ka of threatening and harassing them for their commissary. R. 38-15
(Incident Report). Based upon this knowledge, Young asserts that Sergeant Lohr should have
recommended Ka be reclassified because of the harm Ka posed due to his “predatory nature.”
Appellant’s Br. at 53. However, this one incident cannot support an inference that Sergeant Lohr
perceived that Ka posed a substantial risk to other inmates’ safety such that a reclassification to
medium security was warranted. Sergeant Lohr was aware that Ka was “problematic” because
“[Ka] had a lot of cell movements” and “[h]ad a tough time staying in one place.” R. 44 (Lohr
Dep. at 66) (Page ID #548). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Young, a jury could
find that Sergeant Lohr knew Ka’s behavior was “predatory.” Id. at 72 (Page ID #549). But this
sole incident does not rise to level of showing that Sergeant Lohr was aware that Ka posed a
substantial risk of physical danger to Young or any other inmate. See Thompson, 29 F.3d at 243(noting that an absence of prior instances of physical violence forecloses a determination that there
was a reasonable fear for inmates’ personal safety).
Even considering the risk to the specific inmates involved in this incident, Sergeant Lohr
took reasonable measures by reporting the incident and moving Ka from that cell. At the time of
the incident, Sergeant Lohr did not possess the authority to classify inmates or dictate where to
house them. R. 44 (Lohr Dep. at 16–18, 49) (Page ID #535–36, 544). At most, he could make
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emergency moves whenever there was “an altercation” or “an ongoing argument that [he] deemed
as possibly volatile to one or multiple other inmates.” Id. at 45 (Page ID #543). Classification
officers handled all housing and reclassification issues; Sergeant Lohr could raise concerns to
classification and make recommendations, but classification “had the ultimate say.” Id. at 49, 70
(Page ID #544, 549). Young cannot show that Sergeant Lohr’s “actions or omissions within his
limited role” displayed a disregard for whatever risk Ka posed to any inmate’s safety. Williams v.
McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, 11 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Young has not shown a material dispute
as to whether Sergeant Lohr acted with deliberate indifference to Young’s safety, the district court
properly found that Sergeant Lohr was entitled to qualified immunity.
2. Sergeant Mischell
Young contends that Sergeant Mischell’s actions show deliberate indifference to the known
risk that Ka posed other inmates’ safety. He claims that (1) her failure to recommend prior to May
20, 2016, that Ka be reclassified after various encounters in which he displayed aggressive
behavior; (2) her failure to ensure that Ka was reassessed for reclassification after her May 20
recommendation to the classification officers; and (3) her failure to place Ka on “red dot” status
after he was not reclassified is “more than enough evidence to allow a jury to conclude that
Mischell ignored or recklessly disregarded a known risk of serious harm to Young.” Appellant’s
Br. at 51.
We cannot conclude that Sergeant Mischell was subjectively aware that Ka posed a
substantial risk to inmates’ safety before May 20. Prior to May 20, Sergeant Mischell interacted
with Ka on three separate occasions. The first two occurred over the course of two days.
Ka disrespected officers and did not follow their instructions, which resulted in classification
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removing him from dorm housing and placing him in isolation for three days. R. 38-10 (Incident
Report); R. 38-11 (Incident Report). About a month later, Sergeant Mischell submitted a report
detailing how deputies found Ka kicking the wall of his cell. When the deputies tried to restrain
Ka, he twice turned aggressively toward the deputies as they led him to the main hall and placed
him in a safety chair due to his continued resistance. R. 38-17 (Incident Report at 3) (Page ID
#220). At most, this evidence suggests that Ka consistently engaged in recalcitrant behavior
toward jail officials that is not atypical in a detention setting. But it fails to establish that Sergeant
Mischell was aware that Ka might randomly attack other inmates.
Arguably, Sergeant Mischell was aware that Ka posed a substantial risk to other inmates’
safety after his fight with another inmate on May 20. But Young cannot show that she displayed
deliberate indifference to that risk. Like Sergeant Lohr, Sergeant Mischell could only raise
concerns to classification officers and recommend that they reclassify an inmate. R. 41 (Mischell
Dep. at 53–54, 96) (Page ID #449, 459). The record reflects that after the May 20 fight, Sergeant
Mischell recommended in her incident report that Ka be “reclassified due to multiple incidents
with jail staff and other inmates.” R. 38-18 (Incident Report at 2) (Page ID #222). Sergeant
Mischell also submitted reports for every incident in which she was involved with Ka. CCDC
trained its classification officers to review every incident report and use them to evaluate whether
an inmate should be reclassified. R. 45 (Plummer Dep. at 78–79, 101–08) (Page ID #582, 588–
89). Young faults Sergeant Mischell for not following up on her recommendation to reclassify
Ka. Appellant’s Br. at 51. Although a more diligent officer might have followed up with
classification, Sergeant Mischell’s adherence to protocol cannot sustain a claim of deliberate
indifference. Rather than consciously disregarding the risk that Ka posed to other inmates,
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Sergeant Mischell took all the appropriate actions offered by her limited role in reclassification.
At most, her conduct suggests possible negligence, which is not enough to establish a violation of
Young’s constitutional rights. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“Eighth Amendment liability requires
‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’”) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
Nor can Young sustain his claim with his argument that Sergeant Mischell should have
placed Ka on “red dot” status. Sergeant Mischell testified that “red dot” status means “[t]wo
deputies have to be with [an inmate] at all times” with the inmate being “shackled and cuffed when
he leaves the cell.” R. 41 (Mischell Dep. at 48–49) (Page ID #447–48). Officials place someone
on “red dot” status when there is “a fight with severe injuries,” or “if [the inmate] go[es] after
deputies [or] jail staff.” Id. at 51 (Page ID #448). Even construing the facts in a light most
favorable to Young, none of the incidents in which Sergeant Mischell was involved rose to the
level of necessitating “red dot” status. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Sergeant
Mischell was proper.
3. Jailer Daley
Young contends that Jailer Daley failed to “direct anyone to reclassify Ka,” despite Daley’s
alleged awareness of the substantial risk of harm Ka posed to other inmates, “even though he was
ultimately responsible.” Appellant’s Br. at 50. We analyze Young’s individual-capacity claim
against Jailer Daley under a supervisory-liability theory because Daley delegates classification and
reclassification responsibilities to the classification officers and delegates the review of all incident
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reports to classification officers and shift supervisors.3 R. 47 (Daley Dep. at 26, 30, 34–35) (Page
ID #648–50).
Young’s claim does not meet the threshold requirements to impose supervisory liability.
Under § 1983, for supervisory liability to attach, the allegation of liability must be based upon
something more than a “mere failure to act.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir.
1999). Instead, Young must demonstrate that Jailer Daley “either encouraged the specific incident
of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Hays v. Jefferson County, 668
F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending officers.” Id. Consequently, if a plaintiff cannot establish that a subordinate engaged
in unconstitutional conduct, any attempt to impose supervisory liability must fail. See McQueen
v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). Because Young has failed to establish
a genuine issue of material fact for his failure-to-protect claims against Sergeants Lohr and
Mischell, they cannot support his claim against Jailer Daley.
Even if Young could point to other jail officials and demonstrate that their conduct violated
Young’s constitutional rights, Young does not provide any facts showing that Jailer Daley directly
3
The district court noted that though Young appeared to waive his deliberate-indifference claim against Jailer
Daley in his individual capacity, see R. 54 (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 44) (Page ID #1004), Young’s
response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment appeared to assert a deliberate-indifference claim under the
failure-to-protect theory against Jailer Daley in his individual capacity. Young, 2020 WL 411710, at *8; R. 54 (Pl.’s
Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 10–11, 40) (Page ID #970–71, 1000). Thus, the district court considered whether
a failure-to-protect claim against Jailer Daley in his individual capacity would survive summary judgment. In his
brief on appeal, Young continues to pursue a failure-to-protect claim against Jailer Daley in his individual capacity,
see Appellant’s Br. at 46–50, and Jailer Daley responds to those arguments in his brief. Appellee’s Br. at 25–27.
Thus, we do not consider this claim to be waived.
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participated in such conduct. The record reflects that Jailer Daley did not directly participate in
any reclassification assessment for Ka. See R. 47 (Daley Dep. at 35) (Page ID #650). Young did
present some circumstantial evidence that, when viewed in a light most favorable to Young, might
allow a jury reasonably to infer that Jailer Daley saw or at least heard about Ka’s more serious
incident reports. Jailer Daley testified that classification officers and supervisors brought
significant reports to his attention, that he tried to review significant reports on his own, and that
every Thursday he met with classification officers, supervisors, and other officers to review
“particular issues or occurrences.” Id. at 21–31 (Page ID #647–49). Under his definition,
significant issues included “[r]ecurring assaults with a single inmate,” a case with a “significant
injury,” or circumstances where an inmate consistently violates rules. Id. at 24–25 (Page ID #647–
48). Arguably, the incident report where Sergeant Mischell recommends that Ka be “reclassified
due to multiple incidents with jail staff and other inmates” would qualify. R. 38-18 (Incident
Report at 2) (Page ID #222). However, as mentioned earlier, Jailer Daley almost never participated
in the reclassification of inmates. R. 47 (Daley Dep. at 35) (Page ID #650). Thus, the mere fact
that Jailer Daley might have reviewed an incident report involving a recommendation that Ka be
reclassified does not establish that Jailer Daley directly encouraged or participated in any
classification officer’s alleged failure to assess or reclassify Ka.
Nor has Young presented any evidence that Jailer Daley implicitly authorized, approved,
or knowingly acquiesced in the behavior of his subordinates in their alleged violation of Young’s
rights. When a jail official is alleged to be personally responsible for a specific duty that the officer
delegates, we must determine whether the supervisor “abandon[s] the specific duties of his position
. . . in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the proper workings of the [jail].” Taylor
16
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995). For example, in Taylor, we determined
that the warden was personally responsible for reviewing and approving all prisoner transfers and
concluded that the plaintiff had shown a genuine issue as to whether the warden was aware of and
acquiesced in his subordinates’ improper approval of transfer orders when the warden (1) was
aware that his direct designees redelegated authority without any authorization; (2) did not know
the procedures they used to approve transfers; and (3) “had no review procedures in place to
determine whether his authority was being abused.” Id. at 80. Young provides no comparable
evidence. In contrast, the record reflects that Jailer Daley routinely met with classification officers,
knew the training and policies used by the classification officers, and had no knowledge of any
serious incidents caused by classification officers failing to reclassify an inmate. R. 47 (Daley
Dep. at 21–25, 30–31, 34, 37–44, 82) (Page ID #647–652, 662). Because Young has not met his
burden to provide evidence showing that Jailer Daley knew his policies and procedures were not
working and yet completely abdicated his responsibilities, Young’s supervisory-liability claim
fails to survive summary judgment.
C. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Young also claims that several CCDC officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
acting with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs that resulted from Ka’s
assault. Appellant’s Br. at 34. Specifically, Young claims that the three-day delay in providing
him medical treatment for his injuries violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care.4
4
Young does not challenge the treatment he received after Deputy Hartman discovered his injuries on the
morning of June 18.
17
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
Id. at 45. Like a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a claim based on deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need has an objective and a subjective component. Blackmore,
390 F.3d at 895. “The objective component requires the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’
medical need.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). As with a failure-to-protect claim, to prove
the subjective component, a plaintiff must establish that an official “knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” which requires the official to “be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837). Consequently, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Nonetheless, a plaintiff
may provide circumstantial evidence from which we can infer that a prison official had the
requisite knowledge. Id. at 842. We assess the subjective component “in light of the prison
authorities’ current attitudes and conduct.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (quoting Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)). As discussed earlier, we consider each defendant’s liability
based solely on the official’s own knowledge and actions. See Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767.
Young contends the district court erred in finding that not all his injuries constituted
objectively serious medical needs. Appellant’s Br. at 34–35. Specifically, Young argues that his
alleged black eye and concussion should serve as a basis for his claim along with his knee fracture.
To establish a sufficiently serious medical need, a plaintiff must point to a medical need “that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d
18No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897). But when a plaintiff’s “affliction
is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” the plaintiff must provide medical proof so that we are able
to “assess whether the delay [in adequate medical care] caused a serious medical injury.”
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898. Young’s knee fracture clearly qualifies as a serious medical need.
However, no doctor ever diagnosed Young’s black eye as mandating treatment, nor is there any
medical evidence in the record that Young suffered a concussion or any evidence that it was
obvious that he suffered from a concussion. Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the facts show
that Young’s black eye evinced “an obvious need for medical care that laymen would readily
discern as requiring prompt medical attention by competent health care providers.” Id. The district
court found that Young’s black eye was a minor or non-obvious injury. We disagree. On June 18,
2016, three days after the assault, the medical staff noted that Young had a black eye. R. 38-21
(Medical Progress Notes) (Page ID #225). Young also testified that Ka punched him in the face
repeatedly and that his face was bruised and swollen with a black eye that lasted two weeks. R.
40 (Young Dep. at 52–54) (Page ID #420–21). On June 19, when Sergeant Mischell viewed the
video recording of cell 220 on the day of the assault, she noticed that Young came out of the
shower “limping and his face was red and bloody.” R. 54-9 (Investigation Emails at 2) (Page ID
#1064). Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to Young, we conclude that a layperson
would clearly know that a bruised, bloodied, swollen face with a black eye required prompt
medical attention. See, e.g., Bush v. Dickerson, No. 16-6140, 2017 WL 3122012, at *3 (6th Cir.
May 3, 2017) (order) (holding that a plaintiff’s swollen eye and several cuts to his face due to an
assault constituted injuries that “a layman would clearly know required prompt medical
19
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
attention”). Accordingly, we must consider Young’s arguments concerning Defendants’
awareness and treatment of his knee injury and his black eye.
1. Deputy Denney
Of all Defendants, Deputy Denney had the most opportunities to observe Young after the
assault occurred at approximately 12:40 p.m. on June 15. Deputy Denney worked day shifts on
June 15 and June 16 and covered BP2 (Young and Ka’s cell area) from about 1:00 p.m. to 7:00
p.m. for each shift. R. 54-17 (Deputy Logs at 31–32, 82–83) (Page ID #1129–30, 1180–81).
During those two shifts, he performed a total of seven observation scans, two meal passes, two
med passes, and one headcount for the cells in BP2. Id. When asked, Deputy Denney did not
recall anything about Young or the incident with Ka. R. 56 (Denney Dep. at 40–41) (Page ID
#1287–88). But Young contends that Deputy Denney had subjective knowledge of Young’s need
for medical treatment because Denney’s typical conduct during these activities supports an
inference that Deputy Denney saw Young limping and his black eye. Young also contends that
Deputy Denney consciously disregarded Young’s needs by failing to report his injuries or convey
him to the medical unit.
There were at least three situations when Deputy Denney might have become aware of
Young’s injuries: (1) during the two meal passes he conducted; (2) during the seven observation
scans; (3) or during the one headcount he performed. We cannot conclude that Deputy Denny was
subjectively aware of Young’s serious medical need during the two meal passes or seven
observation scans. Deputy Denney conducted his observation scan for cell 220 by looking through
the cell window, which did not place him close enough to see Young’s black eye. Id. at 33 (Page
ID #1280). Although Deputy Denney testified that he would always require an inmate to come to
20
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
the door and get their meal unless they refused, Young’s own testimony forecloses any inference
that Deputy Denney observed Young limping to receive his meals. Young testified that he
remained in bed, mostly asleep or unconscious, the entire three days after his assault due to his
injuries, until he approached Deputy Hartman on June 18. R. 40 (Young Dep. at 56–57) (Page ID
#421). Young also testified that he did not speak to any jail employee, that he felt personally
deterred by Chapman from getting up to go to the cell door, and that Chapman brought him his
meals. Id. at 56–62 (Page ID #421–423). Based on this testimony, Young fails to establish any
genuine dispute as to whether Deputy Denney perceived Young’s black eye or limp during meal
passes or observation scans.
Deputy Denney did testify, however, that for headcounts he had inmates sit on their bunks
while he checked their wristbands, called their names, and waited to receive some sort of verbal
confirmation from the inmate. R. 56 (Denney Dep. at 18–19) (Page ID #1265–66). He conducted
a headcount of cell 220 on June 16 at around 1:50 p.m., approximately twenty-four hours after the
assault. Based on Deputy Denney’s testimony about the way he conducted headcounts, coupled
with the fact that every official to come within close range of Young noticed his black eye, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Denney did in fact have knowledge of Young’s serious
medical need. See Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 875–76 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
defendant’s testimony about his usual practices established a genuine issue as to whether he had
actual knowledge of a plaintiff’s serious medical need). CCDC’s supervision policy bolsters this
inference as it instructs officials to “observe inmates’ behavior and appearance for unusual or
questionable situations and events” like “bruises or cuts on an inmate’s face.” R. 54-13 (Inmate
Supervision Policy at 1) (Page ID #1086). A jury could reasonably conclude that Deputy Denney
21
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
noticed a questionable situation and yet failed to question Young to ascertain how he became
injured and whether he had any other injuries. See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8 (holding that
a prison official may not “escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify
underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that
he strongly suspected to exist”). Moreover, the fact that no one reported Young’s injuries or
provided him treatment until June 18 is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Deputy Denney disregarded Young’s obvious need for medical attention.
Because the district court erred in finding that Deputy Denney did not act with deliberate
indifference to Young’s serious medical need, we must decide if Young’s right to medical care
under these circumstances was clearly established and whether Deputy Denney’s actions were
objectively unreasonable. Harris, 513 F.3d at 511. We have consistently held that “where the
circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness,
the denial of such aid constitutes [a constitutional] deprivation.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
555 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 313
(6th Cir. 2005)). As applied to this case, Young’s right to adequate medical care for his serious
medical needs has been clearly established. Furthermore, the CCDC’s own policy shows that
Deputy Denney’s actions were objectively unreasonable. Consequently, the district court erred in
granting Deputy Denney qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
2. Deputy Fassler
On June 17, Deputy Fassler conducted one meal pass and one headcount for cell 220.
According to his testimony, he supervised the training of Deputy Morris who filled out the deputy
log for that shift. R. 54-17 (Deputy Logs at 102–03) (Page ID #1200–01); R. 58 (Fassler Dep. at
22
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
72–73) (Page ID #1444–45). Unlike Deputy Denney, Deputy Fassler testified that for the
headcount, he would have stood at the cell door, called Young’s name and waited to get a verbal
and physical response from Young, even if Young just called out and waved from his bed. R. 58
(Fassler Dep. at 75–76) (Page ID #1447–48). Based on Young’s testimony that he stayed in bed,
did not speak to any jail official, and received his meals from Chapman, nothing in the record
supports an inference that Deputy Fassler perceived a substantial risk to Young’s health and then
ignored that risk. Most assuredly, Deputy Fassler could have and should have perceived Young’s
injuries if he had followed CCDC protocol for conducting the one headcount or followed up as to
why Young did not take his meal. But there is no liability under a deliberate-indifference standard
for what is arguably only negligent conduct. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of
qualified immunity to Deputy Fassler.
3. Deputy Henning
The record reflects that Deputy Henning had no close encounters with Young during the
relevant period. Deputy Henning covered BP2 on July 17 from 2:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and
performed five observation scans and a meal pass. R. 54-17 (Deputy Logs at 100–01) (Page ID
#1198–99). Deputy Henning performed his observation scans for cell 220 by looking through the
window. R. 57 (Henning Dep. at 33) (Page ID #1329). He also testified that he did not notice any
issues with Young during his shift or see an inmate with a black eye or a limp. Id. at 32–33 (Page
ID #1328–29). Considering that every official who noticed Young’s black eye did so at close
range, nothing in the record supports an inference that Deputy Henning perceived any injury to
Young and subsequently disregarded the risk such an injury posed. Thus, the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Henning.
23
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
4. Deputy Snider
Deputy Snider did not cover BP2 during any of the relevant period, although he did work
a shift covering BP1 on June 17. R. 38-27 (Daily Logs at 10) (Page ID #247). Young asserts that
Deputy Snider would have covered BP2 during Deputy Fassler’s lunch break and thus potentially
performed one observation scan of cell 220. R. 58 (Fassler Dep. at 80) (Page ID #1452). Deputy
Snider testified that his practice for observation scans was to “walk by and get a visual of each
cell” and occasionally he would enter the cell to do a check. R. 59 (Snider Dep. at 24) (Page ID
#1501). Without any evidence in the record that Deputy Snider actually performed an observation
scan of cell 220, Young cannot show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Deputy
Snider perceived Young’s injuries and consciously disregarded them. Thus, Young’s claim
against Deputy Snider cannot survive summary judgment.
5. Sergeant Lohr
Sergeant Lohr was the night-shift supervisor on June 17 through June 18 from 7:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m. R. 38-27 (Daily Logs at 11) (Page ID #248). He conducted three supervisory passes of
BP2. Id. Sergeant Lohr testified that for cell 220, he would simply look through the cell window
to make sure that there were no issues. R. 44 (Lohr Dep. at 99, 102) (Page ID #556–57). Because
Sergeant Lohr never viewed Young at a close range, Young cannot establish an inference that
Sergeant Lohr perceived his injuries but failed to take reasonable measures to alleviate the risk to
Young’s health. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Lohr.
6. Sergeant Mischell
Sergeant Mischell was the day-shift supervisor on June 17 and June 18 and worked both
days from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. R. 38-27 (Daily Logs at 9, 14) (Page ID #246, 251). On June
24
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
17, she conducted three supervisory passes of BP2. Id. Sergeant Mischell testified that for her
supervisory passes she would simply check to make sure “everybody was doing what they were
supposed to be doing and the area was safe and secure.” R. 41 (Mischell Dep. at 19) (Page ID
#440). As with Sergeant Lohr, the evidence does not substantiate that Sergeant Mischell was in
close enough range to perceive Young’s injuries during her supervisory passes. Thus, the evidence
does not support a deliberate-indifference claim against her.
7. Sergeant Wright
Sergeant Wright was the night-shift supervisor on June 15 to 16 and June 16 to 17 from
7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. R. 38-27 (Daily Logs at 3, 7) (Page ID #240, 244). She conducted three
supervisory passes of BP2 on her first shift and two on her second shift. Id. During her rounds,
Sergeant Wright usually looked through cell 220’s window but would occasionally enter the cell
if something did not look right. R. 46 (Wright Dep. at 23–24) (Page ID #626). If she entered the
cell, she tended to check faces and liked to make sure she got a verbal response from every inmate.
Id. However, once lights went out at 11:00 p.m. until the lights turned on at 6:00 a.m., Sergeant
Wright generally left the inmates undisturbed and would simply look through the cell window. Id.at 52–56 (Page ID #633–34). All but one of Sergeant Wright’s supervisory passes during June 15
through 17 took place during lights out. R. 38-27 (Daily Logs at 3, 7) (Page ID #240, 244). Based
on Sergeant Wright’s testimony concerning her practices, there is no merit in Young’s argument
that Sergeant Wright likely was aware of Young’s injuries but consciously acted with deliberate
indifference to his health. Thus, the district court properly granted Sergeant Wright qualified
immunity.
25
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
D. Municipal Liability
Young contends that the district court erred in finding that Campbell County and Jailer
Daley, in his official capacity, were not deliberately indifferent toward the risk of harm posed by
Defendants’ actions and policies. A suit against Jailer Daley in his officially capacity is
permissible under § 1983 and is equivalent to a suit against the entity on whose behalf he acts—
Campbell County. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).
To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, it is not enough for a plaintiff simply to
demonstrate that a municipality’s employee engaged in unconstitutional conduct. Instead, “a
plaintiff must show that the alleged violation occurred because of a municipal policy, practice, or
custom.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 2016). This requires the plaintiff to
prove that the municipality’s deliberate conduct “was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury
alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). A plaintiff can show the
existence of a municipal policy, practice, or custom by identifying: “(1) the municipality’s
legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-
making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance
or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429
(6th Cir. 2005). In most cases, if a plaintiff cannot establish that individual defendants violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, municipal liability will not attach. See, e.g., McQueen, 433
F.3d at 471. However, we have also recognized other instances in which a lack of individual
liability will not foreclose a municipal-liability claim. See, e.g., Epps v. Lauderdale County, 45 F.
App’x 332, 334–35 (per curiam) (Cole, J., concurring) (noting that municipal liability may attach
when individual defendants are exonerated but “municipal liability is based on the actions of
26
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
individual government actors other than those who are named as parties” or when “the combined
acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or custom [violates]
an individual’s constitutional rights”) (citation omitted). Young argues that (1) Campbell County’s
express classification policies show a deliberate indifference to the risk of nonviolent inmates
being placed with a violent inmate; (2) Jailer Daley’s actions as a final decision-maker exhibited
a deliberate indifference to safety risks faced by Young; and (3) Jailer Daley had a custom of
tolerating his employees’ unconstitutional acts by “failing to investigate and punish meaningfully
allegations of unconstitutional conduct.” Appellant’s Br. at 14–33. All of Young’s arguments are
unavailing.
Young has not presented any facts from which a jury could reasonably find that Campbell
County had a policy or custom that caused a violation of Young’s constitutional right to protection
from inmate violence. An express policy can be unconstitutional in two ways: “(1) facially
unconstitutional as written or articulated, or (2) facially constitutional but consistently
implemented to result in constitutional violations with explicit or implicit ratification by city
policymakers.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006). “Where the
identified policy is itself facially lawful, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the municipal action
was taken with “deliberate indifference” as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of
simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.’” Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). To
the extent that Young is arguing that Campbell County’s classification policies are facially
unconstitutional, he provides no authority to substantiate this contention. Young also has not
pointed to any evidence showing that the classification policies have been “consistently
implemented to result in constitutional violations with explicit or implicit ratification by city
27
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
policymakers,” except for Young’s alleged assault. Gregory, 444 F.3d at 752. As the district court
found, though Young’s expert testified to several inadequacies in the classification policies and
how they posed a risk to inmates’ safety, see R. 38-32 (McCann Expert Report), such testimony
does not show that Campbell County acted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious
consequences of its policies. There is no evidence in the record of the expert even finding that
similar deficiencies at other jails or prisons have caused constitutional violations. At most, this
supports a conclusion that Campbell County acted negligently by adopting or permitting a policy
that proved inadequate in this case. See Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 431 (6th Cir.
2006). But negligence cannot satisfy the deliberate-indifference standard.
In some cases, a single act by a policymaker with final policymaking authority may sustain
a municipal-liability claim. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th Cir. 2013). However, to
prove municipal liability under a single-act theory, Young must demonstrate that Jailer Daley
made “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from among various alternatives.”
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion). As discussed earlier,
Young has presented no evidence that Jailer Daley deliberately chose not to reclassify Ka.
Consequently, Young has failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish an unconstitutional policy.
Young also has not shown that Jailer Daley and Campbell County had a custom of
tolerating unconstitutional acts due to Jailer Daley’s failure to investigate or discipline the
classification officers or the officers who supervised BP2 from June 15 through 18. In order to
establish deliberate indifference due to a final decisionmaker’s failure to investigate or discipline,
Young must show that “the flaws in this particular investigation were representative of (1) a clear
and persistent pattern of illegal activity, (2) which [Jailer Daley] knew or should have known
28
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
about, (3) yet remained deliberately indifferent about, and (4) that the [CCDC]’s custom was the
cause of the [violation].” Thomas, 398 F.3d at 433. Young has not met this burden as he has not
presented evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations or incidents where inmates were
harmed due to failures in the classification system or by CCDC officials failing to follow
supervision policies. Absent these showings, “mere acquiescence in a single discretionary
decision by a subordinate is not sufficient to show ratification.” Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
988 F.2d 649, 656 (6th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the facts fall short of showing deliberate
indifference by the municipality.
Finally, to the extent that Young argues that CCDC classification officers had an unwritten
policy or practice of failing to reclassify violent inmates that was condoned by Jailer Daley, see
Appellant’s Br. at 29–30, such argument is also unavailing. To survive summary judgment under
this theory, Young must show, among other requirements, “the existence of a clear and persistent
pattern of [illegal activity].” Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). As
discussed earlier, Young has failed to make such a showing. In sum, the district court properly
found that Campbell County and Jailer Daley, in his official capacity, could not be held liable with
respect to Young’s deliberate-indifference claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Deputies Fassler, Henning, and Snider, Sergeants Lohr, Mischell, and Wright,
Jailer Daley, and Campbell County; we REVERSE its grant of summary judgment in favor of
Deputy Denney; and we REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
29
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, Concurring. I join the majority opinion
but write separately because I believe that Young’s official-capacity claims against Jailer James
Daley and the municipal-liability claims involving him fail because Daley lacked final
policymaking authority.
“[O]nly those municipal officials who have ‘final policymaking authority’ may by their
actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
123 (1988). The “identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law,” based on
where the state places statutory authority to make municipal policy. Id. at 124. Kentucky law
provides that “[t]he county governing body shall prescribe rules for the government, security,
safety, and cleanliness of the jail and the comfort and treatment of prisoners.” Ky.Rev.Stat.
§ 441.045(1).1 Other provisions charge the county fiscal court with operating prisons in
accordance with state statute. Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ 67.080(2)(d), 67.083(3)(e); see also Johnson v.
Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1287 (6th Cir. 1990) (“State law contemplates that the authority
to promulgate policies for the care of prisoners is not vested in the jailer, but in the fiscal court.”);
see also Wimberly v. Leavell, 110 F.3d 66, 1997 WL 135578, at *1 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table order).
Final policymaking authority “may be delegated by an official who possesses such
authority,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986), but the plaintiff carries the
burden of showing delegation. See Johnson, 908 F.2d at 1287 (“[Plaintiff] introduced no evidence
1
Kentucky amended this statute in 2020; the relevant portion was unchanged.
30
No. 20-5143, Young v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. et al.
that the fiscal court has explicitly or implicitly delegated its authority to the jailer.”). Young did
not make such a showing here.
In my view, Daley did not have final policymaking authority under Kentucky law.
Therefore, Young’s official capacity claims against Daley, and Young’s theories of municipal
liability that rested on Daley’s purported final policymaking authority, fail on this ground alone.
31