United States v. E. Stanley Hoff

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0152n.06
Case No. 18-3476
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Mar 28, 2019
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff - Appellee,
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
E. STANLEY HOFF,
) OHIO
Defendant - Appellant. )
BEFORE: BOGGS, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech,
among other guarantees, not threats of physical harm. One aspect of this case calls for interpreting
the distinction between the two.
E. Stanley Hoff pled guilty to one count of threatening to assault or murder a United States
official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115, for leaving a threatening voicemail at the office of a
member of Congress. Hoff argues that (1) the district court erred by allegedly failing to rule on
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his counsel failed to obtain a ruling on the motion to withdraw Hoff’s guilty plea, and (3) the
district court imposed a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. For the reasons
that follow, we AFFIRM.
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
BACKGROUND
In February and March of 2017, Hoff left three voice messages at the Hillard, Ohio office
of United States Representative Steve Stivers that gave the Congressman concern for the safety of
himself and his family. Congressman Stivers contacted the Capitol Police to investigate these
calls. During the Capitol Police investigation, an investigating agent (Agent Andriko) warned
Hoff not to contact Congressman Stivers’s office again. Nevertheless, Hoff left two additional
voice messages on April 30, 2017, and June 18, 2017.
The latter message was left just four days after a shooting at a baseball practice in
Washington D.C. where Republican congressmen and their staffs were fired upon. In that
message, Hoff referenced the baseball practice shooting: “I’ve seen the [] prayer y’all were saying
at the baseball diamond last night. I think y’all better hit your knees and pray for the people that
you’re screwin up their lives with your secret legislation . . . .” R. 47-1, PageID 274–75. Hoff
continued: “We are taking our country back. We are on the march. The other day is the tip of the
iceberg. I’ve tried to warn you . . . . Maybe the next one taken down will be your daughter, huh?
Or even your wife. Or even you.” Id. at 275.
After the Capitol Police determined the caller’s identity—Hoff had blocked his number—
the Capitol Police obtained a warrant for his arrest. Following Hoff’s arrest, a grand jury in the
Southern District of Ohio indicted him on one count of threatening to assault and murder a United
States official and threatening to assault and murder a member of the immediate family of a United
States official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (b)(4).
After a mental-health evaluation and a denied motion for bond, Hoff entered into a plea
agreement on October 24, 2017. Pursuant to that agreement, Hoff pled guilty to leaving “a voice
mail at the Hilliard, Ohio, office of United States Representative Steve Stivers (OH-15),” in
2
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115. R. 27, PageID 79. Hoff also acknowledged that he had made his
calls to Congressman Stivers “because of Representative Stivers[’s] official duties.” Id. The
district court accepted Hoff’s guilty plea on October 24, 2017.
On January 11, 2018, approximately three months after the district court accepted Hoff’s
guilty plea, Hoff moved to withdraw his counsel. The motion stated that Hoff no longer wanted
to work with his present counsel and was “adamant that he wants to withdraw his guilty plea and
communicated his decision to do so on or about December 12, 2017.” R. 35, PageID 136. In
response to the motion, the district court held a status conference on January 30, 2018.
During the status conference, the district judge questioned defense counsel about Hoff’s
motion to withdraw. Hoff’s counsel explained that “Mr. Hoff has indicated that he is resolute in
his decision to move to withdraw his plea.” R. 54, PageID 297. The district judge responded,
“I’m resolute in my decision to deny that[,]” but was “willing to hear what [Hoff has] to say” on
the matter. Id. In the colloquy that followed, Hoff explained to the district judge that had suffered
from an onset of depression and was suicidal at the time and of the guilty plea and now wished to
withdraw it. Based on Hoff’s explanations, the district judge decided to “re-refer” Hoff to a
psychiatrist “for an updated evaluation to determine whether or not the situation has changed with
[Hoff’s] mental health post-plea so that [the court] can either grant [his] motion or deny the motion
with the most up-to-date information that we have.” Id. at 305. After reaching this conclusion,
the district court granted Hoff’s motion to withdraw his counsel and in turn, appointed new counsel
for him. The district judge also told Hoff the following: “You have orally indicated that you wish
to withdraw your plea. You may want to discuss that with new counsel before you file a formal
motion, but I’ve heard what you’ve said today.” Id. at 307.
3
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
Having secured new counsel, Hoff moved to extend the time to object to the initial
presentence report. The motion made no mention of withdrawal of his guilty plea, nor did Hoff
formally file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before his sentencing. The district court granted
Hoff’s motion for extension of time, and on May 11, 2018, the district court sentenced Hoff to 40
months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
This timely appeal followed.1
DISCUSSION
I.
We first address Hoff’s assertion that the district court erred in failing to rule on his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. Relying on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Hoff asserts that
the district court either did not rule upon or implicitly denied his oral motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, which was raised during the January 30, 2018, status conference. Hoff contends that the
district court’s “implicit denial” is reversible error because he successfully demonstrated that he
had “two very strong, fair and just reasons in the instant matter” to satisfy the withdrawal standard
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B).
The district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2013); accord United
States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008). Of course, this standard of review
presupposes that the defendant has not waived or forfeited2 his rights to challenge the district
1
We note that after Hoff filed his notice of appeal, he also moved to request a decision on “Defendant’s Prior Motion
to Withdraw Plea.” The district court denied the motion on two bases. First, the district court noted that during the
status conference: “Defense counsel clarified that no motion to withdraw had yet been made but it was Defendant’s
intent to make such a motion in the future.” R. 58, PageID 352 (emphasis added). Second, the district court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to withdraw the plea because the district court had already sentenced the defendant. Id. at
352–53 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)).
2
We are mindful that although the terms waiver and forfeiture are often used interchangeably, they have different
meanings. “[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right[;] waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment
4
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
court’s denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See United States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537,
543 (6th Cir. 2004). A defendant waives a particular challenge when he abandons it in the
proceedings below. See id. at 544. When the defendant abandons (i.e., waives) his challenge,
“that challenge is forever foreclosed, and cannot be resurrected on . . . appeal.” United States v.
Saucedo, 226 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 2000).
This case presents circumstances similar to those in Denkins and United States v. Smith,
608 F. App’x 395 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), where this court held that each defendant
abandoned his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In Denkins, the defendant simultaneously
moved for withdrawal of his guilty plea and for a competency evaluation, “with the former motion
resting solely on the ground that Defendant lacked the mental competency to understand the nature
of the proceedings or to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter a plea.” 367 F.3d at 543.
After the evaluation concluded that the defendant was competent, the defendant withdrew his
objection to the presentence report and as a result, “the district court was never called upon to
decide whether to permit Defendant to withdraw his plea on the ground of incompetency.” Id. at
544. In those circumstances, this court concluded that the challenge was abandoned on appeal, as
the district court had given the defendant an opportunity to explore the basis for his plea withdrawal
and “surely would have been willing to revisit the issue.” Id.
Likewise in Smith, this court concluded that the defendant abandoned his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. 608 F. App’x at 396. The defendant in Smith simultaneously moved to
withdraw counsel and withdraw his guilty plea. Id. The district court granted the defendant’s
motion to withdraw counsel but denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea without
prejudice. Id. Quoting the district court, this court noted that the district court denied the motion
or abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
5
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
to withdraw the plea without prejudice because “[t]his will allow Defendant to consult with new
counsel on the risks and benefits of proceedings with such a motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). This court then concluded that the defendant’s “failure to renew his motion and the
factual concessions in his supplemental sentencing memorandum constituted an effective
abandonment of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id.
Smith and Denkins guide us to a similar conclusion here. Turning to this case, we discern
no difference from our precedents that would warrant a different outcome. Hoff moved to
withdraw his counsel when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Hoff’s counsel explained that
he had not formally filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Instead, defense counsel explained
that “the motion is a motion to withdraw as counsel on the basis being that [Hoff] intends to move
forward with this motion to withdraw the plea. We have not made that motion [to withdraw the
plea] because we didn’t feel that we could given the conflicts that [the government] has already
explained.” R. 54, PageID 306. Just as in Smith, the district court here granted the motion to
withdraw and informed Hoff that the court acknowledged his oral request to withdraw his plea and
that Hoff “may want to discuss that with new counsel before [he] file[s] a formal motion” to
withdraw his plea. Id. at 307; 608 F. App’x at 396.
From this colloquy, Hoff was on notice that the request for a plea withdrawal could be
revisited so that the district court could “either grant [Hoff’s] motion or deny the motion with the
most up-to-date information that [the court has].” R. 54, PageID 305. And yet, even with this
information, Hoff, like the defendants in Denkins and Smith, elected not to revisit this challenge
prior to sentencing after presumably considering the matter with his new counsel. Moreover, we
note that like the defendant in Smith, Hoff also conceded guilt in his sentencing memorandum
when he stated that the fifth voice message qualified as a “threat” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
6
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
§ 115(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (b)(4). Thus, we conclude Hoff waived his challenge to the district
court’s failure to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.
II.
We now turn to Hoff’s argument that he was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Hoff contends that he “was denied his
right to counsel on [the issue of the motion to withdraw his plea], where at his sentencing hearing,
his newly appointed counsel . . . ignored the issue of the pending conclusion to Hoff’s motion to
withdraw his plea, and allowed Hoff to be sentenced prior to conclusion of the issue.” Appellant
Br. at 10.
“[O]rdinarily we will not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal because the record is usually insufficient to permit adequate review of such a claim. These
claims are more properly raised in a postconviction proceeding . . . .” United States v. Gardner,
417 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d
537, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[w]ithout a record, it is difficult for this court to determine
whether [Hoff’s] trial counsel was, in fact, ineffective.” United States v. Richardson, 906 F.3d
417, 424 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2005)). There
is nothing in the record explaining whether Hoff and his trial counsel discussed pursuing the
motion to withdraw his plea or whether Hoff decided to abandon the motion. In these
circumstances, we therefore decline to rule on Hoff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
because it is not ripe. See United States v. McCarty, 628 F.3d 284, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
ineffective-assistance claim not yet ripe for review because the “record does not explain why
defense counsel did not ask for a continuance or what her strategy entailed regarding [defendant’s]
mental history or guilty plea”).
7
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
III.
Lastly, we turn to Hoff’s challenges to his sentence. He asserts that the sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Hoff maintains that the district court erred by imposing a procedurally unreasonable
sentence because it incorrectly calculated the applicable advisory United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) range for the underlying offense. According to Hoff, the
district court erred in applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2)(A) because the
underlying conduct did not involve more than two threats and erred in applying the enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) because his conduct was not motivated by Congressman Stivers’s
status as a government official.
Because Hoff preserved his sentencing objections below, we review “the district court’s
legal conclusions regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and . . . the
district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Newell, 309 F.3d 396, 400 (6th
Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 2001)). A district court
imposes a procedurally unreasonable sentence, and thus abuses its discretion, when it “fail[s] to
calculate (or improperly caculat[es]) the Guidelines Range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory,
fail[s] to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); accord United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007).
i. More Than Two Threats (U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2))
After reviewing the transcripts and recordings of Hoff’s five voice messages, the district
court concluded that the more-than-two-threats sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.
8
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
§ 2A6.1(b)(2)(A) applied to Hoff’s underlying conduct because “any reasonable person would
understand the intended threat in the multiple phone calls that are made.” R. 55, PageID 320. The
district court identified a threat in four of the five voice messages because a “reasonable person is
going to feel threatened by the receipt of . . . voicemails like that.” Id. at 319. Hoff argues that
the district court erred in applying the more-than-two-threats enhancement because the threats
needed to be viewed “in totality.” Appellant Br. at 12. That is, according to Hoff, once the threats
are viewed as a whole in conjunction with his interviews with the Capitol Police, the voice
messages demonstrate that Hoff was not threatening Representative Stivers, but instead was
advocating a peaceful resolution and did not intend to harm the Congressman. Neither the district
court nor this court finds Hoff’s argument persuasive.
Hoff has conceded that his last message contained a threat. Thus, for the enhancement to
apply, we need only determine if at least two of the remaining four voice messages contain a
“threat” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2).
The Guidelines state, in relevant part: “If . . . the offense involved more than two
threats . . . increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2). Neither the Guidelines nor the
commentary provide a definition of “threat.” See United States v. Mitchell, 59 F. App’x 701, 702
(6th Cir. 2003). Further, we have not previously defined “threat” for purposes of U.S.S.G.
§ 2A6.1(b)(2). Consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s approach in United States v. Spring, we find
that the meaning of “threat” as used in U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2) is the same as statutes criminalizing
threats (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). 305 F.3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying § 2.A6.1(b)(2) to a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 115); see also United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir.
2018) (citing Spring’s analysis regarding the applicability of § 2.A6.1(b)(2) to conclude that a
threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) includes statements made to accomplices); United States v. Frazer,
9
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
391 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing with approval Spring’s conclusion that definition of
threat for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2) is the same as the criminal codes). Because we have
interpreted the word “threat” in 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), Doggart, 906 F.3d at 512, we will now apply
its meaning to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2).
Under the definition from Doggart, a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is a communication
such “that a reasonable observer would understand the words . . . as a serious expression of an
intent to harm.” 906 F.3d at 512 (relying upon Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)).3
Thus, the relevant issue is whether a reasonable person would view at least two of Hoff’s four
voice messages as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm based on the particular
message’s content and the context in which it was delivered. Doggart, 906 F.3d at 511; United
States v. Andrews, 48 F. App’x 151, 155 (6th Cir. 2002). This is a factual question that we review
for clear error. See United States v. Glover, 846 F.2d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Hankins, 195 F. App’x 295, 300–01 (6th Cir. 2006); Mitchell, 59 F. App’x at 702.
In conducting our review, we are mindful that in this nation there is a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Honoring this commitment here
requires delineation between protected speech—which can be “very crude offensive method[s] of
3
In analyzing whether a defendant made more than two threats for purposes of determining whether the enhancement
applies, courts need not inquire into the defendant’s mens rea. See United States v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 846, 849 (6th
Cir. 1996) (noting that this court does not infer mens rea requirement when interpreting the Guidelines); United States
Jordan, 678 F. App’x 759, 774 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2)(A) does not have a mens rea
requirement).
10
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
stating . . . political opposition” through language that is often “vituperative, abusive, and
inexact”—and unprotected speech that amounts to a “true threat.” Id. at 707, 708.
First, we consider the context in which these communications were delivered. All five of
Hoff’s voice messages were placed directly with Congressman Stivers’s office. Unlike the
statements that were made in Watts during a political rally that caused the audience to laugh, the
serious statements made by Hoff were more direct and personal. See id.; see also United States v.
Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321–22 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that letters and postcards to home
and work address would likely be viewed as a threat compared to the statements made in the large
outdoor political rally in Watts). In these circumstances, after listening to the speaker’s words, a
reasonable person could conclude that the message was a threat and not political hyperbole.
Mitchell, 59 F. App’x at 702 (affirming Guidelines enhancement to multiple threats made on
telephone messages).
In addition to context, the content of the messages supports district court’s finding of
threats for purposes of applying the enhancement. On March 5, 2017, Hoff left the following voice
message:
Hey Stevie its Joe America Again. I’m sick and tired of seeing your baby rattle
head on my TV lying to me. If you say you’re working for me then you better get
to work. I haven’t seen you’re a[**] or heard from your a[**]. You’re hiding like
the baby b[****] again which you Republicans are very well known for. Let me
tell you something partner, if you sons of b[****] steal one more election from us
then we are gonna go into peaceful takeover. In other words we’re going to take
our country and our government back. If you shoot down one of our troops and
you will have the bloodiest massacre God’s earth has ever seen. And the massacre
will be on you and Trump and Conway and all that whole bunch of s[***] in the
cesspool you’ve got. We’re going to take care of it you see and we’re going to take
care of it our way and if you don’t like it I suggest you move to North Korea or
even go over to Russia with old Donny boy. He’s got some friends over there
maybe he can get you hooked up with one of them American b[*****] with one of
them Russian whores. You understand what I’m saying dumbass? Get your
f[*******] a[**] to work b[****]. Leave Obamacare alone or die.
11
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
R. 47-1, PageID 274. As the district court correctly noted, the threatening part of this message
concerns the phrase “Leave Obamacare alone or die.” Although these words may appear to be
only vulgar on the sterile paper record before us, their threatening nature is revealed when the
message is heard as delivered. Thus, the district court’s finding that this message contained a
threat is not clearly erroneous, as the audio recording demonstrates that Hoff meant to emphasize
“or die” using an ominous and menacing tone. A reasonable person would interpret these
statements delivered in their context as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.
According to Hoff, a reasonable person would understand that the “Leave Obamacare alone
or die” comment relates back to Hoff’s belief that repealing Obamacare will trigger the “bloodiest
massacre God’s Earth has ever seen” and is not directed toward taking Congressman Stivers’s life.
But that interpretation is not the only conclusion that can be reached by this passage because a
reasonable person could determine those words are a true threat. Therefore, the district court did
not err in counting Hoff’s March 5 voice message as one of the threats for applying the
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2).
On March 23, Hoff left this voice message:
Yeah Mr. Stiver’s (sic) how’s your family today? This is S.O.L. calling. If you’re
going to serve the people, do so. If you’re going to serve the Republican party, go
to North Korea, get the F[***] out of here. The issue at hand today you’re going
to be voting on a health care bill. If you go down with the s (sic), and that bill
passes, I guarantee you my death will not be in vain. You want a more dangerous,
hateful country to live in? We’re going to give it to you. Thank you for this time
and remember serve the people not the repugnant party and that jackass in the White
House.
R. 47-1, PageID 274. The district court concluded that this message was a threat because of the
phrase “You want a more dangerous, hateful country to live in, we’re going to give it to you.” R.
55, PageID 319. Hoff concedes that these words sound “threatening and foreboding” when heard
in isolation. Appellant Br. at 15. Nonetheless, he asks us to conclude that that this message is not
12
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
a threat when read alongside his subsequent interview with Agent Andriko. Hoff’s “context”
argument fails from the outset. Although it is true that we are to view messages allegedly deemed
as threats “in context,” see Doggart, 906 F.3d at 511, that analysis does not include non-
contemporaneous statements made by the defendant after the alleged threat. We have found no
authority to support Hoff’s argument that we may look to words, statements, or actions, delivered
after the original message to determine whether the original message is a threat.
Moreover, in view of Hoff’s acknowledgement that his March 23 voice message was
threatening and foreboding, we discern no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that this
message contained a threat. We also note that Hoff mentioned Congressman Stivers’s family for
the first time in this call: “Yeah Mr. Stiver[s] how’s your family today?” In view of Hoff’s
threatening tone and express reference to the Congressman’s family (which he had not done
previously) a reasonable person would understand this call as a serious expression of an intent to
harm for this additional reason. Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error in counting
Hoff’s March 23 voice message as one of the threats for applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2A6.1(b)(2).
In view of Hoff’s admission that the June 18 voice message was a threat and our conclusion
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that March 5 and March 23 voice messages were
threats, we hold that the district court did not err in applying the more-than-two-threats
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2).
ii. Motivated by Status as Government Official (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2)
Hoff maintains that his conduct was not motivated by Congressman Stivers’s status as a
government official. Instead, Hoff claims that his agitation and rationale for leaving the June 18
voice mail stems from Agent Andriko’s investigation into his previous calls. Thus, according to
13
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
Hoff, his fifth voice message differs from his previous messages because “Hoff’s last voicemail
for Representative Stivers appears to focus and center on Hoff’s anger over Agent Andriko’s
telephone interview.” Appellant Br. at 21.
The relevant provision of the Guidelines states:
(a) If (1) the victim was (A) a government officer or employee . . . or (C) a member
of the immediate family of a person described in subdivision (A) []; and (2) the
offense of conviction was motivated by such status, increase by 3 levels.
(b) If subsection (a)(1) and (2) apply, and the applicable Chapter Two guideline is
from Chapter Two, Part A (Offenses Against the Person), increase by 6 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a)–(b). The comments in the Guidelines specify that “Motivated by such status”
for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) “means that the offense of conviction was motivated by the
fact that the victim was a government officer or employee, or a member of the immediate family
thereof.” Id. § 3A1.2 cmt. 3.
The district court held this enhancement applied because “[t]he victim in the offense is a
United States Congressman and his family” and Hoff “specifically targeted the victim because of
his position in public office.” R. 55, PageID 326. The district court reasoned that the call was
motivated by Representative Stivers’s status as a government employee “because of the tone and
threats conveyed in that statement.” Id. at 325.
At the outset, we note that Hoff has not challenged that the Congressman qualifies as a
“government officer or employee” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2, nor do we discern any plain
error in the district court’s holding. Moreover, we discern no clear error in the district court’s
holding that Hoff’s actions were motivated by Congressman Stivers’s status as a government
official. See United States v. Smith, 463 F. App’x 564, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that
defendant’s motivation is a factual determination). The record supports the district court’s factual
determination because Hoff admitted that his conduct was motivated by Stivers’s duties. See
14
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
United States v. Zazueta-Garcia, 239 F. App’x 941, 946 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If the facts admitted by
[the defendant] support the district court’s finding, the court did not commit error.”). Hoff
admitted in his guilty plea that he “made this phone call in violation of 18 U.S.C. [§] 115 to a U.S.
Official because of Representative Stivers[’s] official duties.” R. 27, PageID 79.
The district court’s conclusion is supported even without the benefit of Hoff’s admission
in the plea agreement. Beginning in February 2017, Hoff directed calls to Congressman Stivers’s
office because of official actions that either Stivers or his political party took at the time. See R.
47-1, PageID 274 (“You were elected to serve all the people.”); id. (“Leave Obamacare alone or
die.”); id. (“If you go down with this s (sic), and that bill passes, I guarantee you my death will not
be in vain.”). As a member of Congress, Representative Stivers is called upon to vote on pending
legislation, and thus it is clear that Hoff’s statements were motivated by and directed toward the
Congressman’s status as a government official.
Further, those three calls were made before Hoff had any contact with Agent Andriko.
Hoff’s assertion that his fifth call was purely motivated by Agent Andriko is contradicted by the
contents of his prior calls. Hoff was previously calling Congressman Stivers in response to actions
associated with the Congressman’s official duties. Agent Andriko’s involvement only heightened
Hoff’s previous agitation. Agent Andriko was not the independent source of Hoff’s motivation
for the fifth voice message.
Even if we viewed Hoff’s final voice mail in isolation, the district court’s factual
conclusion is still sound. It is true that Hoff references Agent Andriko in his call, but it also clear
from the transcript of the call that the district court could fairly conclude that Hoff’s actions were
motivated by Stivers’s status as a government conduct. Hoff stated, “I think y’all better hit your
knees and pray for the people that you’re screwing up their lives with your secret legislation that
15
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
you’re tryin (sic) to run through everything.” R. 47-1, PageID 274–75. He also remarked, “You
are nothing more than a public servant. And that’s what you gonna be. Ok? You are going to
serve all of the public. Not just the repugnant public.” Id. at 275. In view of these statements, we
find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the Guidelines enhancement under § 3A1.2
applies to Hoff’s underlying conduct.
In view of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence as procedurally
reasonable.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Unlike procedural objections, “defendants do not need to raise the claim of substantive
unreasonableness before the district court to preserve the claim for appeal.” United States v.
Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th
Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion, even where the sentence imposed is greater than the guidelines range.” United States
v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251, 264 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Smith, 516 F.3d 473, 477–
78 (6th Cir. 2008)). A sentence that is above the Guidelines range is not entitled to the presumption
of reasonableness, “but neither is it presumptively un-reasonable.” Id. (citing United States v.
Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2007)).
We consider a sentence to be substantively unreasonable “when the district court selects a
sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant
sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008)). In other words, substantive
reasonableness focuses on whether “a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals) or too short (if
the government appeals).” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). And in
16
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
our review of the sentence, “we may take the degree of variance into account and consider the
extent of the deviation from the Guidelines . . . [but we] must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors . . . justify the extent of the variance.” Robinson,
813 F.3d at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 516 F.3d at 477–78). Lastly, we note that
when a defendant asks us to “balance the [§ 3553(a)] factors differently than the district court did,”
such a request “is simply beyond the scope of our appellate review, which looks to whether the
sentence is reasonable, as opposed to whether in the first instance we would have imposed the
same sentence.” United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006); accord United States v.
Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008).
Hoff asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his sentence of 40
months’ imprisonment deviated from the Guidelines range of 24–30 months’ imprisonment.
According to Hoff, the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence because it is
not consistent with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), as the district court did not account for
Hoff’s life expectancy, lack of financial assets, that the speech at issue is borderline protected by
the First Amendment, and the facts of this case present a “less serious” offense.
Hoff’s sentence is an above-guidelines sentence, so we do not give it a presumption of
reasonableness. Nevertheless, Hoff asks us for relief that we cannot provide because his challenge
requires us to revisit factors weighed and balanced by the district court. Furthermore, contrary to
Hoff’s arguments, the district court took Hoff’s life expectancy and personal situation into account
when it imposed Hoff’s sentence.
Hoff also fails to acknowledge that the district court’s 10-month upward variance is
justified based on the record in light of his criminal history and the underlying conduct. Although
Hoff had a criminal history category of I, at sentencing, the district noted that there were four and
17
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
a half pages of Hoff’s criminal history ranging from “assault and battery, and criminal damaging,
and vandalism, and criminal mischief, and petty theft, and disorderly conduct, and falsification,
domestic violence, and stalking, aggravated menacing.” R. 55, PageID 327. In light of Hoff’s
past criminal conduct, the district judge told Hoff at sentencing: “You’ve violated protective orders
in the past and yet you have no criminal—no countable criminal history for purposes of this case
simply because of the age. Clearly, those things happened when you were a younger man, but in
your 60s you made phone calls like this that tell us that you haven’t learned anything from the
previous incidents and your previous opportunities on probation.” Id. at 338–39. The district
judge also noted that “this is not your typical threat case” given that Hoff “threaten[ed] a member
of [C]ongress’[s] family, their minor child,” and that “the kind of language that [Hoff] used is well
beyond the pale and well beyond the boundaries of civil discourse.” Id. at 338. Though receptive
to the considerations raised by Hoff, the district court concluded that “an above-guideline sentence
is sufficient in this case” in light of the underlying conduct and Hoff’s criminal history. Id. at 340.
Given these considerations, we hold that district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing its
sentence. See United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 214 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court
does not commit reversible error simply by ‘attach[ing] great weight’ to a few factors.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 57)); United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746, 750, 757–58 (6th
Cir. 2013) (holding that defendant’s above-Guidelines range sentence was substantively
reasonable where defendant failed to learn from past incarcerations, the underlying seriousness of
the firearms offense, and the effect of the offense on the surrounding community).
Lastly, Hoff argues, relying on Watts, that Hoff’s messages did not rise to the level of a
“true threat” and “even if they did, they borderlined on being protected speech and did not justify
his being sentenced above his guidelines range.” Appellant Br. at 26. As noted earlier, Hoff’s
18
Case No. 18-3476, United States v. Hoff
voice messages were delivered in a very different setting than the context of the statements in
Watts. Hoff’s voice messages fall outside bounds of the constitutionally protected speech and into
the category of unconstitutionally protected threats if a reasonable person would view those
statements as a serious intention to inflict bodily harm. At sentencing, the district court made such
a finding: it remarked that “in concert with the actions that occurred on that baseball field, the
timing of the June 18th phone call, to the hearer would scare the hell out of anyone.” R. 55, PageID
337. This finding was not clearly erroneous based upon what Hoff said in his messages. Thus,
Hoff’s speech meets the legal definition of a threat, and the district court did not sentence Hoff
based upon constitutionally protected speech.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s sentence as it is substantively reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and sentence.
19