United States v. Mario Velasquez-Gomez

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0193n.06
Case No. 21-6071
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Apr 25, 2023
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff - Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
MARIO VELASQUEZ-GOMEZ, )
Defendant - Appellant. ) OPINION
)
)
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Mario Velasquez-Gomez pled guilty to two
counts of federal drug trafficking crimes and was convicted by a jury for possessing a firearm in
furtherance of the drug trafficking. The district court sentenced Velasquez-Gomez to a total term
of imprisonment of 175 months. He now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for
his firearm conviction and arguing that the government impermissibly refused to seek an additional
reduction of his offense level at sentencing for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.
I.
On July 13, 2018, Velasquez-Gomez was apprehended by Kentucky State Police following
a tip from a confidential informant that Velasquez-Gomez was trafficking drugs. When detained,
Velasquez-Gomez was carrying a yellow bag containing over a kilogram of cocaine, two cell
phones, and over $2,000 in cash. Police obtained and executed a search warrant of his home.
During the search, a half-kilogram of cocaine was discovered in the garage, along with sandwich
bags, a digital scale, a metal form shaped like a brick, and a small tied off bag of cocaine—all
No. 21-6071, United States v. Velasquez-Gomez
located in a grey backpack. Inside the house, approximately twenty to twenty-five feet from the
backpack, police found two semiautomatic handguns on a shelf. The guns, a nine millimeter and
a .40 caliber, were unloaded, but live rounds were located with the firearms. A round of
ammunition fitting the nine millimeter was also found in the grey backpack, alongside the half-
kilogram of cocaine and other materials.
Velasquez-Gomez was indicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (3) possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Velasquez-Gomez pled guilty to both drug trafficking crimes
without a written plea agreement, but not to the firearm count.
In July 2021, Velasquez-Gomez faced a two-day trial for the § 924(c) firearms count. The
government presented six witnesses and an array of physical evidence, after which the jury
returned a guilty verdict.
The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) grouped the drug-trafficking crimes for
sentencing and calculated a criminal history in Category I and a total offense level of 32, with no
adjustment downward for acceptance of responsibility. Velasquez-Gomez’s counsel objected to
the refusal to grant a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The district court
found the issue to be “a close question” but ultimately awarded the two-point downward
adjustment to the offense level for acceptance of responsibility for the drug crimes. DE 183,
Sentencing Tr., Page ID 1313, 1315. The court further noted that the government was not moving
for a third level of acceptance credit, as it could under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and found that that
decision “[was not] made for any improper reason whatsoever that could cause the Court to
question that determination.” Id. at Page ID 1315. Velasquez-Gomez’s counsel objected to the
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failure of the government to move for a third level of acceptance credit and the court overruled
that objection.
With the reduced offense level of 30 and Criminal History Category I, the Guidelines range
for the drug trafficking crimes ranged from 97 to 121 months and the firearms count carried a
minimum consecutive sentence of 60 months. Velasquez-Gomez requested a total sentence of 120
months, while the government recommended at least 169 months’ total imprisonment. The court
sentenced Velasquez-Gomez to 175 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised
release.
Velasquez-Gomez appeals and raises two challenges: first, the sufficiency of the evidence
for his firearms conviction; and second, the government’s refusal to move for a third level of
acceptance credit at sentencing.
II.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v.
Bankston, 820 F.3d 215, 235 (6th Cir. 2015). “When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a jury verdict, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” United States v. Woods, 14 F.4th 544, 551 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). In
assessing the record, we must affirm a defendant’s conviction if “any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Hendricks, 950 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.
Vichitvongsa, 819 F.3d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 2016)).
Velasquez-Gomez was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Velasquez-Gomez concedes that a drug-
trafficking crime occurred—he pled guilty to two drug offenses. The two issues before us with
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respect to the sufficiency of the evidence are whether the government established constructive
possession of the weapons and whether the government presented adequate evidence that
Velasquez-Gomez possessed the firearms “in furtherance of” a drug-trafficking offense.
A.
“A jury is entitled to infer that a person exercises constructive possession over items found
in his home.” United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Evidence indicating ownership includes testimony that the individual
lived on the premises, clothing, and personal papers. Id.Here, the government presented sufficient evidence of constructive possession. The jury
heard that Velasquez-Gomez told officers he lived at the home and had marijuana in the
refrigerator. Officers also testified that they found Velasquez-Gomez’s truck in the driveway and
his clothes, passport, and Kentucky identification inside the home. While mail with other names
was found in the home, the jury heard that this was not uncommon for narcotics traffickers, as
sometimes fake names are used on mail to conceal the trafficker’s identity. In sum, the evidence
was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Velasquez-Gomez lived in the home and had
constructive possession over the items inside, including the firearms.
B.
For possession of a firearm to be “in furtherance of” a drug-trafficking crime, “the weapon
must promote or facilitate the crime.” United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460-61 (6th Cir.
2001). That is, there must be “a specific nexus between the gun and the crime charged.” Id. at
462 (citing United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2001)). To aid in determining
whether this nexus exists, Mackey provided a list of factors for courts to consider, including:
(1) whether the firearm was “strategically located so that it [was] quickly and easily available for
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use”; (2) “whether the gun was loaded”; (3) “the type of weapon”; (4) “the legality of its
possession”; (5) “the type of drug activity conducted”; and (6) “the time and circumstances under
which the firearm was found.” Id.; see also United States v. Guadarrama, 591 F. App’x 347, 352
(6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Leary, 422 F. App’x 502, 510 (6th Cir. 2011). But this list is non-
exhaustive. “Courts should not lose sight of the forest (whether the defendant possessed the
firearm to facilitate the crime) for the trees (whether or how each factor applies).” United States
v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2020).
The government presented sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have
found that Velasquez-Gomez possessed the firearms for a purpose of facilitating his drug-
trafficking activity. Four of the six factors, and a holistic analysis of the evidence, support the
jury’s conclusion. To begin, the type of large-scale drug activity suggested that the guns were
possessed in connection with that activity. Detectives on the case explained to the jury that
Velasquez-Gomez was involved with a larger drug-trafficking organization and that, within the
organization, he was responsible for distribution of cocaine for all of Lexington, Kentucky. These
statements were supported by the sheer quantity of cocaine discovered, both on Velasquez-
Gomez’s person and at the house. The street value for the half-kilogram of cocaine discovered at
the house was at least $15,000, though the jury learned the value could be much higher, over
$40,000, if sold by the gram. Drugs worth thousands of dollars, particularly when found alongside
materials that suggest a drug packaging and distribution operation, indicate large-scale drug
trafficking and an incentive “to protect the drugs, the proceeds of drug sales, or the dealer himself.”
Maya, 966 F.3d at 500 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 882 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Additionally, the presence of a nine-millimeter round in the same backpack as the half-kilogram
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of cocaine and packing materials further solidifies the connection between the weapon and
Velasquez-Gomez’s drug-trafficking activity.
Next, the type of firearm and illegality of its possession support the conviction. The
firearms were semiautomatic, which the jury heard was a type of firearm commonly found with
drug traffickers because semiautomatic weapons are easier to reload than a revolver. The court
further informed the jury that it is unlawful for an individual who is in the country illegally to
possess a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce, and the jury was presented with some
evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that Velasquez-Gomez knew that he was in the
country illegally.1 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Velasquez-Gomez’s firearms are far from the
“innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a
cupboard.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462.
As Velasquez-Gomez reminds us, not all factors weigh so heavily in the government’s
favor. The firearms were not found on Velasquez-Gomez’s person nor were they loaded.
However, we have previously found that an unloaded gun in a closet can still be possessed in
furtherance of a drug crime, particularly where drugs, money, and ammunition are nearby and
readily accessible. See Guadarrama, 591 F. App’x at 352. Here, the firearms were found next to
the back door of the house, about twenty feet from the half-kilogram of cocaine, and so close to
ammunition that one could touch both at the same time. While proximity alone cannot establish a
violation of § 924(c), the specific location and its proximity can serve as evidence that the firearm
1
The district court’s comments at trial regarding whether Velasquez-Gomez was in the country
illegally may raise issues relating to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2019) (“A
defendant who does not know that he is an alien ‘illegally or unlawfully in the United States’ does
not have the guilty state of mind that the statute’s language and purposes require.”). However, we
need not address any Rehaif issues that may be implicated by the district court’s comments because
the parties’ counsel have not briefed such issues and Velasquez-Gomez has not raised it. See Doe
v. Michigan State Univ., 989 F.3d 418, 425 (6th Cir. 2021).
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was strategically located to be quickly and easily available for use. See, e.g., United States v.
Lengen, 245 F. App’x 426, 436 (6th Cir. 2007).
The totality of the circumstances and the weight of the Mackey factors lead us to conclude
that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to convict Velasquez-Gomez of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
III.
We next turn to Velasquez-Gomez’s sentencing for the grouped drug-trafficking offenses.
Although the PSR recommended against awarding Velasquez-Gomez any reduction of his offense
level for acceptance of responsibility, the district court granted a two-level reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Velasquez-Gomez’s counsel then objected to the government’s failure to
move for a third level of reduction under § 3E1.1(b). The court overruled the objection and
Velasquez-Gomez now appeals.
The case law in our circuit is inconsistent about the standard of review applied to district
court decisions concerning acceptance of responsibility. Compare United States v. Darden, 552
F. App’x 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2014) (reviewing for abuse of discretion), with United States v.
Corrigan, 128 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1997) (reviewing for clear error); see also United States v.
Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 769 (6th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the lack of clarity). However, we need
not resolve this question, as it has not been fully briefed and Velasquez-Gomez’s argument fails
even under de novo review.
Section 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level reduction in the
offense level of a crime if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility.”
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Subsection (b) then permits the government to move for an additional one-
level reduction in the offense level if it states that the defendant “has assisted authorities in the
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investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(b). The government’s discretion to move for this additional reduction “is subject only to
the limitation that the government’s refusal to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion cannot be based on a
‘constitutionally impermissible factor’ and cannot be arbitrary.” United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d
697, 704-05 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 215 (6th Cir. 2010)).
The defendant bears the burden to present “objective evidence of an improper motive or arbitrary
action.” Id. at 705 (quoting Lapsins, 570 F.3d at 769). In other words, the district court must
accept the government’s decision to move or not move for additional responsibility credit under
§ 3E1.1(b) unless the defendant can produce some objective evidence to show improper motive or
arbitrary action.
Velasquez-Gomez argues that the government withheld the motion for reduction “for the
impermissible reason of Velasquez-Gomez exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to test
the government’s case against him”—that is, going to trial on the firearms count. CA6 R. 41,
Appellant Br., at 22-23. And the government agrees that a chief reason why it declined make a
§ 3E1.1(b) motion was Velasquez-Gomez’s “refusal to accept responsibility for possessing the
firearms.” CA6 R. 52, Appellee Br., at 17. This is not a “constitutionally impermissible factor”
such as race or religion, nor is it arbitrary, as it was rationally related to the government’s interest
in preservation of resources. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). Although a
“[c]onviction by trial . . . does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such
a reduction,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2, Velasquez-Gomez’s refusal to accept responsibility for
the related (but non-grouped) firearms offense is a permissible reason for the government to
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withhold a § 3E1.1(b) motion. See United States v. Boykin, 679 F. App’x 400, 401, 405 (6th Cir.
2017); see also United States v. Flowers, 476 F. App’x 55, 64-65 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the
district court’s denial of even a two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) where defendant did not
accept responsibility for firearms charge but pled guilty to drug charges).
Moreover, the government asserted as an additional ground for its refusal to move for a
third acceptance credit under § 3E1.1(b) Velasquez-Gomez’s decision to move for rearraignment
on the drug trafficking offenses eight days before trial and his challenges to the drug quantity
attributed to him at sentencing. While Velasquez-Gomez accepted responsibility for the drug
offenses by pleading guilty, he did not do so “early enough to save the government the expense of
preparing for trial.” Lapsins, 570 F.3d at 770; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6. Velasquez-
Gomez agreed to plead guilty to the drug offenses just eight days before trial began. Velasquez-
Gomez asserts that the government is responsible for this late plea by failing to timely respond to
Velasquez-Gomez’s initial plea offer; however, the government had already begun preparing for
trial when discussion of the plea offer occurred.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Velasquez-Gomez a third
acceptance credit, as the government’s decision not to move for that reduction was neither arbitrary
nor constitutionally impermissible.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Velasquez-Gomez’s conviction and sentence.
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