Brandenburg Health Facilities v. Ivye Mattingly

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0124n.06
Case No. 16-6168
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Feb 24, 2017
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
BRANDENBURG HEALTH FACILITIES, et )
al., )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
) KENTUCKY
IVYE MATTINGLY, Administratrix of the )
estate of Mary Jo Hancock, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: BOGGS, SILER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Ivye Mattingly appeals the district court’s grant of Plaintiffs’
motion to compel arbitration and enjoin state court proceedings. The Plaintiffs filed a motion to
dismiss Mattingly’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Since the district court stayed the
case pending the completion of arbitration, the district court has not issued a final order, and we
have no jurisdiction over Defendant’s appeal. For this reason, the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss
the appeal is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mattingly is the administratrix of Mary Jo Hancock’s estate. Hancock was a resident at a
nursing home owned and operated by the Plaintiffs (collectively “Preferred Care”). In 2007,
before entering into the facility operated by Preferred Care, Hancock executed a durable power
Case No. 16-6168, Brandenburg Health Facilities, et al. v. Mattingly
of attorney granting Mattingly the authority to “make and enter into any contract or contractual
arrangement.” Mattingly brought a claim in state court on behalf of Hancock alleging that
Hancock suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of negligent care provided by
Preferred Care in 2013. Preferred Care filed a motion to dismiss that lawsuit for failure to
properly file suit as a next friend. Preferred Care also filed a motion to compel arbitration as
contemplated in the parties’ agreement based on the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The state
court did not rule on the motion to compel arbitration, instead holding the case in abeyance
pending a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court. After Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman,
478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015), was issued, Preferred Care brought a complaint in federal court
seeking to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration,
enjoined Mattingly from pursuing her claims in state court except for the wrongful death claim,
and stayed the federal case pending the conclusion of arbitration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We must determine for ourselves whether this court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory
appeal. See Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2003). Review of
whether the district court violated the Anti-Injunction Act is de novo. Six Clinics Holding Corp.,
II v. Cafcomp Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1997).
DISCUSSION
Preferred Care moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 6th
Cir. R. 27(d)(1). The basis of this motion is Preferred Care’s assertion that the district court’s
order was an interlocutory order which cannot be appealed pursuant to the text of the FAA.
The text of the district court order is important in assessing our jurisdiction:
(1) Plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration and enjoin the state court action is
GRANTED. Mattingly is ENJOINED from proceeding against Plaintiffs in the
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Meade Circuit Court action on all but the wrongful-death claim. The parties are
COMPELLED to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement the
claims which are the subject of Mattingly’s Meade Circuit Court complaint,
excluding only the wrongful-death claim. Counsel shall promptly inform the
Meade Circuit Court of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
(2) Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, this proceeding is STAYED until the conclusion of
the ordered arbitration, at which time the Court will decide whether to enter
judgment approving any arbitral award. The parties shall submit a joint status
report every ninety (90) days from the date of entry of this Order until the
resolution of the arbitration. The parties shall promptly report on the resolution of
the arbitration, or of any settlement.
The critical language for the jurisdictional analysis is subpart (2) staying the case pending the
completion of arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. Since the case was stayed under 9 U.S.C. § 3, an
appeal cannot be taken from the order under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) unless otherwise provided for in
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) requires a district judge to state in writing in the relevant
interlocutory order that the order involves a controlling question of law whose resolution may
materially advance completion of the litigation, but the district court did not make such a finding
here.
In an attempt to circumvent this textual bar on appellate jurisdiction, Mattingly cites a
case from the Ninth Circuit where that court held that “where an order compelling arbitration is
inextricably bound up with an injunction order, [appellate courts] have jurisdiction to review
both orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1379
(9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). This authority runs directly counter to our ruling in
Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Estate of Hopkins by & through Hopkins addressing an
almost identical scenario. 845 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2017).
There is similarly no jurisdiction over Mattingly’s appeal of the district court’s injunction
of Mattingly’s proceeding on certain claims in state court. The district court has the authority
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under § 4 of the FAA to direct arbitration to proceed in accordance with the terms of the
arbitration agreement. This arbitration clause does not allow litigation to proceed while
arbitration is ongoing. Since the injunction was entered pursuant to § 4 of the FAA, review of it
is foreclosed by 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2). See id. at 768-69.
Mattingly also challenges the state-court injunction as it pertains to the Kentucky
defendants. Since those defendants could not have participated in federal litigation premised
upon diversity of citizenship, she argues that she should be allowed to pursue her claims against
them in state court. This argument fails to grasp that the district court’s jurisdiction is predicated
upon the FAA, a federal statute conferring federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED.
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