United States v. Adam Wayne Campbell

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 22a0173n.06
No. 21-1493
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Apr 26, 2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
ADAM WAYNE CAMPBELL, ) MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Before: ROGERS, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Adam Campbell pled guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). He now appeals his sentence, arguing that the
district court erred when it applied a four-level enhancement for unlawfully possessing a firearm
in connection with another felony offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We affirm.
In August 2020, Campbell broke into a gun store in Kent County, Michigan and stole 18
firearms. Campbell left seven of the guns in a post office drop box; nine others he traded for drugs.
Police arrested Campbell later that month and he eventually pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of firearms.
As part of his plea agreement, Campbell “waive[d] all rights” to challenge his conviction
or sentence, subject to certain exceptions. The relevant exception here would apply where “the
District Court incorrectly determined the advisory Guidelines range applicable to the defendant, if
the defendant objected at sentencing on that basis.”
No. 21-1493, United States v. Campbell
The probation office prepared a presentence report, which calculated a guidelines range of
120 months’ imprisonment—the statutorily authorized maximum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
That recommendation was based in part on two enhancements. The first was a two-level
enhancement for possessing firearms that were stolen. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). The
second was a four-level enhancement for possessing the firearms “in connection with another
felony offense, to wit: Theft of Firearms from a Federal Firearms Licensee as charged in Count
One of the Indictment.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
Campbell later objected that the presentence report’s “guidelines calculations include two
offense-level enhancements for the same behavior,” namely, his theft of the firearms. Thus, he
argued, the application of both enhancements amounted to double-counting. The district court
overruled that objection and sentenced Campbell to 103 months’ imprisonment. This appeal
followed.
Campbell now challenges the district court’s application of a four-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense[.]” Specifically, Campbell presents two
arguments as to why (in his view) the application of that enhancement amounted to double-
counting. The first argument is the one he made to the district court: he says that the application
of both the two-level and four-level enhancements punished him twice “for indistinguishable
conduct.” But a court may impose two sentencing enhancements for the same conduct if each
enhancement punishes “distinct aspects” of that conduct. See United States v. Sweet, 776 F.3d
447, 450 (6th Cir. 2015). Such was the case here: the § 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement punished
Campbell for the fact that he possessed stolen guns; the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement punished
Campbell for the facts that Campbell himself had stolen the guns, and had done so from a licensed
2
No. 21-1493, United States v. Campbell
federal firearms dealer. The enhancements thus punished different aspects of Campbell’s conduct,
and the district court did not err when it applied the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to Campbell’s
base-offense level. United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010).
Campbell’s second argument is that “the exact same conduct that supported the offense of
conviction (i.e., being a felon in possession) also supported the ‘other’ felony offense (e.g., the
burglary).” But Campbell did not raise this argument at sentencing. And in his plea agreement,
Campbell waived all challenges to his Guidelines range unless he “objected at sentencing on that
basis.” Campbell therefore waived this argument. See United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 378
(6th Cir. 2012).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
3