James LeGrone v. Thomas Birkett

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0487n.06
No. 13-1053
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JAMES LEGRONE, )
FILED
Jul 07, 2014
)
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
THOMAS BIRKETT, )
)
Respondent-Appellee. )
—————————————————————————————————————
BEFORE: BOGGS and MOORE, Circuit Judges; and BARRETT, District Judge.*
BOGGS, Circuit Judge: James LeGrone, a state prisoner serving a mandatory life
sentence without parole for first-degree murder, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s denial
of LeGrone’s petition.
I
In 1991, James LeGrone was charged with felony murder, armed robbery, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He entered a not-guilty plea as to all counts and
the case proceeded to a jury trial in 1992 at what was then the Recorder’s Court for the City of
Detroit. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts and LeGrone was sentenced to life in
prison without parole for the felony murder and to concurrent sentences of two and twenty-five
years respectively for armed robbery and felony firearm.
*
The Honorable Michael R. Barrett, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting
by designation.
1
LeGrone appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals in 1994 and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Recorder’s Court’s judgment. People v. Legrone, 517 N.W.2d 270 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994). LeGrone’s appeal centered on the Recorder’s Court’s alleged error in denying
his motion for a new trial because a juror had not been dismissed following a challenge for cause
by the prosecutor, despite having been convicted of selling cocaine 17 years earlier.1 After
thorough analysis, the Court of Appeals rejected LeGrone’s argument against the juror’s
admission. It also rejected the two other arguments presented on appeal: first, that the tenor of
the prosecution’s closing remarks, combined with the court’s subsequent refusal to include a
curative jury instruction, denied LeGrone a fair trial and second, that police testimony regarding
a photo line-up amounted to impermissible hearsay. In December, 1994, LeGrone’s application
for leave to appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court, ending direct review of his
conviction.
LeGrone then attempted to obtain post-conviction relief in 1997 by filing a motion for
relief from judgment before the Recorder’s Court. The motion was denied. Similarly denied
were his applications, both in 2000, for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision to the Michigan
Court of Appeals and to the Michigan Supreme Court. Later, LeGrone submitted two further
motions for relief from judgment to the trial court in 2006 and 2007. These were both rejected,
as were the succeeding applications for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeals and the
Michigan Supreme Court.
In 2001, LeGrone filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of
Michigan, which the court denied as untimely under AEDPA. Legrone v. Jones, No. 01-71667
1
LeGrone himself does not appear to have joined in the prosecutor’s challenge despite having seven
preemptory challenges remaining at the end of voir dire. In fact, he described himself as “very satisfied” with the
composition of the jury.
2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2002). A certificate of appeability was then denied by this court. LeGrone
v. Jones, No. 01-2707 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2002).
LeGrone initiated the current proceedings in 2009 by filing a motion for an order
authorizing a second or successive petition, in which he claimed that newly-available evidence
proved his innocence. This court granted his motion, In re: James LeGrone, No. 09-2108 (6th
Cir. Apr. 2, 2010), and LeGrone filed his § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan in May 2010. In his petition, LeGrone advanced four
arguments: that the Michigan trial court should have granted his motion for relief from judgment,
that newly discovered evidence demonstrated his actual innocence, that the prosecution coerced
witnesses to withhold evidence at trial, and that the prosecution did not disclose exculpatory
evidence. The State of Michigan argued that LeGrone’s petition should be denied as barred by
the statute of limitations or, alternatively, because all of its claims were either non-cognizable or
procedurally defaulted.
The district court denied LeGrone’s petition. It found that his first claim, that the
Michigan trial court should have granted his motion for relief from judgment, was an
unreviewable matter of state law. It found that LeGrone’s second claim, that of actual
innocence, did not merit relief because it was based on affidavits that contained no new
evidence—the affiants testified as to their intimidation at the original trial. Further, the district
court pointed out that LeGrone’s new evidence consisted only of affidavits, executed many years
after the trial. They were submitted without explanation for the delay and were not subject to
cross-examination. Such evidence is not, “new reliable evidence” proving that, “it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence”—
the threshold required for actual-innocence claims. See Ross v. Berghuis, 417 F.3d 552, 556 (6th
3
Cir. 2005). Similarly, LeGrone’s third claim, that he was denied confrontation by police
intimidation was found to be without merit because both witnesses testified as to the police
coercion that they experienced before the trial. Finally, the district court rejected LeGrone’s
Brady claim because the evidence that LeGrone claimed had been suppressed in fact came out at
trial from a different source.
Finding that reasonable jurists could disagree as to its findings with regard to LeGrone’s
third and fourth claims (those regarding the denial of his right to confrontation and the alleged
Brady violation), the district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to those claims
only. LeGrone timely appealed the district court’s denial of his petition and then immediately
applied to this court for, and was granted, a COA for the two issues that the district court did not
certify for appeal. The current appeal advances arguments from both the original and the
expanded COAs.
II
We review the district court’s rulings on both questions of law and mixed questions of
law and fact de novo and review the district court’s finding of fact for clear error. Lucas v.
O’Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1999). Because LeGrone filed this petition for habeas
corpus after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty act of 1996
(AEDPA), its standards govern his petition and his appeal. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–
27 (1997). Federal courts may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on claims adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that was: 1) contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court; or 2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2012).
4
The state court’s factual findings, moreover, are accorded a presumption of accuracy, rebuttable
only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
III
LeGrone advances two claims on appeal: The first claim, denial of due process, is based
on police intimidation of two favorable witnesses, Javon Carter and Willie Pringle. LeGrone
states two theories by which he hopes to demonstrate denial of due process. First, he argues that
police intimidation denied him the testimony of Carter and Pringle and thus a direct violation of
due process. Second, LeGrone argues that the intimidation of Carter and Pringle amounted to a
Brady violation and thus denied him due process under that doctrine. (Appellant’s Br. 10–11,
13.)
LeGrone’s second argument on appeal is a free-standing actual-innocence claim based on
the evidence contained in the affidavits of Javon Carter and Willie Pringle. (Appellant’s Br. 16.)
The district court correctly rejected both claims.
A
The district court correctly rejected LeGrone’s free-standing due-process claim based on
witness intimidation by the police.
Witness intimidation, in and of itself, constitutes a violation of a defendant’s due process
rights only when, “[g]overnment conduct rises to the level of substantial interference with a
witness's ‘free and unhampered determination to testify.’” Johnson v. Bell, 525 F.3d 466, 480
(6th Cir. 2008). Far from interfering with the witnesses’ “unhampered determination to testify,”
any attempts by the police to intimidate Carter and Pringle were quite obviously unsuccessful.
Not only did both witnesses’ testimony at trial contradict their earlier statements to the police,
but both witnesses specifically testified that police intimidation induced those statements.
5
Further, the defense cross-examined both witnesses in order to discredit their earlier statements.
The intimidation of these witnesses, if there was any, may have extended to their original
statements, but it did not extend to their testimony at trial.
Similarly, LeGrone cannot make out a Brady claim based on the witnesses’ intimidation.
A successful Brady claim requires that evidence “favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching . . . must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Cauthern v. Colson, 736 F.3d 465,
481 (6th Cir. 2013).
On both counts, LeGrone’s Brady claim fails. Although the district court found,
correctly, that the evidence in Carter and Pringle’s affidavits could have been used to impeach
Hughes, the district court also found, correctly, that there was no evidence that the intimidation
of Carter and Pringle actually suppressed any evidence. On the contrary, the very evidence that
was allegedly suppressed was raised in open court when Hughes took the stand. When directly
asked (by LeGrone’s counsel) if she set up the robbery, Hughes answered, “I’ve never set
anything up but a dining room table . . . .” Additionally, the district court correctly found that
there was no prejudice because there was not, “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See United States v.
Holder, 657 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2011). LeGrone’s guilt was also established by two
eyewitnesses both of whom identified LeGrone in a photographic array and at trial. More
evidence advancing the theory that Hughes set up the robbery herself, material already subjected
to courtroom inquiry while she was on the stand, would not have changed the result of the trial.
6
B
The district court also correctly rejected LeGrone’s second claim on appeal, that of actual
innocence. “[C]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been
held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation . . . .”) Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400. Any potential free-standing claim of
actual innocence, stated in its own right absent a predicate constitutional violation, faces an
“extraordinarily high” threshold showing. See Id. at 417 (stating, in the context of capital
punishment, that free-standing actual-innocence claims based on stale evidence would create an
enormous burden on state courts and jeopardize finality). As with the petitioner in Herrera, the
evidence offered by LeGrone consisted of no more than affidavits executed a decade and a half
after trial and was offered without adequate explanation as to the delay. This falls far short of
Herrera’s “extraordinarily high” threshold. Ibid.IV
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of LeGrone’s
petition for habeas corpus.
7