United States v. Roddrick Montez Wilson

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0263n.06
No. 22-1587
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jun 08, 2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
RODDRICK MONTEZ WILSON, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellant. )
) OPINION
)
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Roddrick Wilson was
charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and with
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He conditionally pleaded guilty,
reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence based on
alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Because his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated,
we affirm.
I.
Around midnight on June 6, 2021, Grand Rapids Police Officer Ryan Manser was
patrolling a residential area in a marked police vehicle. When he approached an intersection,
Manser heard a car door slam to his right and turned to observe a man (later revealed to be Wilson)
in blue jeans and a t-shirt walking away from a black sedan. Wilson repeatedly looked over his
shoulder at Manser’s vehicle and walked with his left hand swinging freely and right hand pinned
No. 22-1587, United States v. Wilson
to his side. Manser then turned right at the intersection and activated the spotlight on his vehicle
to better observe Wilson. As soon as he did so, Wilson bolted, running down the block and through
residential foliage to evade Manser, who then noticed a dark object in Willson’s right hand and
suspected it was a firearm.
Manser pursued and, with the assistance of other officers, located Wilson hiding on the
front porch of a house in the neighborhood. The officers took Wilson into custody, searched him,
and found an iPhone and a car key fob in his pockets. Manser then proceeded, with the assistance
of a canine tracking Wilson’s scent, to search the area where Wilson ran through the foliage.
Manser found a semiautomatic handgun, another cell phone, and a container of pills—then
believed to be Adderall but later revealed to be methamphetamine. The officers placed Wilson
under arrest.
Returning to the area where Manser had first heard a car door slam, the officers used the
key fob seized from Wilson and found that it matched a black Mercedes Benz in that exact location.
The officers ran a license plate check on the Mercedes and discovered the plate was registered to
a different vehicle, one belonging to a woman named Kayla Shannon. They then checked the VIN
number which was registered to a man named Victor Castillo. Because Wilson was under arrest
and because the vehicle was not registered to him and had illegitimate license plates, police
impounded the vehicle. The officers therefore searched the vehicle prior to having it towed and
found a large amount of cash, sets of other vehicle keys, and numerous peach-colored pills, similar
to the pills found in the foliage.
Wilson was later charged in a seven-count indictment. He moved to suppress the evidence
found in the vehicle, claiming the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied
the motion. He pleaded guilty to two of the counts, one for possession with intent to distribute 500
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grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and
one for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and
to withdraw his plea should he prevail on appeal. He now asks this court to reverse the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527,
536 (6th Cir. 2011). The movant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.III.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend IV. Generally, this right is secured by requiring law enforcement officers to obtain
a warrant prior to conducting a search. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). However,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that some circumstances, including the search of an
automobile and the inventorying of seized assets, obviate the need for a warrant provided the
search is otherwise reasonable. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (automobile
exception); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (inventory exception).
In one such circumstance, under what is known as the inventory exception, police may
search and examine items seized as part of an inventory policy. See United States v. Smith, 510
F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 2007). “It is settled law that the police may conduct an inventory search
of an automobile that is being impounded without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.”
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United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith, 510 F.3d at 650). This
exception exists to allow police to protect items in their custody from theft or loss and to avoid
danger arising from the seizure of potentially hazardous articles. Smith, 510 F.3d at 651. To pass
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, an inventory search must be conducted
“according to standard police procedures.” Id. (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 5 (1990)).
Law enforcement may not undertake an inventory search as a pretext for a criminal investigation.
United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 2020).
Another warrant exception, the so called “automobile exception,” allows law enforcement
to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have “probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains evidence of a crime.” Smith, 510 F.3d at 647 (internal quotation omitted). Probable cause
exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983). Probable cause requires only “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima
facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir.
1998) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, the automobile exception is not limited to cases
where the car is immediately mobile, Carney, 471 U.S. at 391, or to items in plain view, United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817-22 (1982). Rather, law enforcement may search a vehicle and
the containers therein provided the officers have probable cause to believe that the object of the
search may reasonably be found in the vehicle or containers. Id. at 824.
These officers had two legitimate reasons to search Wilson’s vehicle without a warrant.
Start with the inventory exception. Grand Rapid’s impoundment policy provides that officers
“shall impound” a vehicle when “the driver was arrested and is not the owner.” The officers validly
arrested Wilson for possession of contraband. After they located his vehicle with the key fob
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found in his pocket, they discovered that the vehicle was registered to someone else. Because they
had arrested Wilson and he did not own the vehicle, they impounded the car and, per department
policy, searched it prior to having it towed.
Wilson claims the officers did not follow department policy because they never saw him
drive the vehicle. Because the policy authorizes impoundments when “the driver” is arrested,
Wilson argues, the search was not pursuant to standardized criteria and therefore invalid under the
Fourth Amendment. The district court rejected this argument, finding that Manser’s observation
of Wilson walking away from the nigh-closed vehicle, combined with the key fob found on his
person, sufficiently “attached” Wilson to the vehicle for the purposes of the impoundment policy.
We agree. The officers could reasonably conclude that Wilson was the driver of the vehicle.
Wilson secondly argues that the real reason for the search was investigatory. He cites the
cross-examination of an officer at the scene, who, when asked whether his “real reason for
searching the car” was to look for evidence of a crime, simply responded, “Yes, sir.” While the
Fourth Amendment certainly prohibits inventory searches that operate as a ruse for a criminal
investigation, Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, we have previously rejected challenges to such searches based
solely on the subjective motives of the officers—particularly when the inventory search was
inevitable and objectively justifiable. See Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 636; United States v. Kimes, 246
F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2001). The inventory search in this case was objectively justified by
standardized police procedures and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Even if we were to conclude that the officers’ inventory search fell on the impermissible
investigatory purpose side of the line, their search was valid under the automobile exception. The
officers undoubtedly had probable cause to search Wilson’s vehicle. Manser first noticed Wilson
when he heard a car door slam and saw him walking away from the black sedan. That initial
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sighting, combined with the discovery of the key fob in Wilson’s pocket, supported a fair
probability that Wilson had just exited the vehicle. Once the officers recovered both the firearm
and drugs which Wilson had attempted to discard while fleeing, they accurately deduced that if
Wilson had just exited the vehicle carrying contraband, it was likely that more could be found in
the vehicle. The officer’s logic and conclusion were self-evidently reasonable.
Wilson makes much of the fact that Manser did not actually see him driving or exiting the
vehicle. He argues that because the officers did not actually see him exit the vehicle and because
he was not arrested in or near his vehicle, that the police did not have probable cause to search his
vehicle. This argument is without merit. The probable cause inquiry looks to the totality of the
circumstances, including what the officer heard. Considering what Manser heard and saw, we
agree with the district court that sufficient evidence “attached” Wilson to the vehicle to support
probable cause.
The officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and they did not violate Wilson’s
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court therefore did not err in refusing to suppress the fruits
of the search.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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