Keri-Yakei Morris v. City of Detroit, Mich.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0522n.06
Case No. 19-1386
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Oct 16, 2019
KERI-YAKEI MORRIS; CALVIN ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
GALLOWAY, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
) MICHIGAN
CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN; )
JENNIFER LEE ADAMS, )
)
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________/
Before: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiffs Keri-Yakei Morris and Calvin Galloway. Plaintiffs allege violations
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on claims of wrongful seizure and excessive
force by defendants Jennifer Lee Adams of the City of Detroit, Michigan, police department, and
the City of Detroit, Michigan. While on duty, Adams went to plaintiffs’ residence seeking
repayment of a personal debt owed to her by Morris, which resulted in a physical altercation
between the two women, and the discharge of Adams’ police-department-issued firearm. Because
Adams acted only in a personal capacity during the incident, she was not acting under color of
state law, and District Court Judge Avern Cohn therefore granted summary judgment to
defendants. Relying on the same reasoning as the district court, we affirm its judgment.
Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
I.
Defendants dispute plaintiffs’ account of the facts, but they concede that we must view the
facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff for purposes of summary judgment. The district court
accordingly found the following “undisputed” facts as set forth by plaintiffs.
On June 20, 2017, Adams clocked out and left work to go to plaintiffs’ house at
approximately 4:30 pm, even though she was scheduled to work until 6:00 pm that day. Upon
arriving at the house, Adams began to knock aggressively on the door. When Morris opened the
door, Adams placed her foot in the door so that Morris could not close it. Adams then entered the
house and began questioning Morris about repayment of a $300 personal loan. Adams became
hostile, pointing her finger in Morris’ face and initiating a physical confrontation during which
Morris sprayed Adams in the face with mace. After being sprayed with mace, Adams drew her
gun and fired a shot. The bullet did not hit Morris.
Before the confrontation between Morris and Adams escalated, Galloway was upstairs on
the second floor. At some point during the confrontation, Galloway began making his way down
the stairs. As he descended, Adams threatened him, stating she would do physical harm to him if
he came downstairs. Galloway did not intervene in the dispute, but the bullet fired by Adams
grazed Galloway, who was in the next room.
After discharging her gun, Adams fled the scene. Galloway called 911 immediately after
Adams left the house and Detroit police officers responded. Criminal charges were brought against
Adams in state court, but Adams was acquitted of all criminal charges because the state court
found that Morris had lied to the court about the incident.1 In addition to facing state criminal
1
The state court judge held: “The Court finds, as a fact, that during this trial, Ms. Morris lied; she fabricated
a story that defied logic and explanation; her testimony was offensive; and she tried to marry her testimony of what
occurred with the physical evidence as found by the Investigating Police Officers; and she was unable to do so . . . the
Court finds that it cannot believe anything that Ms. Morris said, during her testimony, in good conscience. . . . because
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Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
charges, Adams was also suspended after an internal police department investigation determined
that she violated various police department policies and procedures. The internal investigation
found that, at the time of the incident, Adams was not in police uniform. However, she was
wearing her badge, had a waistband holster that displayed her department-issued gun, and had her
department-issued handcuffs. The internal police investigation determined that Adams was
technically “on duty” when she clocked out and went to plaintiffs’ home at 4:00 pm because she
was scheduled to work until 6:00 pm the day of the incident.
Based on this occurrence, plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court, which defendants
removed to federal court, containing the following claims: Count I- 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth
Amendment violation, “False Arrest”; Count II-42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourteenth Amendment
violation, “Substantive Due Process”; Count III-42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment violation,
“Substantive Due Process”; Count IV- “Municipal Liability for Constitutional Violations”; and
Count V- “Michigan Constitutional Claims.” Plaintiffs requested damages of $1,000,000, as well
as costs and attorney fees.
Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. The district court granted
defendants’ motions for summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims. Morris v. City of Detroit, No. 17-13415 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2019).
This appeal followed.
Ms. Morris is the only witness who provided any evidence of what occurred . . . the Court must acquit the defendant
of all charges, and dismiss this matter with prejudice.”
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Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
II.
A. Claims Against Adams
To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a person, (2) acting
under color of state law, (3) deprived him or her of a constitutional right. Waters v. City of
Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2001). The issue in dispute is whether Adams was
“acting under color of state law” when she went to plaintiffs’ home and discharged her revolver.
Plaintiffs contend that Adams was acting under color of law because she had her department-issued
badge, service revolver and handcuffs, and she was on duty because her shift did not end until 6:00
pm.
When determining whether a person acted under color of state law, “[t]he fact that a police
officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. ‘It is the nature of the act
performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which
determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.’” Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438,
441 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)). We
consider certain factors when deciding whether an officer was acting under color of state law, such
as whether the officer flashed a badge, identified himself as a police officer, placed an individual
under arrest, intervened in a dispute between third parties pursuant to a duty imposed by police-
department regulations, Memphis, Tenn. Area Local Am. Postal Workers Union v. City of
Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12, 13 (6th Cir.
1980)), or used state-issued equipment. Layne, 627 F.2d at 13. Courts must consider the totality
of the circumstance in determining whether an officer was acting under color of law at the time of
the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Neuens v. City of Columbus, 303 F.3d 667, 671 (6th
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Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
Cir. 2002). “Acts of police officers in the ambit of their personal, private pursuits fall outside of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Stengel, 522 F.2d at 441.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we assume that Adams was on
duty, even though she had clocked out at 4:00 pm before going to plaintiffs’ home. She was
scheduled to work until 6:00 pm that day, and the police investigation report found that she was
on duty. Adams was not in uniform when she went to plaintiffs’ house, but she had her badge,
handcuffs and service revolver with her. The only item she used during the incident was her
service revolver.
Although Adams used her gun, which was state-issued equipment, she did not manifest the
requisite showing of state-granted authority to act under color of law. The sole purpose for Adams
being at Morris’ house was to collect a personal debt of $300. Adams did not purport to be
conducting police-related business, nor did she attempt to use her status as a police officer
advantageously during the altercation. The fact that Adams used her department-issued weapon
during a private dispute is not enough to establish she was acting under color of law. “To hold
otherwise would create a federal cause of action out of any unauthorized use of a police-issue
weapon, without regard to whether there are any additional circumstances to indicate that the
officer was exercising actual or purported police authority.” Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d
809, 816 (3d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs’ argument against Adams is based entirely on the fact that Adams had
department-issued equipment with her, including her badge and service revolver, and the fact that
she was technically on duty, even though she had clocked out for the day. The purely private
altercation between Morris and Adams does not possess the necessary indicia of authority to find
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Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
that Adams was acting under color of law.2 Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Adams
was not acting “under color of law,” plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a necessary element of a
constitutional violation and their claims must fail.
B. Claims Against the City of Detroit
Plaintiffs contend that the City of Detroit should be held liable for Adams’ actions because
it failed to properly train and supervise Adams, and that it permits officers to carry guns when off
duty. It is well settled that there can be no respondeat superior municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. However, in Monell v. Department of Social Services., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that § 1983 permits suit against a municipality if the municipality’s custom or policy
caused a constitutional violation. We have repeatedly recognized that “[t]here can be no liability
under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606,
622 (6th Cir. 2014).
In order to determine whether a government or municipality is liable for a § 1983 violation,
a two-part test is applied. First, a plaintiff must show that he suffered the deprivation of a
constitutional right. If an underlying constitutional violation exists, the plaintiff must show that
the alleged deprivation occurred at the hands of the actor, while acting under color of state law.
Second, a municipality can be liable for such a violation only if the plaintiff can show that “the
municipality engaged in a ‘policy or custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation
of the plaintiff’s rights.” Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir.
2
Adams’ conduct was the definition of the ancient concept of “frolic.” The general principle of the concept
of “frolic” remains intact today, and vicarious liability arises only with respect to conduct that in part at least is in
furtherance of the employer’s business. Restatement (Second) Agency, § 235. “If the agent is off on a frolic of its
own, in a situation where the principal has neither given the agent authority to act for it nor done anything to suggest
to others that the agent has such authority, and in the absence of ratification, courts do not ordinarily treat the act of
the agent as the act of the principal.” Abbott Labs. v. McLaren Gen. Hosp., 919 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1990); Carroll
v. Hillendale Golf Club, Inc., 144 A. 693 (Md. Ct. App. 1929) (“Where there is not merely deviation, but a total
departure from the course of the master’s business, so that the servant may be said to be on a frolic of his own, the
master is no longer answerable for the servant’s conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Case No. 19-1386, Morris, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al.
2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Liability must be predicated on more than allegations
that a municipal employee employs a tortfeasor.
Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims require Adams to be a state actor,
which in turn requires her to have acted under color of law. However, as discussed above, Adams
was not acting under color of law. Consequently, the City cannot be liable for Adams’ personal
actions not taken under color of state law, and plaintiffs’ claims against the City fail. We also note
that plaintiffs challenge the reasonableness of the City’s policies that permit off-duty officers to
carry state-issued firearms. But § 1983 does not authorize municipal liability based on the purely
private actions of an officer without an underlying constitutional claim. We agree that the City of
Detroit is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I-IV of plaintiffs’ complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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