Mark Richardson v. CTA

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
August 2, 2019
Before:
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
Nos. 17-3508 & 18-2199
Appeals from the United States District
MARK RICHARDSON, Court for the Northern District of
Plaintiff-Appellant, Illinois, Eastern Division.
v. No. 16-cv-03027
CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, John Robert Blakey,
Defendant-Appellee. Judge.
ORDER
The opinion issued in the above-entitled case on June 12, 2019, is hereby amended
as follows:
On Page 7, line 23, the last sentence of the paragraph, which states,
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA are entitled to
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984);
see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1997).
Nos. 17-3508 & 18-2199 Page 2
is amended to read,
We view EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA’s
definitions as “instructive guidance.” Steffen v. Donahoe, 680
F.3d 738, 743 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Waldrip v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 325 F.3d 652, 655 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (EEOC regulations
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12102 are “persuasive authority”).1
Additionally, on Page 12, line 20, the last sentence of the paragraph, which
states,
While EEOC interpretive guidance is “not entitled to full
Chevron deference,” it does “reflect a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance” and is therefore “entitled to a
measure of respect under the less deferential Skidmore [v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)] standard.” Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95
F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 1996).
shall be removed.
1 Because Congress did not delegate authority to the EEOC to implement 42 U.S.C. § 12102, the precise
degree of deference courts owe to EEOC regulations interpreting the term “disability” is an open question.
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (“Because both parties accept the EEOC
regulations as reasonable, we assume without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to decide
what level of deference, if any, they are due.”), superseded by statute, ADAAA, 122 Stat. 3553; Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (same), superseded by statute, ADAAA, 122 Stat. 3553; Albertson’s, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 n.10 (1999) (same); see also Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 603 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2009) (EEOC interpretations of § 12102 are “not necessarily entitled to any special deference by the
courts”).