United States v. Alfred Kowalski

CLARK, Associate Justice.

Alfred Kowalski was convicted by a jury of violating Title 18, U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) [engaging in the business of importing, manufacturing or dealing in firearms]. On his appeal he raises six points: (1) Is Section 922(a)(1) unconstitutionally vague and indefinite; (2) is the evidence sufficient to support the verdict; (3) was it error to cross-examine Kowalski regarding pending state charges; (4) may prior felony convictions more than twenty-five years old be used for impeachment; (5) is it error to allow proof by hearsay that one of the guns allegedly sold by Kowalski was stolen; and (6) was it prejudicial for the prosecutor to characterize one of the guns in question as a “sniper’s gun”, etc.

Wayne Stebins offered to sell a rifle (that Kowalski was holding on a $100 loan owed by Stebins) to David Krug, a Treasury Agent. Krug, Stebins and another Treasury Agent went to Kowal-ski’s house to obtain the gun. While the Agents remained in a van truck, Stebins went into Kowalski’s house and returned alone with the gun which he sold to Krug for $125.00, which money Stebins later paid to Kowalski. Thereafter a Government informer, Junior Lucas, took the Agents to Kowalski’s house and inquired of Kowalski if he had any guns for sale. The latter said that he had “a varmint rifle” and after some dickering over the price, Kowalski sold the rifle to Krug for $150.00, with some ammunition thrown in. Some two weeks later the same parties returned to Kowalski’s house and purchased a .45 caliber target pistol for $150.00 and an old 16 gauge shotgun for $30.00.

Kowalski was regularly employed as a truck driver by Ruan Transport Company, was 60 years of age and married. From June 7, 1973 until October 2, 1973, Kowalski did not sell or purchase any other firearms nor did he spend any time locating additional firearms to sell.

The statute in question provides that except for a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, it “shall be unlawful ... to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing or dealing in firearms or ammunition. . . ” We hold that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague; that Kowalski was engaged “in the business of . . . dealing in firearms . . .” in violation thereof; and that there is no merit in the remainder of his points.

1. As to the vagueness claim, we find that this Circuit has upheld the Act under that attack in two cases, United States v. Zeidman, 444 F.2d 1051 (1971) and United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355 (1971). In the latter case the Act was found “not impermissibly vague”, Id. at 1357. Likewise three additional circuits have upheld it: Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Wilkening, 485 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1973). The single case cited by Kowalski is wholly inapposite. It involved a vagrancy statute in the District of Columbia and typical of those acts, used such terms as “loitering”; “leading an immoral and profligate life”, etc. And it was properly held vague. Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 414 F.2d 1097 (1968). We uphold the Act involved here.

2. Kowalski attacks the evidence as being insufficient to support the jury verdict. However, a reading of the transcript reveals at least three sales of prohibited weapons, a .225 Winchester rifle, a .45 pistol and a 16-gauge shotgun. In addition, Kowalski received the proceeds of a fourth prohibited gun sale, a .30-30 rifle. Moreover statements by Kowalski to the Government agents and admitted by Kowalski but at trial claimed to be: “That was just, like I say, just wind-ing it a little bit, playing it bigger than I should have and got myself into trouble” indicate other illegal activity under the Act. These included receiving a shipment of ten stolen rifles, after which he tried to contact Krug but could not find him and so he sold them to others; that he was trying to re-stock his gun supply; that he went to Michigan to get some guns but only got one and it was no good; and that he got guns in and out all the time for sale. We believe the evidence quite sufficient.

3. Kowalski claims that the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination if he had ever been convicted of a felony were all too remote in years, i. e. 1932, 1937 and 1948. However the eases are to the contrary. See United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Morefield, 411 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 18-20, (7th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 951, 91 S.Ct. 1632, 29 L.Ed.2d 122.

4. During the interrogation as to prior felonies, the prosecutor also asked Kowalski: “You have been charged in state court in Bureau and La Salle County”, and the answer was: “conspiracy”. The prosecutor then asked: “How many charges are pending against you there, sir”, whereupon objection was made. The court sustained the objection “to the pending charges.” Ko-walski then moved for a mistrial which was denied. The court did instruct the jury “to disregard the question and any implications of it.” The question should not have been asked and we agree with the dissent’s criticism of the Assistant United States Attorney. However we note that Kowalski made no objection to the previous question. Indeed he answered it. The prosecutor then asked the details. In light of the court’s specific charge to the jury that the question as to the pending charges be stricken and that they disregard “the question and any implications of it”, we find it harmless, especially in light of the entire record.

The direct evidence of guilt was overwhelming — indeed it was admitted by Kowalski save for the point as to whether the number of sales etc. was sufficient to find that he engaged in the business of dealing in firearms. The jury found against him on this point under the court’s charge to which there was no objection. There was no indication of bad faith on the part of the government. Indeed, the previous question as to Kowalski being charged in “Bureau and LaSalle County” had already been answered without any objection. We reiterate the question should not have been asked, and the prosecutor is censured for posing it, but in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt as well as the manner and time in which the question was asked, we find that there was no prejudice.

5. The claimed hearsay nature of the evidence as to one of the guns involved being stolen is not correct. It is true that in tracing the sale of the gun the Agent received information as to the sequence of purchasers. However, upon going to the ultimate purchaser, he found that the gun was stolen. He then contacted the Sheriff of Putnam County who forwarded the official report showing the gun was stolen. Moreover, Ko-walski admitted on cross-examination that he had told Agent Krug the gun was stolen at Granville. At trial he testified that he had traded a .243 target rifle for it at a gun show in Princeton. He said: “I was questioning around if anybody had a smaller gun that I could trade around. The guy asked me to look at it.” The trade took place, he said, “right at the edge of where they — where all the gun show — where the people were.” Kowalski remembered that it was in 1971 but could not remember the day, the month and “didn’t even ask him” (the seller) his name. “He didn’t ask me mine.”

6. Nor was the prosecutor’s comment that the gun might be a “sniper’s gun” prejudicial. The gun was before the jury, had a scope on it and was called “a varmint gun” by Kowalski. The referenced characterization is not claimed to have referred to Kowalski as a sniper. It was fair comment under the evidence.

The other claims of Kowalski are frivolous and the judgment is Affirmed.