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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

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DocketNumber： 13-2276

Judges： Flaum, Easterbrook, Tinder

Filed Date： 1/3/2014

Status： Precedential

Modified Date： 10/19/2024

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13-‐‑2276
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellee,
v.
ROBERTO FLORES, JR.,
Defendant-‐‑Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 CR 1004 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2013 — DECIDED JANUARY 3, 2014
____________________
Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Roberto Flores, an alien who
returned without permission following his removal, was
charged with that crime and others arising from his armed
drug dealing. Flores, who maintained that the United States
Code does not apply to him and that the court had no juris-‐‑
diction to try him, refused to entertain the possibility of a
guilty plea. He went to trial and was convicted on all counts.
The judge sentenced him to concurrent 96-‐‑month sentences
No. 13-‐‑2276 2
on all counts but one; that conviction, for possessing fire-‐‑
arms in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, led to a con-‐‑
secutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment. The total is 456
months. The consecutive 360-‐‑month sentence was compulso-‐‑
ry in light of Flores’s earlier conviction of the same crime.
See

18 U.S.C. §924

(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Flores   presents   a   single   argument:   that   his   lawyer   fur-‐‑
nished   ineffective   assistance   by   telling   the   jury   that   Flores
indeed   had   distributed   cocaine   after   reentering   the   United
States  without  permission.  Counsel  tried  to  persuade  the  ju-‐‑
ry  that  the  prosecution  did  not  establish  guilt  beyond  a  rea-‐‑
sonable   doubt   on   the   weapons-‐‑related   charges   (including
the   one   that   dominated   the   eventual   sentence).   The   jury
nonetheless   convicted   on   all   counts.   Now   Flores   contends
that  no  competent  attorney  would  have  pursued  this  strate-‐‑
gy.   It   is   always   forbidden,   his   appellate   lawyer   insists,   for
trial  counsel  to  concede  his  client’s  guilt  on  any  of  the  charg-‐‑
es.  A  concession  on  any  charge  is  equivalent  to  a  guilty  plea,
and   when   the   client   has   declined   to   plead   guilty   counsel
must  attempt  to  secure  an  acquittal  on  every  charge,  howev-‐‑
er  improbable  that  outcome  may  be.  He  relies  principally  on
United  States  v.  Cronic,

466 U.S. 648

  (1984),  which  held  that  a
lack   of   legal   assistance,   when   an   appointed   lawyer   goes
missing  in  action,  always  violates  the  Constitution.
Florida  v.  Nixon,

543 U.S. 175

  (2004),  is  a  major  obstacle  to
this  contention.  Nixon  holds  that  it  is  not  invariably  ineffec-‐‑
tive  for  counsel  to  concede  guilt  on  some  charges,  even  in  a
capital  prosecution,  as  part  of  an  effort  to  make  the  defense
credible.  The  Court  concluded  that  Cronic  does  not  apply  to
situations  in  which  defense  counsel  concedes  a  subset  of  the
charges.  Denying  the  obvious  can  lead  jurors  to  tune  out  the
3                                                                 No.  13-‐‑2276
defense   lawyer   or,   worse,   assume   that   if   defense   counsel   is
behaving  unrealistically  (even  deceitfully)  on  some  charges,
the  defense  is  phony  on  all.
Flores   tries   to   distinguish   Nixon   as   a   situation   in   which
counsel   alerted   his   client   to   his   plan   to   concede   guilt   on
some  charges,  while  Flores  insists  that  his  lawyer  never  told
him   what   the   trial   strategy   would   be   and   thus   violated   the
duty   to   discuss   tactics   with   the   accused.   See   Strickland   v.
Washington,

466 U.S. 668

,  688  (1984).  This  is  not  a  compelling
line  of  distinction,  because  Nixon,  having  been  alerted,  sat  in
silence   and   neither   approved   nor   objected.

543 U.S. at 186

.
The   Court   nonetheless   held   that   counsel’s   performance   met
the  sixth  amendment’s  requirements.  Lack  of  notice  seems  a
lesser  sin,  unless  we  are  confident  that  the  client  would  have
objected   and   that   counsel   would   have   followed   the   ac-‐‑
cused’s   instructions.   See   also   Wright   v.   Van   Patten,

552 U.S. 120

  (2008)  (remarking  the  limited  scope  of  Cronic).
But  there  is  a  deeper  problem  with  Flores’s  proposed  dis-‐‑
tinction   of   Nixon:   it   lacks   support   in   the   record.   The   source
for   the   proposition   that   Flores’s   trial   lawyer   didn’t   tell   him
about   the   plan   for   the   defense   at   trial—and   that   he   would
have  objected,  had  he  been  told—is  an  assertion  by  Flores’s
appellate   lawyer.   We   may   assume   that   this   is   based   on   in-‐‑
formation  from  Flores.  But  a  private  message  to  counsel,  re-‐‑
layed   to   the   court   outside   the   record,   is   not   evidence;   we
must  ignore  it.
This   highlights   a   fundamental   problem:   this   is   a   direct
appeal   rather   than   one   from   the   disposition   of   a   collateral
attack  under

28 U.S.C. §2255

. Nixon and Strickland, like many
other decisions, say that counsel’s strategic choices are pre-‐‑
sumed to be competent. As a practical matter that presump-‐‑
No. 13-‐‑2276 4
tion cannot be overcome without an evidentiary hearing at
which the defendant explains his view of what went wrong
and counsel can justify his choices.
At a hearing Flores might testify that his lawyer did not
tell him of a plan to concede guilt on some charges and focus
the defense on the others, and that he would have forbidden
such a strategy even knowing that the jury might find a
complete denial outlandish. Counsel might testify that he
did tell his client and that the client listened impassively (as
Nixon did) or approved, or perhaps counsel might explain
why he overrode his client’s objection. A district judge then
could determine who was telling the truth, make appropri-‐‑
ate findings, and decide whether the defense had been con-‐‑
ducted in a professionally competent way.
On direct appeal, by contrast, the record lacks evidence
on these issues and any findings about where the truth lies.
A court of appeals is not about to assume that the accused is
telling the truth and condemn counsel’s choices on that ba-‐‑
sis. The best that could come of an appeal (from the defend-‐‑
ant’s perspective) would be a remand for a hearing—
duplicating the process initiated by a motion under §2255—
and the worst that could come of it would be an affirmance
observing that an empty record is fatal to the appeal.
Lack of an adequate record is not the defendant’s only
problem. Lack of a decision by the district judge is another.
Flores never asked that judge to give him a new trial on the
ground that his counsel had furnished ineffective assistance.
This means that appellate review is limited by the plain-‐‑
error standard of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). And the Supreme
Court has concluded that the plain-‐‑error standard is a de-‐‑
manding one. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus,

560 U.S. 258

5                                                                   No.  13-‐‑2276
(2010);   Puckett   v.   United   States,

556 U.S. 129

   (2009);   United
States  v.  Dominguez  Benitez,

542 U.S. 74

  (2004);  United  States  v.
Vonn,

535 U.S. 55

  (2002);  Johnson  v.  United  States,

520 U.S. 461

(1997);  United  States  v.  Olano,

507 U.S. 725

  (1993).  The  plain-‐‑
error  standard  assigns  to  appellant  the  need  to  demonstrate
that  “(1)  there  is  an  ‘error’;  (2)  the  error  is  ‘clear  or  obvious,
rather   than   subject   to   reasonable   dispute’;   (3)   the   error   ‘af-‐‑
fected   the   appellant’s   substantial   rights,   which   in   the   ordi-‐‑
nary  case  means’  it  ‘affected  the  outcome  of  the  district  court
proceedings’;   and   (4)   ‘the   error   seriously   affect[s]   the   fair-‐‑
ness,  integrity  or  public  reputation  of  judicial  proceedings.’”
Marcus,

560 U.S. at 262

,  quoting  from  several  other  decisions.
And  even   if   the   appellant   establishes  all   of  these  things,  re-‐‑
versal  is  discretionary:  a  plain  error  permits,  but  never  com-‐‑
pels,  appellate  correction.
It  is  hard  to  understand  why  a  defendant  would  assume
these  burdens  when  the  alternative,  a  collateral  attack  under
§2255,  entails  none  of  them.  The  district  court  can  compile  a
record   and   make   findings;   appellate   review   of   the   law   is
plenary   (though   review   of   factual   findings   is   deferential).
After  Massaro  v.  United  States,

538 U.S. 500

  (2003),  held  that  a
defendant   is   never   obliged   to   raise   an   ineffective-‐‑assistance
argument   on   direct   appeal—held,   in   other   words,   that   it   is
always   safe   to   reserve   the   issue   for   collateral   review—we
have  said  many  times  that  it  is  imprudent  to  present  an  inef-‐‑
fective-‐‑assistance  argument  on  direct  appeal.  See,  e.g.,  United
States   v.   Miller,

327 F.3d 598

,   601   (7th   Cir.   2003);   Harris   v.
United  States,

366 F.3d 593

,  595  (7th  Cir.  2004);  United  States  v.
Harris,

394 F.3d 543

,   557–59   (7th   Cir.   2005);   Fuller   v.   United
States,

398 F.3d 644

,  649  (7th  Cir.  2005);  United  States  v.  Pala-‐‑
dino,

401 F.3d 471

,  479  (7th  Cir.  2005);  Peoples  v.  United  States,

403 F.3d 844

,  846  (7th  Cir.  2005);  United  States  v.  Turcotte,  405
No.  13-‐‑2276

6 F.3d 515

,  537  (7th  Cir.  2005);  United  States  v.  Banks,

405 F.3d 559

,  567,  569  (7th  Cir.  2005);  Sanchez  v.  Keisler,

505 F.3d 641

,
647   (7th   Cir.   2007);   United   States   v.   Stark,

507 F.3d 512

,   521
(7th   Cir.   2007);   United   States   v.   Waltower,

643 F.3d 572

,   579
(7th   Cir.   2011);   United   States   v.   Isom,

635 F.3d 904

,   909   (7th
Cir.  2011).
Raising   ineffective   assistance   on   direct   appeal   is   impru-‐‑
dent   because   defendant   paints   himself   into   a   corner.   We’ve
explained  why  the  contention  is  doomed  unless  the  conten-‐‑
tion  is  made  first  in  the  district  court  and  a  full  record  is  de-‐‑
veloped—which   happens   occasionally   but   did   not   happen
here.  Yet  although  the  argument  has  trifling  prospect  of  suc-‐‑
cess,   the   defense   has   much   to   lose.   For   we   held   in   United
States   v.   Taglia,

922 F.2d 413

   (7th   Cir.   1991),   and   Peoples   v.
United  States,

403 F.3d 844

(7th Cir. 2005), that, when an inef-‐‑
fective-‐‑assistance claim is rejected on direct appeal, it cannot
be raised again on collateral review. A litigant gets to argue
ineffective assistance, and for that matter any other conten-‐‑
tion, just once. A collateral attack cannot be used to obtain a
second opinion on an argument presented and decided ear-‐‑
lier. By arguing ineffective assistance on direct appeal the
defendant relinquishes any opportunity to obtain relief on
collateral review, even though a motion under §2255 affords
the only realistic chance of success.
Ever since Massaro the judges of this court have regularly
asked counsel at oral argument whether the defendant is
personally aware of the risks of presenting an ineffective-‐‑
assistance argument on direct appeal and, if so, whether de-‐‑
fendant really wants to take that risk. We encourage counsel
to discuss that subject with the defendant after argument
and to consider withdrawing the contention. We asked that
7 No. 13-‐‑2276
question at oral argument of this appeal, and counsel as-‐‑
sured us that Flores is aware of the risks and wants the con-‐‑
tention resolved now. That is his prerogative, foolish though
the choice seems to the judiciary.
Since there is no record, Nixon cannot be distinguished
and the judgment is
AFFIRMED.