DocketNumber： 12-1848
Citation Numbers： 476 F. App'x 438
Judges： Daniel, Diane, Easterbrook, Frank, John, Sykes, Tinder
Filed Date： 8/24/2012
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 8/5/2023
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted August 22, 2012* Decided August 24, 2012 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge No. 12-1848 Appeal from the United States District Court for UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the Central District of Plaintiff-Appellee, Illinois. v. No. 03-CR-20027 Michael P. McCuskey, DANNY L. DIXON, Judge. Defendant-Appellant. Order Danny Dixon filed a motion for a sentence reduction after the Sentencing Commission made a retroactive change in the Guideline for crack-cocaine offenses. The district court reduced his sentence from 360 months to 348 months. He had asked the judge to cut the sentence to 324 months and has appealed from the adverse decision. * This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f) No. 12-1848 Page 2 His lawyer has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California,386 U.S. 264
(1967). Counsel observes that district judges have substantial discretion to choose the amount (if any) of a reduction under a retroactive Guideline and that appellate review is deferential. The district judge concluded that a further reduction would be inappropriate because Dixon has shown contempt for the law during his time in prison. He has been disciplined for multiple offenses, including assaulting other prisoners with homemade weapons. These events, plus Dixon's extensive record before the current conviction and the fact that he became a fugitive after release on bail, led the district court to conclude that a long sentence remains necessary for both deterrence and incapacitation. Dixon was invited to respond to counsel’s brief but did not do so. We agree with counsel’s evaluation of this appeal. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous.