Thomas Walker v. John Baldwin

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2342
THOMAS WALKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN BALDWIN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 19-cv-50233 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MAY 19, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2023
____________________
Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Thomas Walker, a Rastafarian whose
religious beliefs prohibit him from cutting his hair, was an Il-
linois state prisoner at Dixon Correctional Center when
prison officials forced him to remove his dreadlocks. He sued
the prison officials, the prison warden, and the director of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), alleging that the
defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and
2 No. 22-2342
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). This appeal con-
cerns only Walker’s RLUIPA claim, on which the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. We find that
Walker abandoned this claim in the district court and decline
to exercise our discretion to review the waived issue on ap-
peal.
I. Background
On May 25, 2018—several weeks after Thomas Walker ar-
rived at Dixon Correctional Center—Officer Colin Brinkmeier
informed Walker at an intake interview that prison security
policy prohibited prisoners from maintaining certain “un-
searchable” hairstyles like dreadlocks. Walker refused to cut
his hair, informing Brinkmeier that he was a Rastafarian and
had taken the Nazarite vow of separation, which includes a
vow to refrain from cutting his hair. Brinkmeier’s sole re-
sponse was “we’ll see.” Later that day, Brinkmeier returned
with another corrections officer, Lieutenant John Craft, and
again ordered Walker to cut his dreadlocks. Again, Walker re-
fused, citing his religious beliefs.
Brinkmeier and Craft disciplined Walker for his disobedi-
ence by placing him in segregated housing for several days.
Walker submitted an emergency grievance, seeking an accom-
modation from the prison based on his religious beliefs, but
John Varga, the prison warden at the time, denied Walker’s
request without explanation. On June 1, Brinkmeier and Craft
brought a tactical team and mace to Walker’s cell and told
Walker that if he did not acquiesce, the tactical unit would
forcibly remove his dreadlocks. Walker gave in and allowed
the prison barber to shave his hair.
No. 22-2342 3
Following this incident, Walker began regrowing his
dreadlocks. He was able to keep them for three years without
any problems. When conducting security checks, prison offic-
ers would run their gloved hands through his dreadlocks. At
the time IDOC released him from Dixon in July 2020, Walker’s
dreadlocks were roughly the same length as they had been
when he was forced to cut them. According to Walker, many
other inmates at Dixon were permitted to wear dreadlocks.
In late 2019, Walker sued Varga, Craft, Brinkmeier, and
IDOC Director John Baldwin for violations of the First
Amendment and RLUIPA. At the screening stage, the district
court held that Walker had a viable § 1983 claim for a violation
of the First Amendment and a viable claim for injunctive relief
under RLUIPA. It noted, however, that under Circuit prece-
dent, Walker could not seek monetary damages against indi-
vidual defendants under RLUIPA “because they are not the
recipients of federal funds” and therefore dismissed that
claim.
The defendants later moved for summary judgment,
which the district court granted on all claims. Although the
court expressed skepticism regarding “the Defendants’ pur-
ported justification for the de facto policy of cutting off
Walker’s dreadlocks,” it found that “the only relief available
under RLUIPA,” namely injunctive relief, was moot because
Walker “ha[d] already been released” from IDOC custody.
The court also granted the defendants summary judgment on
Walker’s First Amendment claim on qualified immunity
grounds.
Walker timely appealed. He pursues only the RLUIPA
claim and seeks only monetary damages from the defendants
in their individual capacities.
4 No. 22-2342
II. Analysis
RLUIPA prohibits a “government” from “impos[ing] a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person resid-
ing in or confined to an institution,” unless the “imposition of
the burden on that person” is (1) “in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest” and (2) “the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Walker concedes that his injunctive relief
claim is moot now that he is out of prison, see Grayson v.
Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012), and that sovereign
immunity bars his claims for monetary damages from the de-
fendants in their official capacities, see Sossamon v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277, 293 (2011). The question is thus whether RLUIPA au-
thorizes Walker to seek monetary damages from the defend-
ants in their individual capacities. 1
But this case does not give us occasion to answer the ques-
tion. In the district court, Walker expressly abandoned his
RLUIPA claim and waived any argument that RLUIPA au-
thorizes monetary damages against individual officers.
Walker stated, in a footnote in his response to the defendants’
1 Every federal circuit court that has addressed whether RLUIPA au-
thorizes money damages against state officials in their individual capaci-
ties has held that it does not. See Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145–
46 (2d Cir. 2013); Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2012); Ren-
delman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186–89 (4th Cir. 2009); Sossamon v. Texas, 560
F.3d 316, 327–29 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 277; Haight
v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 568–70 (6th Cir. 2014); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d
868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009); Scott v. Lewis, 827 F. App’x 613, 613 (8th Cir. 2020);
Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2014); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d
1322, 1334–35 (10th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271–75 (11th
Cir. 2007).
No. 22-2342 5
motion for summary judgment, “Defendants also violated
[RLUIPA], but that act does not include a damages remedy
and so the RLUIPA claim is not being pursued.” He later
wrote: “Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss his claim for injunctive
relief provided under RLUIPA now that he is no longer an
IDOC inmate. What remains are Plaintiff’s First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause and Constitutional rights protected by
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.” See Henry v. Hulett, 969
F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Indicating such inten-
tional relinquishment, Walker clearly and expressly stated
that RLUIPA does not authorize money damages against the
defendants and that he was abandoning his RLUIPA claim.
Even if that concession alone were unclear, he later reiterated
that his only remaining claim was his First Amendment Free
Exercise claim.
On appeal, Walker attempts to recharacterize his state-
ments as an “acknowledg[ment of] the case’s procedural his-
tory and … binding Seventh Circuit authority.” But this is not
a reasonable interpretation of these footnotes. Nothing in
Walker’s brief suggested that these footnotes were simply ref-
erences to the procedural history of the case and the district
court’s prior dismissal of the monetary damages claim. “Ad-
vocates know how to phrase a limited waiver,” and we see no
basis here for reading in a caveat or limitation that Walker
failed to make himself. 2 See Bradley v. Village of University Park,
59 F.4th 887, 899 (7th Cir. 2023) (Bradley II).
2 Walker was represented by counsel in the district court. Perhaps we
would have been more lenient had he been pro se, but we expect lawyers
6 No. 22-2342
Walker next argues that he could not have abandoned his
RLUIPA claim at summary judgment because the district
court had already dismissed the claim at the screening stage.
To be sure, there is some merit to Walker’s argument. Our Cir-
cuit has repeatedly stated that an argument rejected by the
district court need not be relitigated throughout the lower
court proceedings to be preserved for appeal. See, e.g., Ward v.
Soo Line R.R. Co., 901 F.3d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We see
little value in requiring plaintiffs and their lawyers to replead
and reargue at later steps in the litigation claims or arguments
that the district court has already definitively rejected.”);
Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912 F.3d 989, 1002 (7th Cir. 2019)
(finding no waiver of the appellant’s claim, which had been
screened out by the district court, when the appellant did not
revisit the dismissed claims at summary judgment or under
Rule 60(b)). In accordance with this precedent, if Walker had
said nothing about his RLUIPA money damages claim at sum-
mary judgment, he could have challenged the district court’s
dismissal decision on appeal. But that is not what happened
here. Rather than staying silent, Walker expressly stated that
he was abandoning his RLUIPA claim. He also did not condi-
tion his statement on preserving his right to appeal the district
court’s dismissal ruling. This distinguishes Walker’s case
from those cited above and suggests waiver.
Our decisions in Bradley clarify this point. In Bradley v. Vil-
lage of University Park, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019) (Bradley I),
a police chief sued his former employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983for firing him without due process of law. The district court
to understand and make clear the difference between an acknowledgment
of the court’s prior decision and a concession of that issue.
No. 22-2342 7
sua sponte ordered briefing on a particular defense and later
dismissed the case on that issue alone. On appeal, the village
“conceded that Bradley had a property interest in his job for
the purposes of ‘this case,’ without making any effort to qual-
ify or limit that concession or to reserve [its] ability to dispute
the issue later.” Bradley II, 59 F.4th at 893. During a subsequent
appeal, the village “reversed course,” contending “that Brad-
ley had no protected property interest in his job as chief.” Id.
at 895. But we “held [it] to” its concession in Bradley I, noting
that its waiver was “explicit” and “came with no caveat or
limitation.” Id. at 893, 898, 900.
In so holding, we rejected the village’s argument that the
“odd posture” of Bradley I “prevented [it] from disputing the
property interest.” Id. at 900. The village’s original answer to
Bradley’s complaint failed to state that Bradley did not have
a property interest in his employment. And while the village
moved to amend its answer to make that contention, the dis-
trict court dismissed the case on a particular defense without
ruling on the motion to amend. In the village’s view, “the dis-
trict court’s earlier failure to rule on [its] pending motion to
amend prevented [it] from limiting in Bradley I the scope of
[its] waiver of the property interest element.” Id. We dis-
missed this argument as a non sequitur, explaining that the
village did not need to amend its answer to preserve the ar-
gument in Bradley I. “If [the village] had actually wanted to
limit the scope of [its] stipulation … nothing prevented [it]
from telling us so.” Id.
Similarly, Walker’s argument here is a non sequitur. The
district court’s prior dismissal of Walker’s monetary damages
claim did not force him to later concede his claim. As ex-
plained above, he could have said nothing about the decision,
8 No. 22-2342
electing to challenge the district court’s decision on appeal
from a final judgment. Or, if he wanted to concede the issue
for purposes of summary judgment, he could have said so
and then litigated the issue on appeal. But Walker chose nei-
ther option, instead affirmatively waiving his claim for money
damages without qualification or limitation. This is waiver.
Finding waiver, however, does not end our inquiry.
Whether a waived issue can be addressed “is one left primar-
ily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on
the facts of individual cases.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
121 (1976). We exercise this discretion “on rare occasions.”
Mahran v. Advoc. Christ Med. Ctr., 12 F.4th 708, 713 (7th Cir.
2021). But generally speaking, “a federal appellate court is jus-
tified in resolving an issue not passed on below” where “the
proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where ‘injustice
might otherwise result.’” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (quoting
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
We decline to exercise our discretion to review the waived
issue here. Whether RLUIPA authorizes money damages
against individual officers is a complicated legal issue with
far-reaching implications for prisoners and state prison offi-
cials across the country. Because Walker expressly disclaimed
any reliance on his RLUIPA claim, the defendants did not
fully respond to the argument in their summary judgment
briefing and the district court did not weigh in on the issue.
And although the briefs on appeal have been extensive, the
parties have, at times, confused the constitutional issues, re-
sulting in somewhat cursory analysis on certain points. Be-
cause of the importance of this issue, we decide to wait to rule
on the matter until it is squarely presented before us with the
benefit of a fully developed district court record.
No. 22-2342 9
In the meantime, we note some important points to guide
future litigants, although we take no position on these issues
at this time. Whether a plaintiff can sue individual state offi-
cials for money damages under RLUIPA depends on whether
RLUIPA authorizes plaintiffs to sue officials in their individ-
ual capacities and whether RLUIPA authorizes the recovery
of monetary damages. Additionally, RLUIPA is a Spending
Clause statute, meaning that any requirements it imposes on
recipients of federal funding must be unambiguous. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”). Putting
these two principles together, the text of the statute must
clearly contemplate both money damages as a potential rem-
edy and suits against officers in their individual capacities for
plaintiffs to obtain money damages against individual offic-
ers.
In addition to the scope of the statute, RLUIPA, like
“[e]very law enacted by Congress[,] must be based on one or
more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.” United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). We have expressed
skepticism regarding whether Congress has the constitutional
authority to authorize RLUIPA claims against state officials in
their individual capacities. Nelson, 570 F.3d at 888. 3 And
3 In Nelson, we “decline[d] to read RLUIPA as allowing damages
against defendants in their individual capacities.” Id. at 889. But as Walker
correctly points out and the defendants concede, Nelson did not decide
whether Congress has the constitutional power to authorize individual ca-
pacity suits against state officials under RLUIPA. Instead, we invoked the
10 No. 22-2342
several circuits have outright held that Congress lacks such
authority. See Washington, 731 F.3d at 145–46; Sharp, 669 F.3d
at 154; Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 327–29; Wood, 753 F.3d at 903;
Stewart, 701 F.3d at 1334–35; Smith, 502 F.3d at 1271–75. But see
Haight, 763 F.3d at 570. We leave this issue for another day.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we find that Walker has waived
his RLUIPA claim.
AFFIRMED
canon of constitutional avoidance to construe what we believed to be am-
biguous statutory language to avoid serious constitutional issues. Id.