G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.

the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2621
G.G. and DEANNA ROSE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SALESFORCE.COM, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cv-02335 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.
____________________
On Petition for Rehearing En Banc or Panel Rehearing
____________________
DECIDED October 18, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, EASTERBROOK, ROVNER,
BRENNAN, SCUDDER, ST. EVE, KIRSCH, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, LEE,
and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. On consideration of defendant-appellee’s pe-
tition for rehearing en banc or panel rehearing, filed on Au-
gust 17, 2023, all judges on the panel have voted to deny panel
2 No. 22-2621
rehearing. A judge in regular active service called for a vote
on the petition for rehearing en banc, and a majority in active
service voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc.
Judges Brennan, Scudder, St. Eve, and Kirsch voted to grant
the petition for rehearing en banc.
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc or panel
rehearing by defendant-appellee is DENIED.
No. 22-2621 3
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, joined by ST. EVE, Circuit Judge, dis-
senting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
While I agree with the panel’s narrow holding that G.G.
stated a claim against Salesforce for participation liability un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1595, I am troubled by the overbroad and un-
necessary language in the panel opinion, which risks being
read to offer answers to questions not presented in this case.
Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement limits fed-
eral courts to the resolution of concrete disputes between ad-
verse parties. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
559–61 (1992). When our decisions exceed that limitation—
when we reason with overbreadth—we risk the issuance of
advisory opinions. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
362 (1911); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,
2203 (2021). The majority opinion leaves me with that worry.
The opinion clearly explains Backpage’s notorious sex
trafficking operations, the widespread awareness of those op-
erations, and the scope of Salesforce’s assistance—which, on
the facts alleged in G.G.’s complaint, could only be under-
stood as furthering those affairs. See Slip Op. at 3–6. The panel
majority is also right to conclude that § 1595 does not require
victim-specific knowledge.
Had the opinion stopped there, nobody would be reading
this dissent. But in too many places the opinion goes further
and suggests without qualification that § 1595 participant lia-
bility could attach to anyone in a “continuous business rela-
tionship” with a sex trafficking operation like Backpage. See
Slip Op. at 17–18, 25, 28, 36–37. It also suggests that
knowledge can be inferred from the bare allegation that a de
fendant “repeatedly consulted” with a trafficker about its
4 No. 22-2621
business without a link to the illegal activity. See Slip Op. at
17.
Better to leave tomorrow’s difficult questions about the
scope of § 1595 for tomorrow’s cases. To put the point more
directly, everyone reading the majority opinion ought to dis-
tinguish between the court’s holding and key reasoning and
the broader unwarranted commentary suggesting that § 1595
participant liability may apply in expansive ways to more or-
dinary business relationships. In my respectful view, our full
court missed an opportunity to come together to preserve the
panel’s essential and sound reasoning and to leave everything
else for another day.