United States v. Eric Ladeaux

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1623
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Eric Ladeaux
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: November 17, 2022
Filed: March 3, 2023
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Before BENTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges, and BUESCHER, 1 District
Judge.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Eric Ladeaux of two counts of felon-in-possession and one
count of possessing an unregistered firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2);
1
The Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5845, 5871. He appeals the convictions. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
A jury convicted Eric Ladeaux of three firearm offenses. The first stemmed
from a traffic stop where he initially provided a fake name but was later identified
by bodycam footage. The second and third offenses followed an arrest after a car
chase. Officers found Ladeaux in the passenger seat of a car believed to have robbed
a Kohl’s store. A sawed-off shotgun was under his seat, bullets on the floor at his
feet. Believing Ladeaux had possessed the gun, the government charged him with
felon-in-possession and possession of an unregistered firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5845, 5871. The district court2
sentenced him to 84 months in prison and three years of supervised release.
Ladeaux brings three challenges. First, he argues that Standing Order 19-03
and Standing Order 16-043 denied him his constitutional right to prepare for trial.
Second, he claims the district court erred in declining to give his requested jury
instruction on duress and coercion. Finally, he challenges the evidentiary sufficiency
of his conviction.
2
The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota.
3
These standing orders are now incorporated into the local rules at D.S.D.
Crim. LR 16.1 and 57.10, respectively. See
https://www.sdd.uscourts.gov/sites/sdd/files/LR%2016.1%20DISCOVERY.pdf
(Rule 16.1) and
https://www.sdd.uscourts.gov/sites/sdd/files/LR%2057.10%20ACCESS%20TO%2
0CRIMINAL%20DOCUMENTS.pdf (Rule 57.10).
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II.
Before trial, the district court entered Standing Order 19-03 and Standing
Order 16-04 with the consent of both parties. These orders limited incarcerated
defendants’ access to sealed and restricted discovery documents. By the Standing
Orders, defendants could review sealed and restricted documents in designated
prison areas either alone or with counsel, but could not make or retain copies and
could not show the documents to other incarcerated individuals. Ladeaux argues
that these orders deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to prepare effectively
for trial.
Ladeaux’s argument is new on appeal. Ladeaux neither requested an
exception to the Standing Orders nor lodged an objection when he stipulated to
entering them. Because he did not complain to the district court that the Standing
Orders violated his constitutional rights or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
this court reviews his claim for plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d
543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (plain-error review applies to unpreserved
arguments); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
The Standing Orders do not require reversal. A misquotation of Rule 16(d)
grounds Ladeaux’s argument. Claiming that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(d) requires a “sufficient showing” to restrict discovery, Ladeaux cites precedent
establishing that a “sufficient showing” requires individualized inquiries. Here, the
district court entered the standing orders without assessing the individualized facts
of Ladeaux’s case. This failure to make an individualized inquiry, he argues, falls
short of Rule 16(d)’s “sufficient showing” requirement.
To the contrary, Rule 16(d) does not require a “sufficient showing”; it requires
only “good cause” to modify or restrict discovery. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (“At
any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or
inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”). “Sufficient showing” cases are
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irrelevant. This court rejected an identical challenge to this standing order based on
an identical misquotation:
Smith’s first argument fails on its own terms. Smith
claims that the district court’s Standing Order violates
Rule 16(d)(1), which he says provides that “[u]pon a
sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the
discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred.”
According to Smith, the Standing Order flouts the
“sufficient showing” requirement.
But Rule 16(d)(1) does not have a “sufficient showing”
requirement. Instead, it says only that “[a]t any time the
court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer
discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). So the Standing Order does not
run afoul of Rule 16(d)(1).
United States v. Smith, 4 F.4th 679, 685 (8th Cir. 2021).
Ladeaux cites some cases discussing the “good cause” requirement found in
Rule 16, but they do not mandate an individualized inquiry. Ladeaux misconstrues
each individualized inquiry where a party has moved for unique discovery
limitations as a blanket rule that courts must conduct this inquiry in every instance.
See United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The burden
of showing ‘good cause’ is on the party seeking the order, and . . . the court will
[take into account] the safety of witnesses and others, a particular danger of perjury
or witness intimidation, [and] the protection of information vital to national
security.”); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 212 (3rd Cir. 2007) (upholding a
district court’s decision, reached after “weighing of the competing considerations,”
that “the government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest or good cause
to justify the continual sealing”).
One case makes explicit that an individualized inquiry assists a court in
analyzing whether the moving party has met its burden of proof, but does not limit
the district court’s broad discovery discretion. See United States v. Dixon, 355 F.
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Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019). The district court there observed: “When the Government
is seeking a protective order, it bears the burden of showing that good cause exists
for its issuance.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The Dixon court noted that the “level
of particularity required” for good cause “depends on the nature and type of
protective order at issue” and that district courts have “vast discretion” to craft
discovery limitations. Id. at 3.
The District of South Dakota’s Standing Orders limit access to certain
documents “[i]n order to protect the safety of federal defendants and the integrity of
ongoing investigations and related prosecutions.” See Local Rule 57.10(A). This
general purpose satisfies Rule 16(d)’s good-cause requirement. The district court
did not plainly err in entering its Standing Orders. 4
4
A criminal defendant “has a constitutional right ‘to conduct his own
defense.’” United States v. Smith, 830 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2016), quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). Conducting a defense necessitates
adequate time and resources to prepare for trial. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S.
586, 590 (2009) (“[T]he opportunity . . . to prepare a defense for trial” with one’s
attorney is “the core” of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”). Denying a self-
represented criminal defendant the ability to prepare for trial can effectively abrogate
his constitutional right to self-representation. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
59 (1932) (“It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to
prepare for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any opportunity
to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case.” (quotation omitted)).
The Standing Orders, now local rules, raise Sixth Amendment concerns.
District courts can (and regularly do) provide incarcerated defendants with secure
digital discovery. See U.S. D.O.J. Joint Electronic Technology Working Group,
Guidance for the Provision of ESI [Electronically Stored Information] to
Detainees, 7 (Oct. 25, 2016) (emphasizing the importance of e-discovery to
incarcerated individuals and suggesting courts impose case-specific procedures to
address security concerns). But because Ladeaux did not raise this issue before the
trial court—and did not develop a factual record—this court conducts only plain-
error review. No plain error occurred here. But see Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641,
645 (1987) (“A district court’s discretion in promulgating local rules is not, however,
without limits.); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987)
(reviewing the legality of district court local rules).
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III.
Halfway through trial, Ladeaux requested a jury instruction on duress and
coercion. The district court told him that no evidence had yet been presented to
support these affirmative defenses. But the court promised to instruct the jury on
Ladeaux’s theories if he testified that coercion or duress caused him to possess
firearms. Defense counsel did not object. Ladeaux did not testify, so the court did
not instruct on coercion and duress. On appeal, Ladeaux argues that the court erred
by declining to give a duress and coercion instruction.
This court reviews de novo whether a defendant produced enough evidence
to warrant an instruction on coercion and duress, which are affirmative defenses.
See United States v. Sharron, 986 F.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2021). A party is entitled
to an instruction on its theory of the case if legally correct and factually supported.
See Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 853 F.3d 414, 424 (8th Cir. 2017).
To carry his evidentiary burden on a duress/coercion affirmative defense,
Ladeaux had to show (1) an unlawful and imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury; (2) absence of contributory negligence; (3) that he “had no reasonable, legal
alternative to violating the law;” and (4) a direct causal relationship between his
crime and avoiding the threatened harm. United States v. Myles, 962 F.3d 384, 387
(8th Cir. 2020).
Ladeaux points to no evidence of the third element, absence of a legal
alternative. He claims that a Facebook video supports his affirmative defense. In
that video, Ladeaux brandishes a gun and promises to defend himself against anyone
who comes after his family. He sent the video to a man named Paycheck Johnny,
who replied that he too was “ready to die or spend the rest of [his] life in a cell.”
Even if this exchange showed an (1) imminent threat from Paycheck Johnny that
was (2) not caused by Ladeaux’s negligence and (4) avoided by Ladeaux’s illegal
firearm possession—generous assumptions—Ladeaux points to no evidence that he
(3) had no legal alternative to avoid the threat. In situations like his, legal
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alternatives exist. See Myles, 962 F.3d at 388 (ruling that a defendant could have
reported threats to law enforcement, so she had a legal alternative); United States v.
Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A] defendant’s subjective belief
that going to law enforcement would prove futile is insufficient to meet the objective
standard that there was no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law.”).
Because Ladeaux did not show the absence of legal alternatives to firearm
possession, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the
jury on coercion/duress.
IV.
This court reviews evidentiary sufficiency de novo, viewing the evidence
most favorably to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in the jury
verdict’s favor. United States v. Hensley, 982 F.3d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 2020).
Ladeaux disputes the jury’s conclusion that he knowingly possessed the
sawed-off shotgun charged in counts two and three. His argument fails when
“viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, resolving conflicts in favor of
the verdict, and giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id.Ladeaux’s own statements support the verdict. Although he was one of many
passengers in the car that held the gun, he told officers that he “wouldn’t charge [the
other passengers] with the gun” and joked that he might have held the other
passengers hostage with a “12-guage.” Officers testified that Ladeaux had never
been told that a gun was found in the car, much less that it was a 12-guage. Police
found the sawed-off shotgun under the passenger seat where Ladeaux sat. The gun’s
stock was positioned toward him, bullets at his feet. Ladeaux’s knowledge that the
car held a 12-guage shotgun, the gun’s position, and his proximity to it support an
inference that he knowingly possessed the gun. The jury had sufficient evidence to
convict.
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The reply brief also challenges the evidentiary sufficiency for count one. This
argument, not raised in the opening brief, is waived. See United States v. Grace,
893 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2018).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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