DocketNumber: 13-1073
Citation Numbers: 749 F.3d 709, 2014 WL 1465550, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7057
Judges: Riley, Melloy, Kelly
Filed Date: 4/16/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Carlos Martins appeals the district court’s order denying his post-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a traffic stop. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the traffic stop was unconstitutional and that the district court
I. Background
On August 2, 2010, canine officer Deputy David Wintle saw Martins traveling west on Interstate 80 (“1-80”) outside of Omaha, Nebraska.
All letters, numbers, printing, writing, and other identification marks upon such [license] plates and [registration] certificate shall be kept clear and distinct and free from grease, dust, or other blurring matter, so that they shall be plainly visible at all times during daylight and under artificial light in the nighttime.
It was later determined that Martins had a back-up camera mounted near the top of his rear license plate.
During the traffic stop, Deputy Wintle had to ask Martins several times to sit in his squad car with him while he processed paperwork before Martins complied. While in the squad car, Martins did not want to talk with Deputy Wintle or answer Deputy Wintle’s questions and appeared “argumentative” (though it is uncontested that Martins never posed a physical threat to Deputy Wintle). After all business relating to Martins’s license plate was completed,
Deputy Wintle found the following items inside Martins’s vehicle: a small rubber-banded bundle of money and loose cash in the pocket of a door; a sleeping pad in the back seat; two coolers that Deputy Wintle perceived as smelling of raw marijuana; and two vacuum-sealed bags of rubber-banded bundles of cash stored in a lock-box inside a factory-made storage area of the vehicle. The cash inside the vacuum-sealed bags totaled $45,000.00. No marijuana or other drugs were found.
Deputy Wintle seized the $45,000.00 and transported it back to the local sheriffs office where law-enforcement officers put Kubo through a series of tests. First, officers placed circulated and uncirculated money behind lockers; Kubo did not react. The officers then put the seized money in a locker and Kubo “indicated” at the locker where the money was hidden. Based on
Prior to the forfeiture trial, Martins moved to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop. At a suppression hearing before a magistrate judge, Deputy Wintle testified on direct examination that he was not able to read Martins’s license plate until after he exited 1-80 and was stopping Martins:
Q: ... During the time that you’re following [Martins] and up to the point where the two of you are stopped, have you ... been able to see the plate more clearly?
A: No, [be]cause I never really get close enough to him until the final traffic stop and that’s when I get rather close to vehicles.
Q: Okay. When were you able to determine then what state the plate was from?
A: I’m not sure of the exact one. I know I advised my dispatch that it was a Utah plate, and it was — it was kind of a — a guess as to the way the letters were shaped that it — what I was seeing that it could be a Utah....
Q: When did you tell your dispatch that?
A: As the vehicle was stopping, as I’m making the stop.
Suppression Hr’g Tr. 16-17, Jan. 10, 2012.
Based on the above testimony, the magistrate judge determined that Deputy Wintle had probable cause to believe that Martins was violating § 60-399(2) and recommended denying Martins’s motion to suppress the evidence. The district court agreed and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety. Specifically, the district court adopted the following factual finding: “The [traffic] stop occurs somewhere on the exit ... to West Center Road from 1-80 and at that time— or approximately at that time it becomes known to [Deputy Wintle] that he is dealing with a Utah plate or what he has suspicion to be a Utah plate and that’s communicated with the dispatcher.” Id. at 51 (emphasis added). The district court further stated the following regarding Deputy Wintle’s basis for stopping Martins: “Deputy Wintle ... stopped Martins’s vehicle because Deputy Wintle could not read the license plate on the rear of the vehicle. Specifically, Deputy Wintle was unable to determine which state issued the plate.” (Emphasis added.)
At the subsequent bench trial, Deputy Wintle testified differently regarding his ability to read Martins’s license plate prior to stopping Martins:
(On direct examination)
Q: ... What, if anything, drew your attention to [Martins]?
A: When I observed his vehicle, I couldn’t read his license plate. It had a — sort of a backup video camera mounted to the top of the plate that was obstructing the plate. I had to get close to the vehicle before I could actually see what state the vehicle was from.
Q: So did you do that?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And how did you go about doing that, Deputy?
A: I just accelerated up and drove up close to him.
Q: Okay. So you’re driving next to him side by side?
*713 A: Yes. I didn’t drive — I don’t believe I actually drove up beside him but came within a hundred feet of him to see the plate.
Trial Tr. 13-14, Nov. 16, 2012.
(On cross-examination)
Q: You indicated on your direct testimony, sir, that you stopped [Martins’s] vehicle as he was suspiciously exiting 1-80; is that correct?
A: I stopped him for an obstructed license plate; but his leaving Interstate 80 raised some suspicions with me, yes.
Q: You indicated on your direct testimony that you had to get within a hundred feet in order to read the license plate; is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And after you were able to read the license plate, he — I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, but he abruptly exited the highway?
A: I wouldn’t say abruptly. Basically in a mile period he changed four lanes of traffic, so not abruptly, but it was a continuous lane change.
Q: So, as you’re monitoring him, in your mind, this is a vehicle which is obviously out of place; is that correct?
A: I don’t know if I understand what you mean by out of place.
Q: Strike that question, if I may. You recognize that this is a vehicle heading west with Utah plates; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Id. at 31-32.
After the forfeiture trial was completed, the district court determined that the government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a “substantial connection” existed between the seized money and drug trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1), (3), and ordered the $45,000.00 to be forfeited. Martins subsequently filed a post-trial motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying his pretrial suppression motion, and the district court denied that motion as well. In denying Martins’s motion for reconsideration, the district court stated that it found “no material discrepancies” between Deputy Wintle’s suppression-hearing testimony and his trial testimony.
Martins raises three issues on appeal. First, Martins argues that the district court erred in denying his post-trial motion for reconsideration. Specifically, Martins maintains that Deputy Wintle lacked probable cause to pull him over and that the initial traffic stop was unconstitutional in that it violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Second, Martins argues that the subsequent canine sniff of his vehicle was also unconstitutional because Deputy Win-tle had no basis to further detain him in the squad car after all business relating to the allegedly obstructed license plate was completed. Third, Martins argues that even if there were no constitutional violations leading up to the seizure of the $45,000.00, the government did not meet its burden of proving a “substantial connection.”
II. Analysis
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s legal conclusions on a motion to suppress and reviews factual findings for clear error. United States v. Vanover, 630 F.3d 1108, 1113-14 (8th Cir.2011). The Court will “affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was
A. Deputy Wintle’s Conflicting Testimonies
Before analyzing the constitutionality of the traffic stop, it is necessary to address the inconsistencies between Deputy Wintle’s testimonies. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Wintle testified that he had to “guess” that Martins’s vehicle had a Utah license plate based on “the way the letters were shaped.” (One could also assume that this was an “educated guess” given the fact that any police officer patrolling 1-80 through Omaha would see virtually every state’s license plates on a daily basis — particularly plates from those states through which 1-80 passes, including Utah.) On the other hand, Deputy Win-tle testified at trial that he was able to read Martins’s license plate and tell which state issued the plate when he pulled to within 100 feet of Martins’s vehicle. At trial, Deputy Wintle gave no indication that he had to “guess” as to the issuing state’s name on Martins’s license plate.
In the order denying Martins’s post-trial motion for reconsideration, the district court indicated that she considered Deputy Wintle’s testimony at trial — testimony that she personally observed — to be credible. She went on to state, however, that she did not consider there to be any material discrepancies between Deputy Wintle’s testimony at the suppression hearing, in which he testified that he had to “guess” the issuing state of Martins’s license plate, and his testimony at trial, in which he testified that he could read the license plate from within 100 feet. We disagree. For the reasons that we explain more fully below, it is our view that if Deputy Wintle could read Martins’s license plate from within 100 feet of the vehicle, he lacked probable cause for a traffic stop.
After the district court made its preparatory statements that Deputy Win-tle’s trial testimony was credible and that there were no material discrepancies between his trial testimony and suppression-hearing testimony, the district court then made a factual finding that Deputy Wintle “guessed” as to the state name on Martins’s license plate. We recognize that “the [district] court’s credibility determinations require a high degree of deference,” United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir.2008), and that “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous,” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). However, based on the district court’s finding that Deputy Wintle’s trial testimony was credible, we question how the district court can credit the earlier-given suppression-hearing testimony that she did not observe over the testimony that she did observe and found to be credible. The government argues in support of the district court that there are no inconsistencies between Deputy Wintle’s testimonies, or to the extent that there is an inconsistency, it is irrelevant because there is no difference between a license plate that is partially obscured but still readable and a license plate that cannot be read at all. As previously stated, however, it is our conclusion that the difference is material, and that given the fact that Deputy Wintle very specifically testified, credibly, at trial that he could read Martins’s license plate, any factual finding that Deputy Wintle had to guess as to the state name on the plate
Our determination that the district court clearly erred in characterizing the facts in its order on Martins’s motion for reconsideration does not resolve the ultimate issue before us — the constitutionality of the traffic stop. We turn now to whether Deputy Wintle’s stop of Martins violated the Fourth Amendment, accepting as true the facts as described in Deputy Wintle’s later-given trial testimony that the district court found to be credible, i.e., that Deputy Wintle was able to read the issuing state’s name on Martins’s license plate from within 100 feet while traveling on 1-80.
B. Constitutionality of the Traffic Stop
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). “[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). “Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc).
The objective standard governing an officer’s decision to stop a motorist protects officers who have a mistaken belief that a traffic law is being broken. See United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.1999) (“Even if the trailer was not technically in violation of the statute, [the officer] could have reasonably believed that the trailer violated the statute-”). This standard cuts both ways, however, in that even if it is determined after a traffic stop that a motorist was in fact violating some law (traffic-related or otherwise), if it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that a violation was occurring at the time that the officer decided to effect the stop, then the officer lacked probable cause to seize the motorist. Id. (“The determination of whether probable cause existed is not to be made with the vision of hindsight, but instead by looking to what the officer reasonably knew at the time.” (emphases added)); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (“[W]e have consistently rejected [the proposition] that a search unlawful at its inception may be validated by what it turns up.”). Accordingly, the critical inquiry in a probable-cause determination in the traffic-stop context is what the stopping officer observed before pulling over a motorist. See United States v. Rivera, 370 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir.2004) (“Probable cause for an arrest exists if, at the moment the arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that an offense has been committed.” (emphasis added)).
With this framework in mind, we turn now to the question of whether, based on the facts of this case as set forth in Deputy Wintle’s trial testimony, Deputy Wintle had probable cause to pull over Martins.
1. Probable Cause Based on a Traffic Violation
We begin with the text of the law at issue. As set forth above, Nebraska Revised Statute § 60-399(2) provides as follows:
All letters, numbers, printing, writing, and other identification marks upon such [license] plates and [registration] certificate shall be kept clear and distinct and free from grease, dust, or other blurring matter, so that they shall be plainly visible at all times during daylight and under artificial light in the nighttime.
The question we must answer is whether an interpretation of this statute exists under which an officer who could read a license plate from within 100 feet could reasonably believe there had been a violation of the statute. The answer to this question, we conclude, turns on the meaning of the phrase “plainly visible.” If the Nebraska legislature intended that phrase to outlaw any and all de minimis blurring or obstruction without reference to readability, then Deputy Wintle acted reasonably. If, however, the phrase “plainly visible” enjoys a practical meaning such as “readable,” or “reasonably readable,” or even more contextually, “generally readable for law enforcement and identification purposes from within a reasonable distance,” then Deputy Wintle’s mistake is not excusable as a reasonable mistake.
As the following cases illustrate, a standard of readability has been the standard applied by Nebraska courts. And, our holding with this interpretation does not require officers to be legal technicians. United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.2005) (“We ‘should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.’” (quoting Sanders, 196 F.3d at 913)). It requires only that they “understand the laws that they are entrusted with enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable,” id., and not stop citizens on the street on the authority of § 60-399(2) when the license plate is otherwise readable from within 100 feet.
In State v. Richardson, for example, the defendant was pulled over when a patrol officer, traveling in the opposite direction of the defendant, initially did not see any license plate on the front of the defendant’s vehicle. 17 Neb.App. 388, 763 N.W.2d 420, 423, 425 (2008). The officer testified that, before he turned around to get behind the defendant, he was able to see a license plate “in the front window of the vehicle, ‘tucked in’ between the glass and the dashboard,” but “was unable to ascertain the numbers or see the plate clearly.” Id. at 425. During the stop, the officer learned that the defendant’s license had been suspended, and the officer arrested the defendant. Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence ob
Unlike the officer in Richardson, Deputy Wintle could read the state name on Martins’s license plate from a reasonable position
State v. Reiter, 3 Neb.App. 153, 524 N.W.2d 575 (1994), is also instructive. In Reiter, the defendant was pulled over around 3:30 AM when an officer saw him driving without any license plates and apparently without any in-transit tags, as required by Nebraska law. Id. at 577. Only after the defendant stopped his vehicle and the officer shined a spotlight on the vehicle did the officer see a piece of paper in the rear window. Id. Upon further inspection and contact with the driver, the officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol in the vehicle and subsequently arrested the defendant for drunk driving and driving on a suspended license. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop because “although the initial stop may have been proper [when the officer could not see any in-transit tags], after the officer became aware of registration compliance [i.e., when he saw the tags with the spotlight], he should not have had contact with [the defendant].” Id. at 578. The trial court denied the suppression motion and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court noted that “[the defendant’s] argument rests on the pivotal factual assumption that [the officer] determined that [the defendant] had proper in-transit tags prior to making contact
Our Circuit has had the opportunity to review other states’ license plate display statutes but has never held that a plate readable from 100 feet can be reasonably characterized as not being “plainly visible.” In United States v. Harris, 617 F.3d 977, 978-79 (8th Cir.2010), for example, we addressed a Missouri statute that required license plates to be “plainly visible.” There, the officer who conducted the traffic stop “testified that he had to ‘get right up on the vehicle to get the license plate.’ ” Id. at 978 (emphasis added). “Although the defendant in that case argued the traffic stop was invalid because the officer could read the plate, we held the officer had acted reasonably.”
Finally, we note that in the order denying Martins’s motion for reconsideration, the district court stated the following regarding one of Martins’s trial exhibits:
Martins’s own Exhibit ... show[s] his rear license plate in a bracket, with a back-up camera mounted above the plate. The camera obscures the top half of the name of the issuing state: “Utah.” The photo[] appear[s] to be taken at a direct angle, i.e., at the same height as the plate. Anyone viewing the license plate from an angle above the plate, e.g., any driver of another vehicle, would see less than half the lettering identifying the issuing state.
From our reading of Nebraska cases decided both before and after the 2005 amendment to the statute, see infra note 8, the essence of “visibility” has always been an officer’s ability to read text
The government cites several Eighth Circuit cases in support of the proposition that it was objectively reasonable for Deputy Wintle to believe that Martins was violating § 60-399(2). The government’s cases are not applicable to the issue before us, however, because they each present the same set of materially distinguishable facts. In each of those cases, the law-enforcement officers were not able to ascertain the relevant information prior to stopping the defendants, and thus had probable cause to believe that a law was being broken at the time of the seizures.
In United States v. Sanchez, this Court stated the following:
[I]t was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to suspect at the time of the stop that the paper affixed to the rear of the minivan was not an official registration document from another State. As he approached the minivan*720 from behind, [the officer] could not see the name of any State printed on the paper. Although the words ‘Arizona Temporary Registration Plate’ appeared at the bottom of the paper, the district court did not clearly err in finding that those words were too small to be read by a trooper observing the minivan on the highway.
572 F.3d 475, 478-79 (8th Cir.2009) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in United States v. Smart—also cited by the government — it was not until after the officer stopped the defendant that the officer was able to ascertain the issuing state’s name on the defendant’s license plate to determine whether it was proper that the defendant did not have a front license plate, which is required of vehicles registered in Iowa and certain other states. 393 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir.2005). This Court set forth the facts of Smart as follows:
As [the officer] approached the [defendant’s vehicle] from behind [while driving], the officer observed that it had a rear plate, but he could not determine from his distance what state had issued that plate.... Because the vehicle’s failure to display a front license plate was a possible traffic violation, [the officer] activated his emergency lights and stopped the car for an investigation.... It was only after [the defendant’s] car had stopped and [the officer] approached it on foot that he noticed that there was a Georgia plate on the rear of the car.
Id. (emphasis added).
Just the same, in United States v. Hol-lins, “Omaha police spotted the [defendant’s] SUV, noticed the lack of license plates, stopped the vehicle, and shined a spotlight on it.” 685 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir.2012). As is relevant to the issue before us, “[w]hen the officers initially observed and stopped the SUV, it did not bear license plates, and they could not see the In Transit sticker.” Id. at 706.
Like in the Nebraska cases Richardson and Reiter, the officers in Sanchez, Smart, and Hollins did not possess the relevant information to determine that no traffic violations were occurring until after they stopped the defendants; by contrast, Deputy Wintle testified at trial that, he could read that Martins had a Utah license plate prior to pulling over Martins and while traveling on 1-80. This fact pertaining to what Deputy Wintle knew — and when — is critical in the probable-cause analysis and renders the government’s cases inapposite.
2. Probable Cause Based on Suspicious Behavior
Multiple innocent and lawful acts, when “viewed in the aggregate by a trained law enforcement officer,” can provide the necessary level of suspicion to justify a stop. United States v. Walker, 324 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir.2003); see United States v. Stewart, 631 F.3d 453, 457
This Court has several times suppressed evidence obtained as a result of unconstitutional seizures occasioned by officers’ suspicion, where such suspicion was based solely on the fact that defendants were engaging in legal activity that merely appeared out of the ordinary. In United States v. Yousif, for example, police officers set up signs along a Missouri highway known to be a drug-trafficking route alerting drivers of a checkpoint ahead; the actual checkpoint, however, was at the end of the exit ramp for the exit after the checkpoint signs. 308 F.3d 820, 823-24 (8th Cir.2002). The defendant drove a vehicle with Oklahoma license plates, took the exit where officers were running the checkpoint (albeit unbeknownst to the defendant when he exited), and slowed halfway up the exit ramp when he saw police officers. Id. at 824. Police officers stopped the defendant and found marijuana in his vehicle. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000),
The defendant appealed, and the government argued on appeal that even if the checkpoint was unconstitutional under Edmond, “the totality of the circumstances noted by [the officer] prior to the stop of [the defendant’s] vehicle sufficed to create individualized reasonable suspicion, thereby rendering the stop in this particular case constitutionally permissible.” Id. at 828. According to the government, those circumstances included: “that [the defendant] was driving on a highway that was known to be used for drug trafficking, his car had out-of-state license plates, he pulled off at a rural exit immediately after seeing signs warning of a drug checkpoint ahead, and he slowed almost to a complete stop upon seeing the police checkpoint ahead.” Id. This Court rejected that argument and vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, stating:
The facts that [the defendant’s] vehicle had out-of-state license plates and was traveling on a highway that was “known” to the officers as a drug trafficking corridor cannot alone justify*722 the stop because “[t]oo many people fit this description for it to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” ... Moreover, because there is nothing inherently unlawful or suspicious about a vehicle (even one with out-of-state license plates) exiting the highway, it should not be the case that the placement of signs by the police in front of the exit ramp transforms that facially innocent behavior into grounds for suspecting criminal activity.
Id. at 828-29 (quoting United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.2000)).
Similar to Yousif, in United States v. Jones, an officer saw the defendant “walking across a church parking lot wearing a long-sleeved hooded sweatshirt and ‘clutching the front area of his hoodie pocket with his right hand.’ ” 606 F.3d 964, 965 (8th Cir.2010) (per curiam). The defendant noticed the officer’s squad car, and the officer, after circling the block and regaining sight of the defendant, stopped and patted down the defendant to look for weapons. Id. The officer found a 9 millimeter handgun in the front pocket of the defendant’s sweatshirt and a loaded magazine in the defendant’s back pants pocket. The officer later determined that the defendant had prior felony drug convictions, and the defendant was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him, and the district court granted the motion. The government appealed, arguing that the circumstances surrounding the stop gave the trained officer reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id. at 966. This Court affirmed the district court’s order suppressing the evidence, stating the following:
The government does suggest the presence of other suspicious circumstances, but all were shared by countless, wholly innocent persons — walking in a high-crime area, wearing a sweatshirt on a September day that began at a cool 50 degrees in the morning but warmed to 68 degrees by late afternoon, and intently watching a police cruiser drive by. In other words, the totality of these circumstances, on which our inquiry must be based, adds nothing to [the defendant’s] protective clutching of something in his hoodie pocket.
... With only this circumstance to support [the officer’s] suspicion, though we are mindful of the need to credit law enforcement officers who draw on their experience and specialized training, we conclude that “[t]oo many people fit this description for it to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
Id. at 967 (quoting Gray, 213 F.3d at 1001).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has reached a conclusion similar to the conclusions in Yousif and Jones when applying Nebraska’s traffic laws. In State v. Childs, an officer pulled over the defendant when the officer noticed in-transit stickers on both the front and rear of the defendant’s vehicle. 242 Neb. 426, 495 N.W.2d 475, 476-77 (1993). The officer “walked by the ‘In Transit’ sticker displayed on one of the [vehicle’s] windows, noted that the sticker was still within the In Transit period and was therefore valid” and that the sticker was displayed in the correct location on the vehicle; nonetheless, the officer went to the driver’s window to ask the defendant for a bill of sale. Id. at 477. The officer noticed that the defendant appeared intoxicated, and the defendant was arrested for drunk driving. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, which the trial court denied and
The reasoning in Yousif, Jones, and Childs applies equally to this case. That Martins drove a vehicle with non-Nebraska license plates and exited from 1-80 at an unlikely exit for cross-country travelers (according to Deputy Wintle) does not provide Deputy Wintle with the requisite level of suspicion to stop him. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (“The other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.”); Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir.2003) (“There are limits ... to how far police training and experience can go towards finding latent criminality in innocent acts”). Moreover, even if Deputy Wintle became aware of certain other “indicators” that amounted to reasonable suspicion for him to believe that Martins was involved in drug trafficking — e.g., Martins’s “agitated attitude ... throughout the stop,” the sleeping pad in the back of Martins’s vehicle, and Kubo’s reactions, see Trial Tr. 25-Deputy Wintle did not become aware of these indicators until after he stopped Martins. The only possible basis for pulling over Martins in the first instance (other than for the alleged violation of § 60-399(2), which we have already rejected) was that Martins had a Utah license plate and took a certain exit off of 1-80. The traffic stop was thus, for constitutional purposes, baseless.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the initial traffic stop violated Martins’s Fourth Amendment rights and any evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed. Accordingly, we need not reach the second and third issues that Martins raises on appeal pertaining to the canine sniff and the connection between the seized currency and drug trafficking.
The judgment of the district court is reversed.
. There is conflicting testimony as to whether Deputy Wintle was also traveling west on 1-80 or was pulled off to the shoulder and stationary as Martins passed him.
. Deputy Wintle did not issue a ticket to Martins for the alleged violation.
. With this interpretation, a great deal of flexibility remains within which an officer might reasonably stop a car under the authority of § 60-399(2) even though a court might later find there to have been no violation. That range of flexibility, however, does not extend so far as to make it reasonable to believe that a plate readable from within 100 feet violated the statute.
. The parties do not argue over the merits of the 100-foot distance itself, but we note that 100 feet is approximately six to seven average vehicle lengths, and this spacing does not require Deputy Wintle to tailgate Martins or follow him at an unsafe distance to ascertain the issuing state's name on Martins’s license plate. Compare Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6, 140(1) ("The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, and such driver shall have due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the roadway.”), with State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57, 73-74 (2008) (objective standard for police officers is to allow one car length between vehicles for every ten miles per hour of speed).
. Deputy Wintle testified at trial that he "just accelerated up and drove up close to [Martins]” to get within 100 feet of Martins and see Martins's license plate. Trial Tr. 14.
. We note that Reiter was decided in 1994, i.e., before the 2005 amendments to the relevant statute took place, see infra note 8. However, the court in Reiter equated the then-applicable statutory language requiring proper "display” of a license plate to mean "visible.” 524 N.W.2d at 578 ("The statutory expression requiring ‘proper display' of plates and in-transit tags logically implies a display which is visible.”). Although the court did not elaborate on what, exactly, "visible” means, we note that in its recitation of facts, the Reiter court stated that the officer "turned on his spotlight, shined it into the back window, and then noticed a piece of paper in the rear window, but could not tell what the paper said at that point.” Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Accordingly, even though the Reiter court operated under a different statutory framework, we nevertheless find support in it for the proposition that one’s ability to read a license plate is indicative of the license plate being "visible” within the meaning of § 60-399(2).
. The dissent relies in part on Parks v. State, 247 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo.2011), citing dicta from that court stating that " 'plainly visible' and ‘clearly legible’ indicate that a license plate must not be obstructed in any manner.” Id. at 860. That statement, however, accompanied the Wyoming court’s description of the purpose of the statute, which is: "License plates need to be easily read in order to facilitate law enforcement and ordinary citizens in reporting and investigating hit-and-run accidents, traffic violations, gas-pump drive offs, and other criminal activity.” Id. And, the actual facts of Paries involved officer testimony — testimony found credible and relied upon by the Wyoming court — in which the officer stated he could not read the numbers on the plate "while following” the defendant’s vehicle because a trailer-hitch ball mount obstructed the numbers. Id. at 859.
. We note that at the time that O’Dell was decided, Nebraska motorists were required only to “display” license plates on the front and back of a vehicle. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-323 (2004). The relevant statute was amended in 2005, however, and the current version — and the version in place when Martins was stopped — requires that license plates be "plainly visible.” Id. § 60-399(2) (2005). Nevertheless, we find O’Dell to be persuasive based on its analogous facts and on the fact that it has not been questioned or overruled.
. The dissent characterizes the present case as simple and appears to use the conclusions of Deputy Wintle, the magistrate judge, and the district court judge in this case as support for the legal conclusion that Deputy Wintle acted reasonably. No doubt, this reasonableness-in-numbers approach holds substantial rhetorical appeal. And the dissent correctly notes that we must give "due weight to infer-enees drawn from ... facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The present issue, however, is not a fact question. It is a question of law. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir.2006) ("We review the district court’s ... legal conclusions about probable cause and reasonable suspicion de novo.”). Having separately reviewed the fact question in our Section II.A and having reached our conclusion, deference to the underlying courts regarding the ultimate legal question of reasonableness is not appropriate. In fact, it would seem inconsistent with our obligation to conduct a de novo review. In other words, we cannot carry out our function of appellate judicial review by relying on the lower courts’ determination of reasonableness to decide what is reasonable.
. We note that the government, when discussing Sanchez in its brief, omits from its lengthy block quote the sentence beginning "Although the words" and ending "too small to be read by a trooper observing the minivan on the highway.” See 572 F.3d at 479. This omission is significant for distinguishing Sanchez from this case because in Sanchez, the trooper could not read the relevant information while "on the highway," see id., whereas here, Deputy Wintle testified at trial that he could read Martins's license plate while traveling on 1-80. See Trial Tr. 14 ("I don't believe I actually drove up beside [Martins] but came within a hundred feet of him to see [his] plate.”).
. In Edmond, the Court held that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints ..., stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion." 531 U.S. at 47, 121 S.Ct. 447.
. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras-Trevino, 448 F.3d 821, 824-25 (5th Cir.2006) (holding a license plate frame “that covered the top half of the [state name]" gave officers probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for violation of a statute prohibiting objects that “alter[] or obscure[ ] the letters or numbers on the plate”).