United States v. Dale Roberson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 21-2125
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Dale Roberson
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln1
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Submitted: November 4, 2021
Filed: November 18, 2021
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Dale Roberson received a 180-month prison sentence after he pleaded guilty
to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
1
The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.
841(b)(1)(A), 846. As part of the plea agreement, he waived the right to appeal his
conviction and sentence, except for, as relevant here, ineffective assistance of
counsel. In an Anders brief, Roberson’s counsel suggests that the sentence is
substantively unreasonable. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A pro
se supplemental brief alleges that counsel was ineffective.
The appeal waiver, which is enforceable, covers the sentencing issue. See
United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing the validity of
an appeal waiver de novo); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (explaining that an appeal waiver will be enforced if the appeal falls
within the scope of the waiver, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into
the plea agreement and the waiver, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a
miscarriage of justice). And we decline to consider the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d
824, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that this type of claim is “usually best
litigated in collateral proceedings”).
Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no
other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, grant counsel permission to withdraw, and deny
the pending pro se motion as moot.
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