DocketNumber: No. 73-1731
Judges: Heaney
Filed Date: 3/28/1974
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/4/2024
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the District Court erred in holding that certain contracts for sale of chinchillas were not investment contracts subject to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq.
The plaintiffs’ initiated a class action in the Southern District of Iowa against the chinchilla corporations and individual defendants in March of 1971. The plaintiffs complained that because of material misrepresentations and omissions, they were persuaded to enter into contracts
The plaintiffs claimed that these contracts for the sale of chinchillas were investment contracts
In an amendment to the complaint filed in May of 1973, the plaintiffs added the Mills County State Bank as a de
The Bank filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the contract for the sale of chinchilla animals and a promise to purchase their offspring is not a security under the provisions of either the 1933 or 1934 acts. Other motions not here relevant were also filed.
The District Court treated the Bank’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. It held that the contracts in question were not investment contracts because they were “clearly not passive investment interests.” It concluded that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate
* * * since the sole basis for the Court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over these securities law violations are 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, both of which are premised upon the existence of securities and which are thus inapplicable since no security is herein involved.
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ efforts,in raising the chinchillas were so important to the success or failure of the venture that characterization of the contracts as investment contracts would be improper under the Supreme Court’s definition of that term in Securities & Exch. Com. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946). The court declined to consider the common law claims as they were premised on pendent jurisdiction and the court had found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims.
We consider the fundamental question before us — whether the contracts were investment contracts and hence securities subject to the federal securities laws —in the context of a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2713, at 402-406 (1973).
The starting point in this determination is the Supreme Court’s definition in Howey:
* * * [A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise. * * *
Id., 328 U.S. at 298-299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103.
The Ninth Circuit recently held that the word “solely” should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract. Securities & Exchange Com’n v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973). It stated:
* * * [i]n light 0f the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory policy of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court’s admonitions that the definition of Securities should be a flexible one, the word “solely” should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve. in substance, if not form, securities. * * *
* * * Thus the fact that the investors here were required to exert some efforts if a return were to be achieved should not automatically preclude a finding that the Plan or Adventure is an investment contract, -x- -x- -x- Rather we adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which af-*417 feet the failure or success of the enterprise. (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 482.
We are convinced that the definition of investment contract in Turner is consistent with congressional intent and that it does not represent an impermissible departure from the Supreme Court’s holding in Howey.
The District Court recognized the teachings of Turner but was apparently convinced that the plaintiffs’ efforts were so substantial that even under the Turner test the chinchilla contracts were not investment contracts.
We have reviewed the record
The record shows that the plaintiffs invested money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would profit if the defendants secured additional investors.
In determining whether the plaintiffs’ contributions were nominal or significant, the issue is not what efforts, in fact, were required of them. Rather, it is what efforts the plaintiffs were reasonably led to believe were required of them at the time they entered into the contracts. See, Securities & Exch. Comm. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353, 64 S.Ct. 120, 124, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943), where the Court, in finding an investment contract subject to the Securities Act of 1933, stated:
In the enforcement of an act such as this it is not inappropriate that the promoters’ offering be judged ' as being what they were represented to be.
Viewed in this context, it becomes apparent that the plaintiffs’ efforts in raising the chinchillas are really of no more significance to the venture’s ultimate success than were the efforts of the investors in Turner. There, the
The effort to persuade others to invest was held to be the “undeniably significant” one in Turner, and we are convinced on the record before us that it was the significant one here. If it develops at a later stage in the litigation that the plaintiffs’ allegations are not supported by the evidence, the District Court can so find. But, we have no alternative now but to reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
. The contracts read as follows:
CENTRAL CHINCHILLA GROUP, INC. AGREES:
1. To buy all descendants of the chinchillas purchased from Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., on date of - (Said descendants shall be in pairs . a pair being one male and one female, or two females.)
2. To pay the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per pair for said offspring. PREFERRED PRODUCER AGREES:
1. That all offspring sold to Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., shall be between six and eleven months of age.
2. To sell 100% of his offspring, with the exception that he may choose, at his option, to keep his offspring or a certain percentage of the offspring, for his herd expansion, in which case selection shall be on the basis of one offspring selected by the Producer, then one offspring selected by The Group, etc.
3. To give reasonable care, at all times, to The Central Chinchilla Group strain of breeding stock, and to abstain from introducing any outside stock.
4. To maintain membership in The Central
Chinchilla Group and to manage his herd aecording to recommendations made by The Group.
5. That only clean animals in smooth condition and in normal good health will be involved under the terms of this agreement.
6. That all chinchillas involved shall have been first registered at the home office of Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., through birth announcements, and tagged by an authorized representative of Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., as animals meeting the breeding standards established by Central Chinchilla Group, Inc.
. The term “security” as defined under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes “investment contracts.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b (1) and 78c (a) (10). The definitions in these statutes are virtually identical. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-336, 88 S.Ct. 548, 19 L.Ed.2d 564 (1967).
. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 771(2), 77q.
. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
. See also, Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-693 (3rd Cir. 1973), where the Third Circuit stated :
* * * [A]n investment contract can exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long as they are nominal or limited and would have “little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by the promoters.” * * * As the Ninth Circuit realized, to adopt a position similar to City Investing’s would lead to easy evasion of the act “by adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort.” (Citations omitted.)
. The record before the District Court consisted of pleading, interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, and the affidavit of an official of the Bank and his testimony at a pretrial hearing. Only the pleadings, the interrogatories and the answers to the interrogatories relate to the question before us.
. See, 51 Texas L.Rev. 788 (1973) and 6 Creighton L.Rev. 450 (1973), where the elements of the Howey formula are summarized and investment contract cases are analyzed.