United States v. Ronald Goldberg

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1317
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Ronald Goldberg
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
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Submitted: January 9, 2023
Filed: April 14, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
The district court 1 found Ronald Goldberg violated a condition of his
supervised release by defrauding an innkeeper and revoked his supervision,
sentencing him to a 36-month term of imprisonment followed by two years of
1
The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa.
supervised release. Goldberg appeals, asserting: (1) the court erred when it found
he defrauded an innkeeper; and (2) his revocation sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We affirm.
In 2015, Goldberg pled guilty to two counts of bank fraud and one count of
wire fraud, and he subsequently received a sentence of time served and a term of
supervised release of five years. While under supervision, Goldberg served as a
wine distributor. In 2018, a marketing coordinator for Lamborghini Dallas
purchased wine from Goldberg valued at $1,120. The marketing coordinator
provided Goldberg the information related to a corporate credit card (“Lamborghini
Card”) understanding Goldberg would run the card to receive payment for the wine.
On January 5, 2019, Goldberg checked into a beachfront resort in Palm Beach
Florida, the Tideline, along with an associate Mark Kolta. At check-in, Goldberg
completed an authorization form with respect to the Lamborghini Card, authorizing
Tideline to charge fees related to lodging to the Lamborghini Card. Tideline charged
the initial room deposit of around $1,000 to the Lamborghini Card. Kolta provided
his personal card (“Kolta Card”) to Tideline and authorized Goldberg to charge
incidental expenses but not lodging fees to the Kolta Card.
On January 8, 2019, Goldberg informed a receptionist that Emily Nichols,
Tideline’s manager, had approved a waiver of his phone expenses. Accordingly, the
receptionist noted on Goldberg’s account that he would not receive phone charges.
Notwithstanding Goldberg’s representations, Nichols had never authorized waiver
of phone charges. During his stay, Goldberg incurred thousands of dollars in phone
charges.
On January 31, 2019, Tideline attempted to run the Lamborghini Card and the
Kolta Card, but they were declined. Nichols then received a call from a Lamborghini
Dallas marketing coordinator informing Tideline the Lamborghini Card should not
have been used at the property. A representative of Lamborghini Dallas also
informed Goldberg that he could not use the Lamborghini Card for his personal
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expenses. Goldberg stated that he was unaware he could not do so, and his probation
officer testified that Goldberg regularly used corporate cards in this manner. Nichols
instructed Goldberg to provide a new method of payment. On February 2, 2019,
Goldberg left Tideline in the middle of the night without providing an alternative
method of payment.
The next day, Nichols emailed Goldberg and informed him that he had an
unpaid balance of approximately $10,000. Goldberg disputed the amount, claiming
that phone charges had been waived. He made no claim that he did not owe the
remainder of the bill. In the following weeks, Goldberg twice told Nichols that he
would return to Tideline to pay his balance but failed to follow through.
On March 30, 2019, Nichols reported Goldberg to law enforcement. Only
then did Goldberg take steps to pay the bill. On April 1, 2019, Tideline accepted
from Goldberg a $2,000 payment via a Visa credit card. Thereafter, Goldberg made
additional attempts to pay his balance, but Tideline refused to accept payment.
Tideline later removed Goldberg’s phone charges from his account.
Goldberg’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke, which, after
amendment, proceeded to a three-day hearing before the district court. In response
to the government’s evidence, Goldberg claimed that he had provided his personal
Mastercard credit card (“Mastercard Card”) and not the Lamborghini Card at
check-in. Goldberg further testified Kolta authorized Goldberg to charge lodging
fees to the Kolta Card. Goldberg acknowledged he had authorized Tideline to charge
the Lamborghini Card but claimed he had given limited authority only to the extent
of the amount he believed Lamborghini Dallas owed him. Goldberg also testified
that Tideline’s receptionist waived his phone charges and that his initial reluctance
to pay was only because of the phone charges. Finally, Goldberg testified that
Tideline never attempted to charge the Kolta Card and the MasterCard Card was
declined because Tideline attempted to charge it in an amount exceeding its limit.
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The district court found Goldberg’s testimony not credible based on its
observation of Goldberg and his prior convictions for crimes of deceit. The district
court discredited his testimony and credited the government’s evidence. Based on
the credited evidence, the court found that Goldberg did not violate Florida law and
his supervision conditions by using the Lamborghini Card without authority.
Among other factors, the court considered that Goldberg only successfully charged
the approximately $1,000 deposit to the Lamborghini Card—an amount less than
what Lamborghini Dallas owed him—and that Goldberg has used corporate credit
cards in a similar manner in the past.
Even so, the court determined Goldberg violated Florida law and his terms of
supervision by defrauding an innkeeper. Specifically, the court found that Goldberg
did not provide the Mastercard Card at check-in. The court also found that Goldberg
obtained lodging at Tideline with no ability to pay and with intent to defraud because
Lamborghini Dallas only owed Goldberg $1,120, an amount dwarfed by the actual
lodging fees he owed, and the Kolta Card was only authorized for incidental
expenses.
At sentencing, the court found a Sentencing Guidelines range of 6 to 12
months but rejected the advisory range because of the seriousness of Goldberg’s
offense, his numerous prior crimes of deceit, and the serious financial risk he poses
to the community. On the mitigation side, the court found that Goldberg committed
no violation while on supervised release between 2016 and 2019. After weighing
all the relevant factors, the court sentenced Goldberg to a 36-month term of
imprisonment to be followed by two years of supervised release.
Goldberg claims the district court erroneously found he intentionally
defrauded an innkeeper. “We review the district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for an abuse of discretion” and any “subsidiary factfinding as to
whether or not a violation occurred . . . for clear error.” United States v. Black Bear,
542 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “A defendant violates a
mandatory condition of supervised release if he commits a federal, state, or local
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crime.” United States v. Asalati, 615 F.3d 1001, 1005 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted). A person commits the offense of defrauding an innkeeper if he “obtains
food, lodging, or other accommodations . . . with intent to defraud.” Fla. Stat.
§ 509.151(1).
The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, when it found
Goldberg defrauded an innkeeper. The court reasonably credited the government’s
evidence suggesting Goldberg incurred thousands of dollars in hotel expenses after
checking into Tideline using only the Lamborghini Card and the Kolta Card, neither
of which were authorized to cover the full amount of Goldberg’s lodging fees. The
court also reasonably credited the government’s evidence suggesting Goldberg
furtively absconded from Tideline without providing a valid form of payment and
subsequently made unfulfilled promises to pay. This evidence is more than
sufficient to support a conclusion that Goldberg obtained lodging from Tideline
without the ability to pay and with intent to defraud.
Goldberg asserts the court unreasonably disregarded evidence that he
provided the MasterCard Card at check-in. The court could reasonably discredit
Goldberg’s self-serving testimony and find his proffered account statement
unpersuasive considering the evidence that Tideline adjusted his account balance
after he left Tideline. Goldberg also asserts the court’s conclusion that he defrauded
an innkeeper conflicts with its conclusion that he did not use a credit card without
authority. However, the court could reasonably find that Goldberg had authority to
charge the Lamborghini Card in an amount up to $1,120 while also finding this
amount was insufficient to cover his extensive lodging fees.
As to Goldberg’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, we
review the substantive reasonableness of revocation sentences for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Cain, 976 F.3d 778, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (citations omitted). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district
court sentence––whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines
range––as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455,
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464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). The district court’s consideration
of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the seriousness of his offense, his
extensive criminal history involving crimes of deceit, and the financial risk he
presents to the community were all permissible sentencing factors. While Goldberg
asserts the court should have more heavily weighed his prior successful performance
on supervised release, the court acted within its wide sentencing discretion in finding
this factor insignificant in comparison to the financial risk he poses to the public.
See United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The district court
may give some factors less weight than a defendant prefers or more to other factors
[without] justify[ing] reversal.” (citation omitted)). The sentence is not
substantively unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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