United States v. Jerrell West

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1584
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jerrell West
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: December 16, 2022
Filed: April 25, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted Jerrell West of interstate travel with intent of engaging in
illicit sexual conduct with a minor. On appeal, West argues that the district court1
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The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, then Chief Judge, now United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
abused its discretion by allowing an expert witness to testify about the typical
behaviors of child sex-abuse victims. Because the expert witness only discussed the
typical behaviors of child sex-abuse victims and did not opine about the minor’s
truthfulness, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the expert’s testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
West was charged with one count of interstate travel with intent of engaging
in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. In preparation for trial, the government filed
a notice of intent to call expert witness Anthony Harper, a forensic interviewer for the
Children’s Advocacy Services of Greater St. Louis (CASGSL), a child advocacy
center (CAC). The government attached Harper’s curriculum vitae (CV) to its notice.
Harper’s CV showed his expertise in minor sexual abuse disclosure, recanting,
predatory grooming, and re-traumatization behavior. In response, West filed a motion
in limine to exclude the expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and
403.
At the pretrial conference, the district court denied West’s motion in limine to
exclude Harper’s testimony. It concluded that Harper’s testimony “may help [the jury]
better understand how trauma, especially in this case, sexual abuse, manifests itself
in a child’s behavior and disclosure.” R. Doc. 117, at 8. It noted that Harper’s
testimony was “general” and would not “comment . . . on the evidence in this case or
whether it happened or didn’t happen but how the information typically comes out.”
Id. On balance, the court did not find Harper’s testimony to be “unduly prejudicial.”
Id.
On the second day of trial, Katherine Knudsen, a CASGSL forensic
interviewer, testified that she performed the CAC interview of the minor on the day
of the sexual assault and three days later. In conjunction with Knudsen’s testimony,
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the government admitted the minor’s CAC video interviews that Knudsen recorded.
In the CAC interviews, the minor reported meeting West through an online social
media application. On April 19, 2020, West picked up the minor and drove her to a
truck stop, where he sexually assaulted her in the backseat of his vehicle. West
transported the minor back to her residence after the sexual assault.
Right after Knudsen’s testimony, the minor took the stand. During her
testimony, the minor provided fewer details of the sexual assault and communications
with West than she had previously provided to Knudsen in the CAC interviews.
Thereafter, the government called Harper as a witness. West renewed his
objection to the expert testimony. The district court noted the objection but
maintained its original denial. Then, upon the government’s motion, the district court
designated Harper “as an expert in the field of forensic interviewing, specifically
dealing with child sexual assault trauma and child disclosure.” R. Doc. 118, at 141.
Upon questioning, Harper confirmed that he had not reviewed the evidence in the
case, had never met the minor, and had not viewed the minor’s CAC videos. Instead,
Harper acknowledged, he was called “to testify regarding child sexual assault trauma
and child disclosure.” Id. at 142. Harper then testified about sexual abuse, trauma,
re-traumatization behaviors, and the effect of predatory grooming on the memory and
disclosure process.
In addition to Knudsen, the minor, and Harper, several other witnesses testified
for the government. These witnesses included FBI agents who testified about the
historical cell site data analysis performed on West’s cell phone; a pediatric nurse at
St. Louis Children’s Hospital who testified that she had performed a physical exam
of the minor on the day of the assault and that the minor’s injuries were consistent
with acute sexual assault; an FBI forensic examiner who testified about the strong
connection between the DNA collected from the minor at the hospital and West’s
DNA; and the minor’s mother who identified West and set forth a timeline of events.
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West called no witnesses. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
II. Discussion
On appeal, West argues that the district court abused its discretion in
“permitt[ing] Anthony Harper, [a] forensic interviewer, to testify generally regarding
minor victims’ behavior after a traumatic event.” Appellant’s Br. at ix. Specifically,
he maintains that Harper’s testimony did not assist the trier of fact as required by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because it impermissibly vouched for the minor’s
credibility and was “invalid and irrelevant” given that the minor never delayed
reporting the incident and never recanted. Id. at 3. He also contends that Harper’s
testimony violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from Harper’s
bolstering of the minor’s credibility.
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to permit
expert testimony. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2001). Rule 702
authorizes “a district court to allow the testimony of a witness whose knowledge,
skill, training, experience, or education will assist a trier of fact in understanding the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. “In the context of child sexual abuse
cases, a qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused
children and describe the characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the witness “may not opine as to whether the alleged
abuse actually occurred or whether the victim is telling the truth.” Id. at 766.
We have consistently allowed the type of testimony that West challenges on
appeal: an expert opinion discussing the typical behaviors of child sex-abuse victims,
as long as the expert does not opine about the alleged victim’s truthfulness. See, e.g.,
Kirkie, 261 F.3d at 765–66; United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785–86 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Azure,
801 F.2d 336, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1986); cf. United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133,
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1140 (8th Cir. 2017) (“While these cases involved sexual abuse of children, we see
no reason why similar testimony should not also be considered helpful to the jury in
cases where, as here, the victim of sexual abuse is an adult.”). Here, the record shows
that Harper testified “about the general characteristics of victims of sexual abuse,”
Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1141, and did not express any opinion on the truthfulness of the
minor’s testimony.
“Likewise, the expert testimony did not mislead the jury, confuse the issues,
or otherwise unfairly prejudice [West] in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”
Id. Harper “did not testify as to [the minor’s] behavior and did not opine as to whether
[the minor] had in fact been abused.” Id.III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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