Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3658
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Judith Steckelberg, Parents on behalf of their minor child AMS; Michael
Steckelberg, Parents on behalf of their minor child AMS; AMS, minor child
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Chamberlain School District
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Southern
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Submitted: June 15, 2023
Filed: August 15, 2023
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
The Steckelbergs, AMS’s parents, placed AMS at a private academy after the
Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner
decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded the Steckelbergs costs
associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court 1 affirmed, and
so do we.
I.
AMS was a special education student at Chamberlain High School diagnosed
with severe neuropsychiatric conditions. AMS had an Individualized Education
Plan (IEP), a document that lays out a student’s special education needs and a
school’s plan to help the student make progress. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
Before AMS’s junior year of high school, a behavioral analyst created different
support documents for AMS. While the analyst gave the documents to school staff,
a behavior support plan was not included in AMS’s junior year IEP. Ultimately, the
IEP required AMS to meet behavioral goals that left little to no room for error.
Before the start of the school year, AMS got into trouble. A plan was
eventually made for AMS to attend classes from home, which did not go well. AMS
was often unable to access learning materials and had limited contact with teachers.
Meanwhile, Chamberlain and the Steckelbergs considered other options. The
Steckelbergs suggested an out-of-state academy (the Academy). Chamberlain did
not expressly approve of the Academy but also didn’t find any suitable alternatives.
Eventually, AMS went to the Academy, did well, and graduated.
The Steckelbergs filed a due process complaint against Chamberlain. A state
hearing examiner held that Chamberlain violated the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) and awarded the Steckelbergs costs associated with AMS’s
placement at the Academy. Chamberlain sought review of the examiner’s decision
in state court, and the Steckelbergs removed to federal court. The district court
denied remand and affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision. Chamberlain appeals.
1
The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.
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II.
We first turn to the district court’s denial of remand, which we review de novo.
Halsey v. Townsend Corp. of Ind., 20 F.4th 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2021).
Chamberlain argues that the Steckelbergs weren’t eligible to remove the case
from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). Chamberlain has it wrong. While the Steckelbergs initially sought to
recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state
court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain
became the plaintiff for removal purposes. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); Paris
Sch. Dist. v. Harter, 894 F.3d 885, 887 n.3 (8th Cir. 2018) (“A civil action review
proceeding under § 1415(i)(2), while sometimes referred to as an ‘appeal,’ is
formally an original civil action.” (citation omitted)). Because the Steckelbergs were
defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying
remand.
III.
We next review whether Chamberlain complied with the IDEA and the district
court’s award of costs to the Steckelbergs. Here, we “afford due weight to the
outcome of the administrative proceedings, and accept the district court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Albright ex rel. Doe v. Mountain Home
Sch. Dist., 926 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
To recover, the Steckelbergs had to first show that Chamberlain did not
provide AMS a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Sneitzer v. Iowa Dep’t of
Educ., 796 F.3d 942, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2015). To have provided AMS with a FAPE,
Chamberlain was required to offer AMS an IEP that was “reasonably calculated to
enable [AMS] to make progress in light of [AMS’s] circumstances.” Endrew F. ex
rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017).
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When writing AMS’s junior year IEP, school staff did not consider the
behavior support plan, which contained “the nuts and bolts of the behavior change
process” and detailed “how the school personnel w[ould] support [AMS’s]
developing/emerging appropriate behaviors.” While the junior year IEP set goals
for AMS, the expectation for AMS was near-perfect compliance. When AMS was
placed at home to learn, the amended IEP lacked adequate information about how
AMS was going to make progress despite the change in learning environment.
Worse, AMS was left at home without adequate academic support.
Giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, we
conclude that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. See Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v.
Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that no cohesive plan was in
place to meet [a student]’s behavioral needs supports the ultimate conclusion that he
was not able to obtain a benefit from his education.”).
To receive reimbursement, the Steckelbergs also had to show that the
Academy was an “appropriate” placement for AMS. Sneitzer, 796 F.3d at 948. That
is, the Academy must have been “reasonably calculated to enable [AMS] to receive
educational benefits.” T.B. ex rel. W.B. v. St. Joseph Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 844, 847
(8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In other words, the Academy must have been
“specially designed to meet [AMS’s] unique needs.” Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
Chamberlain suggests that the Academy was inappropriate because it focused
on AMS’s behavioral issues, not AMS’s educational ones. But the Academy was
“specially designed” for AMS. It was equipped to handle AMS’s problematic
behaviors and was structured so that students could attend class and counseling
during the week. The Academy partnered with an online school that worked with
the Academy to let students focus on therapy and social skills outside of class. While
there, AMS completed different classes and, importantly, did well enough to
graduate and move on to college. Cf. CJN ex rel. SKN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs.,
323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Where, as here, the record indicates that a
student’s behavioral problems, if unattended, might significantly curtail his ability
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to learn, the fact that he is learning is significant evidence that his behavioral
problems have, at least in part, been attended to.”). All things considered, the
Academy was an appropriate placement, so reimbursement was not error.
In addition to tuition, the district court reimbursed the Steckelbergs for the
cost of traveling to the Academy. Chamberlain says the travel costs weren’t
adequately proven or related to AMS’s education, but this argument misses the mark.
“[O]nce a court holds that the public placement violated [the] IDEA, it is authorized
to grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist.
Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16 (1993) (citation omitted). Here, an
affidavit was submitted to the district court detailing the travel expenses related to
AMS’s placement at the Academy. The district court awarded the Steckelbergs most
of the requested travel expenses. On this record, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. 2
IV.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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2
The Steckelbergs seek full reimbursement of travel expenses. Because they
did not cross-appeal, this argument is waived.
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