Badih Razzouk v. Merrick Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BADIH RAZZOUK, No. 19-71852
Petitioner,
Agency No. A216-626-703
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM*
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 15, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and R. NELSON and HUNSAKER, Circuit
Judges.
Badih Razzouk, a native and citizen of Syria, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his application for asylum and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the
petition.
The BIA properly rejected Razzouk’s claim of well-founded fear of
persecution on account of his religion because substantial evidence supports that
there was no pattern or practice of persecution by Islamic terrorist organizations
against Christians.1 The record does not compel the conclusion that the violence by
Islamic extremists against Christians was “sufficiently widespread” or “systematic”
in Syria. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). According to the U.S. Department of State (“State Department”), ISIS’s
atrocities were endured by Christians residing “in areas it control[led].” In 2017,
ISIS control was limited to northeastern Syria, near Iraq, in three out of Syria’s
fourteen governorates. Areas of Syria—such as Mashta El Helo in Tartus—were
predominately Christian and under the control of the Syrian government in 2017 and
2018. According to the State Department, “leaders from a number of minority
religious groups, such as representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox Christian
1
Razzouk also argues that he has well-founded fear of persecution because
Christians are a “disfavored group.” We note that “disfavored group analysis is an
evidentiary concept that applies when a petitioner attempts to show that []he will
be individually singled out for persecution.” Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d
1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A). Because
Razzouk failed to argue that he faces an individualized risk of persecution before
the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review his eligibility for relief under the disfavored
group analysis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
2
communities” view the Syrian government as “their protector against violent Sunni
extremists.” Evidence also shows that the violence against Christians is not
sufficiently systematic; rather, the State Department has described most of the
violence in Syria as “indiscriminate,” affecting large portions of the population, not
just Christians.2 See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1061.
The BIA also properly concluded that Razzouk failed to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution based on his membership in the proposed particular
social group of “young Syrian males who would be subject to military recruitment
and who take physical action to avoid military service.” “[F]orced conscription or
punishment for evasion of military duty generally does not constitute persecution,”
unless the petitioner establishes that he faces a “serious or disproportionate
punishment for refusing to serve in the military” on account of a protected ground,
Zahatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), or
“where the [petitioner] would be required to engage in inhuman conduct were he to
continue serving in the military,” Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir.
1995) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence supports that the Syrian government
2
Further, the BIA did not necessarily require Razzouk to prove individualized
harm when it mentioned that Razzouk’s Christian family members remain
unharmed in Syria. Even if harm to Razzouk’s family was inapplicable to the
pattern or practice analysis, there is still sufficient substantial evidence overall to
show a lack of pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in Syria.
3
does not inflict a disproportionately severe punishment on military service evaders,
as opposed to deserters, based on any protected ground. See Zahatye, 453 F.3d at1187–88. No country documents show the government punishes military service
evaders of certain religions or imputed political opinions more harshly than other
evaders. Razzouk also failed to show that the Syrian military would require him to
engage in inhuman conduct, as evidence supports that military conscripts are more
likely to be assigned to administrative and guard functions as opposed to the armed
forces in offensive operations. See Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 864. And no country
documents show the military places conscripts on the front lines of battle on account
of religion or evasion of military service.
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Razzouk’s evasion of military service does not by itself qualify as political opinion.
See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1992). Even if, as Razzouk
argues, the government would impute a political opinion onto him solely from his
evasion of military service, there is no explanation or evidence as to how that would
differ from the way the government views every other military evader or why
Razzouk would be subject to different treatment or punishment than other military
evaders.
Because Razzouk failed to meet the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum,
he necessarily failed to meet the “clear probability” standard for withholding of
4
removal.3 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–32 (1987). Thus,
Razzouk’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal were properly
denied.
PETITION DENIED.
3
According to Razzouk, the BIA erred by not considering his eligibility for
withholding of removal. We disagree. The BIA properly evaluated Razzouk’s
claim for withholding under the “clear probability of persecution” standard. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–32 (1987).
5