United States v. Jeremy Wing

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-30070
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
4:19-cr-00027-BMM-1
v. 4:19-cr-00027-BMM
JEREMY DAVIS WING,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 7, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Before: CHRISTEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,** District
Judge.
Jeremy Davis Wing (“Wing”) was convicted, after a jury trial, of one count
of Domestic Abuse by Habitual Offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). The
sole issue on appeal is whether the district court committed reversible error in
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for
the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
admitting two treating physicians’ testimony that Wing’s common-law wife,
Andrea Eagleman (“Eagleman”), said her husband was the person who attacked
her. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review for an
abuse of discretion the district court’s application of the rule against hearsay. See
United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984, 1003 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that the physicians’ testimony would be
admissible, based upon Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) and case law addressing the
admissibility of similar testimony in sexual assault cases. See id. The district
court properly considered whether the testimony fell within a hearsay exception,
and the testimony at trial satisfied the Rule 803(4)(B) requirement that the
statement “describe[] . . . present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their
general cause.” However, the district court erred when it applied the sexual assault
case law regarding the Rule 803(4)(A) requirement that the statement was “made
for — and [wa]s reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment[.]”
Eagleman’s statements identifying her husband as her attacker were not made in
the context of diagnosis or treatment for emotional and psychological injuries that
she suffered as a result of the assault, nor were they made as part of a discussion
about how she could prevent further domestic abuse.
The district court’s error in the Rule 803(4)(A) analysis was harmless as to
the testimony of Navtejpal Kaholn, M.D., because his testimony established
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another medical purpose for the medical staff’s inquiries about the identity of an
assault victim’s attacker: the attacker’s identity provides insight about the extent of
the force that was used, which contributes to the assessment of the severity of the
injuries and the determination of whether there may be internal injuries. See
United States v. Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1141–44 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that it
was not necessary to reverse the improper hearsay analysis because the record
supported the admission of the statement under established hearsay exceptions).
Although Pedro Guzman, M.D., did not testify regarding the medical purpose for
Eagleman’s statement about her attacker’s identity, the admission of his testimony
about her statement was harmless because it duplicated Dr. Kaholn’s testimony.
See United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that any
error in the admission of the statement was harmless because other witnesses
testified to the same point).
The district court therefore did not commit reversible error when it admitted
Dr. Kaholn’s and Dr. Guzman’s testimony about Eagleman’s statements
identifying her husband as the person who assaulted her.
AFFIRMED.
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