United States v. Ruben Medina

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50025
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:05-cr-00578-JFW-28
v.
RUBEN MEDINA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 14, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,**
District Judge.
Defendant/Appellant Ruben Medina appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to the First Step
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (FSA). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is
not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District
Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review denials of FSA
motions for sentence reductions for abuse of discretion. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007) (explaining that the abuse of
discretion standard “applies to all sentencing decisions”). We affirm.
Assuming that Medina committed covered offenses that
rendered him eligible to move for a sentence reduction pursuant to the
FSA, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his
motion.
Medina was sentenced for the offenses giving rise to this appeal
in 2007, or eleven years before the FSA was enacted, and his original
twenty-year sentence has not since been disturbed. Medina’s
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute crack cocaine base and
distribute methamphetamine was charged as a violation of both 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Since this offense involved at least 500
grams of a substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, or at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2006) was one of the applicable penalty
provisions. See United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 475 (9th Cir.
2020). And Medina’s 2000 conviction for possession of cocaine for
sale in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11351 was a
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predicate felony drug offense that triggered increased statutory
penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006). See 21 U.S.C. §
802(44).
Under these circumstances, Medina was subject to a twenty-
year mandatory minimum sentence for the methamphetamine aspect
of his multi-drug conspiracy offense. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2006) (“If any person commits such a violation
after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final,
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may
not be less than 20 years.”). And, although § 401 of the FSA reduced
the statutory sentencing enhancements for qualifying predicate drug
convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), Medina cannot benefit from
this change in the law.
The FSA’s amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) concerning
enhanced sentences based upon prior drug convictions are applicable
only in cases where “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed
as of [December 21, 2018].” United States v. Asuncion, 974 F.3d 929(9th Cir. 2020), held that a sentence is “‘imposed’ when the district
court pronounces the sentence,” id. at 934, which, in this case,
occurred in 2007. Therefore, the predicate offense originally applied
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to enhance Medina’s conspiracy sentence remains applicable,
resulting in a minimum twenty-year sentence on that charge. Had the
district court elected to resentence Medina on the crack cocaine
possession charge, which it could have (the parties recognized that
charge certainly qualified as a “covered offense”), the sentence on the
conspiracy count would still have been a twenty-year mandatory
minimum, as “a sentence for [that] offense [had] been imposed as of
[December 21, 2018].” (emphasis added).
The district court thus correctly recognized that Medina’s prior
conviction for possession of cocaine for sale would no longer qualify
as a predicate felony offense, and would not trigger a 20-year
mandatory minimum, under current law. Still, Medina cannot now
benefit from the FSA’s amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) concerning
increased sentences based upon prior drug convictions. Because
Medina’s twenty-year sentence for his conspiracy offense is at its
statutory floor, the district court could not reduce it. See United States
v. Sharp, 883 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1989). For these reasons, the
district court did not err when it denied Medina’s FSA motion for a
reduced sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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