Susan Ozolins v. Andrew Saul

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN OZOLINS, No. 20-35081
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-02192-BR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2021**
Portland, Oregon
Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,*** District
Judge.
Susan Ozolins appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Administration’s denial of disability benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. The ALJ gave “specific, clear, and convincing” reasons supported by
substantial evidence for discounting Ozolins’ subjective symptom testimony.
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Ozolins’
complaints were inconsistent with the medical record, which reflected, for instance,
largely unremarkable mental status examination findings. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(2). Ozolins’ complaints were also inconsistent with her daily activities,
which showed an ability to perform a wide range of chores and errands. See Molina,
674 F.3d at 1112. The ALJ recognized that “[t]ravel and disability are not mutually
exclusive” but reasonably found Ozolins’ ability to withstand the “physical and
mental demands” of travel not entirely consistent with the extent of her alleged
symptoms. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). And
although Ozolins contests the adequacy of the ALJ’s explanation, we do not require
a “line-by-line exegesis of [her] testimony.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277
(9th Cir. 2020).
2. The ALJ gave “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by
substantial evidence for discounting treating psychologist Dr. Bloom’s opinion.
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Bloom relied largely on
Ozolins’ discounted complaints. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149
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(9th Cir. 2001). For example, his conclusion that it would be difficult for Ozolins to
work turned on her claims of reported struggles with daily tasks. Dr. Bloom’s
opinion of significant work-related difficulties is inconsistent with his treatment
records, which did not document, for example, remarkable mental-status
examination findings. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041. And Dr. Bloom’s opinion is
inconsistent with Ozolins’ daily activities, which the ALJ reasonably found
consistent with an ability to perform light work. Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595,
601–02 (9th Cir. 1999).
3. The ALJ also gave “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by
substantial evidence for discounting examining psychologist Dr. Causeya’s opinion.
Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Dr. Causeya’s opinion is inconsistent with subsequent
treatment records relevant to the applicable time frame, which reflect largely
unremarkable mental-status examination findings. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041.
Ozolins again cites evidence supporting the existence of her symptoms, but that the
record could support an alternative conclusion does not mean the ALJ’s was
erroneous. See Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2020). Dr. Causeya’s
opinion is inconsistent with Ozolins’ daily activities; for instance, her claim that
Ozolins had moderate limitations in completing work is not consistent with the fact
that she sewed 5 to 6 hours a day for a friend. And Dr. Causeya relied heavily on
Ozolins’ subjective reports. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. In each instance in
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which the letter accompanying Dr. Causeya’s assessment form found Ozolins
functionally limited in a given area, the explanation turned almost exclusively on
Ozolins’ subjective reports, not on the limited objective findings that appear
elsewhere in the letter.
4. The ALJ properly concluded that Ozolins’ impairments did not meet
Listing 12.04C. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.04C. Although the
ALJ’s explanation might have been more robust, her lengthy evaluation of the
evidence elsewhere “is an adequate statement of the foundations on which the
ultimate factual conclusions are based.” Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201
(9th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up). The ALJ also reasonably concluded that Ozolins did
not prove any marginal adjustment, see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir.
2001), which requires more than simply reciting symptom evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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