Thomas Bastian v. Charles Ryan

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 22 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS O. BASTIAN, No. 19-15385
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02530-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
ARIZONA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Bastian appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
and § 2253, and we affirm the judgment of the district court. Because the parties
are familiar with the facts of this case, we need not recount them here.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and a district court’s application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, de novo, Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,
964–65 (9th Cir. 2004). For claims that the state court adjudicated on the merits,
federal courts may not grant a petition “unless the adjudication of the claim . . .
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition, federal courts will not
hear a habeas claim if the state court denied the claim on an “independent and
adequate” state law procedural ground, unless the petitioner can show cause for the
default and prejudice from it. See Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir.
2011).
I
The district court properly held that the state court reasonably applied clearly
established federal law and did not make an unreasonable determination of fact in
concluding that Bastian reinitiated contact with police, such that his statements to
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them could be introduced under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981) and
related cases. An accused, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only though counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at 484–85.
Although Bastian invoked his right to counsel in his first interview, the state
appellate court reasonably concluded that he reinitiated contact before his
subsequent interviews.1 The appellate court determined that the trial court had
made an appropriate credibility determination in crediting the officer’s testimony
as to the second interview. In addition, the appellate court noted that Bastian
confirmed in a subsequent interview that he had reinitiated contact before that
second interview, and that Bastian had received additional Miranda warnings in
subsequent interviews, but did not request an attorney. Because all these findings
were based on the record and, taken together, could lead a reasonable jurist to
conclude that Bastian had reinitiated contact under Edwards, we affirm the
judgment of the district court dismissing this claim.
1
We review the last reasoned state court decision addressing the federal
constitutional claims, Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010),
which on this issue is the Arizona Court of Appeals decision on direct appeal.
3
II
The district court properly concluded that Bastian procedurally defaulted his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the use of a stun
belt and leg shackles during the trial. Bastian failed to raise this claim until his
second post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition, and the state court denied it as
successive and untimely and, therefore, precluded under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32. Bastian argues on appeal that the state court improperly applied
Rule 32, because his claim falls into an exception to Rule 32 preclusion. When
raising an adequacy challenge after the state invokes procedural default, petitioner
has the burden to show inadequacy, and he may do so by “asserting specific factual
allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including
citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.” Bennett v.
Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Bastian cites no case where the state
courts permitted a shackling claim, or something substantially similar to a
shackling claim, to be raised in a successive PCR petition.
Moreover, a review of Arizona state law does not suggest that the rule was
applied inconsistently to Bastian. State law at the time provided an exception to
Rule 32 preclusion for certain issues of “sufficient constitutional magnitude;”
issues were of sufficient magnitude if they required a defendant to “knowingly,
4
voluntarily and intelligently” waive the right. Stewart v. Smith, 46 P.3d 1067,
1071 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (citation omitted). These included, for example, the
right to counsel, right to a jury, and right to a twelve-person jury. State v.
Espinosa, 29 P.3d 278, 280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). And where the claim is for
ineffective assistance, the question for preclusion is “determined by the nature of
the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance.” Stewart, 46
P.3d at 1071.
But the right to be free from restraints at trial is not one that must be
knowingly and voluntarily waived. Rather, restraints may be imposed on the
defendant after a judge has made specific findings. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S.
622, 624 (2005). And so there is no basis to conclude that it would qualify under
the “sufficient constitutional magnitude” exception to Rule 32 preclusion. The
district court correctly denied the claim as procedurally defaulted in the state
courts.2
2
Bastian waived any shackling claim that is independent of his ineffective
assistance claim, as he did not raise such a claim in his habeas petition before the
district court. Further, Bastian expressly renounced a theory of cause and prejudice
to excuse procedural default due to ineffective assistance of PCR counsel under
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
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III
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.3
AFFIRMED.
3
We decline to expand the Certificate of Appealability for Bastian’s
uncertified claim that the state court decisions are not entitled to AEDPA
deference. Bastian fails to show that the Arizona rules were inadequate or applied
inconsistently to his case, such that the decisions would not be entitled to
deference. Similarly, he does not appear to argue that he has cause to excuse his
procedural defaults, nor explain how any potential cause prejudiced him. We
conclude that he has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(2).
6