Ranjit Singh v. Merrick Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANJIT SINGH, AKA Ranjit Singh Kaur, No. 19-71733
Petitioner, Agency No. A215-553-474
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 19, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations
under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir.
2010). We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration
proceedings. Lopez-Urenda v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 2003). We
deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on
an inconsistency between Singh’s application and testimony as to where farmers
took him after the second attack, Singh’s admission that he misrepresented to the IJ
when he spoke to his sponsor by phone, and a lack of corroborating evidence. See
Shrestha, 590 F.3d. at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under
“the totality of circumstances”); see also Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11 F.4th
1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (agency was “permitted to afford substantial weight to
inconsistencies that bear directly on [petitioner]’s claim of persecution” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt
on his credibility and the rest of his story.”). Singh’s explanations do not compel a
contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus,
in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Singh’s asylum and withholding
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of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.
2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the denial of Singh’s CAT claim because
it was based on the same testimony found not credible, and Singh does not point to
any other record evidence that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than
not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government
if returned to India. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
The BIA did not err in concluding the IJ did not violate Singh’s right to due
process by denying him a continuance and an opportunity to submit corroborating
evidence. See Lata, 204 F.3d at 1246 (requiring error to prevail on a due process
claim); see also Rodriguez-Ramirez, 11 F.4th at 1094 (“[T]he IJ was not required
to give [petitioner] notice and an opportunity to provide additional corroborating
evidence because substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
determination” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The motion for a stay of removal (Docket Entry No. 1) is denied as
moot. The temporary stay of removal is terminated.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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