Esteban Medina-Mora v. Jefferson Sessions

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ESTEBAN MEDINA-MORA, No. 15-72571
Petitioner, Agency No. A203-247-676
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Esteban Medina-Mora petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeal’s (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s
decision denying adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, including
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
constitutional claims, and we review for substantial evidence factual findings.
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the
petition for review.
The agency did not err in concluding that Medina-Mora was statutorily
ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) because he is
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), where substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that he reentered the United States without
being admitted, after previously accruing more than one year of unlawful presence.
See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Medina-Mora’s contention that the agency relied on a vague record in assessing
inadmissibility lacks merit.
Medina-Mora has not established that the different treatment of pre-April 1,
1997, unlawful presence in sections 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) and 1182(a)(9)(B) violates
his due process rights. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1036, 1041 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2013) (addressing a “half-hearted” equal protection argument and noting that
Congress can “draw lines that specify effective dates when it enacts or amends
relief statutes.”); Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(per curiam) (“Congress has particularly broad and sweeping powers when it
comes to immigration, and is therefore entitled to an additional measure of
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deference when it legislates as to admission, exclusion, removal, naturalization or
other matters pertaining to aliens.”).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Medina-Mora
is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal based on a lack of good moral
character, where he provided false testimony under oath and did not demonstrate
that he recanted his false testimony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(6) (barring a finding
of good moral character for any person who has given false testimony for the
purpose of obtaining any immigration benefit), 1229b(b)(1)(B); Valadez-Munoz v.
Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 2010) (“recantation must be voluntary and
without delay” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to Medina-Mora’s contentions, the agency did not apply an
incorrect legal standard, ignore issues, or rely on an unclear or incomplete record
in assessing good moral character.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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