Hilda Morales-Morales v. Merrick Garland

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HILDA MORALES-MORALES, AKA No. 21-70686
Petronila Morales-Morales,
Agency No. A209-294-875
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 7, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: GRABER and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District
Judge.
Hilda Morales-Morales, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing her appeal of an
immigration judge’s order of removal and rejection of her claims of asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility
determinations, for substantial evidence. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925
(9th Cir. 2020). Under this standard, “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). In assessing an adverse credibility finding, the court must look to
the “totality of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors.” Alam v. Garland, 11
F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Morales-Morales
lacked credibility. First, Morales-Morales used her sister’s name and birthdate on
her application for relief and at four immigration court hearings, only correcting
the record two weeks before her merits hearing. The agency did not err in relying
on this inconsistency because an applicant’s “deliberate deception . . . casts doubt
on [her] credibility and the rest of [her] story.” Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178,
1181 (9th Cir. 2011). Morales-Morales attempted to explain the inconsistency by
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stating that she wished to start “anew” and to avoid paying a debt that she owed the
human smugglers who arranged her entry. The immigration judge reasonably
rejected those explanations because it is not clear how either goal would be served
by Morales-Morales’s claiming to be her sister, who is similarly in the United
States without status. These explanations are not so convincing that any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to accept them. Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 958–
59, 961 (9th Cir. 2021).
Second, Morales-Morales falsely claimed in her application not to know that
it was her uncle who attempted to kill her father in Guatemala. She attempted to
explain the inconsistency by testifying that she “didn’t want to get [her] uncle in
trouble.” The immigration judge reasonably rejected that explanation, observing
that it “makes no sense” that she would not want to get her uncle in trouble for the
attempted murder or that she would not update her application to include the
information after her uncle died. See Li, 13 F.4th at 958–59, 961. Morales-Morales
argues that the inconsistency should be ignored because her “claim for relief was
not based on” her father’s attempted murder, but the Board may support its adverse
credibility finding with “any” non-trivial inconsistency in the record. Shrestha v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010).
Third, the agency found Morales-Morales’s answers to questioning
concerning her use of a false name and birthdate to be nonresponsive. Because the
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immigration judge’s decision identified specific instances of nonresponsive
testimony, the agency permissibly considered that aspect of Morales-Morales’s
demeanor in its adverse-credibility analysis. See Shrestha¸ 590 F.3d at 1045.
Finally, the agency permissibly considered Morales-Morales’s failure to
provide any evidence to corroborate her sexual-orientation claim, which she raised
for the first time at her merits hearing. The applicant bears the burden of
establishing her claim for relief, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B), and, in the absence of
credible testimony or any other evidence, Morales-Morales did not carry that
burden.
PETITION DENIED.
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