Gilbert Garrido v. Raytheon Company

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GILBERT L. GARRIDO, No. 13-55745
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03825-GAF-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RAYTHEON COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2015**
Before: FISHER, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Gilbert L. Garrido appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his diversity action alleging employment discrimination and retaliation
claims under California’s Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”). He alleged
that he was illegally underpaid and terminated. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garrido’s racial
discrimination claim because Garrido failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he performed his job satisfactorily or whether similarly situated
individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. See Guz v.
Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113-14 (2000) (setting forth elements of prima
facie case of discrimination).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garrido’s
retaliation claim because Garrido failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether there was a causal link between any protected activity and the
adverse employment action. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,
646 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII);
Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003)
(employer’s knowledge of protected activity necessary for causation); see also
Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (“California courts apply
the Title VII framework to claims brought under FEHA.”).
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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 13-55745