United States v. Gary Lane

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10081
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No.
3:12-cr-00078-RCJ-VPC-1
v.
GARY H. LANE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2015**
San Francisco California
Before: McKEOWN, MURGUIA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Gary Lane appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to twelve
counts of mail fraud and five counts of attempted tax evasion. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court did not err—and certainly did not clearly err, see United
States v. Aragbaye, 234 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 899 n.8 (9th Cir.
2011)—in imposing a two-level enhancement on the basis that Lane’s offense
involved sophisticated means. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (2013). “Conduct need not involve highly complex schemes or
exhibit exceptional brilliance to justify a sophisticated means enhancement.”
United States v. Jennings, 711 F.3d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013). Lane’s conduct
was comparable to conduct that we have previously held sufficient to support
imposition of this sophisticated means enhancement. See United States v. Tanke,
743 F.3d 1296, 1307 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Horob, 735 F.3d 866, 868-69,
872 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Likewise, the district court did not clearly err, see United States v. Scrivener,
189 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 1999), in imposing a two-level enhancement on the basis
that Lane knew or should have known that at least one of his victims was particularly
vulnerable, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(b)(1) (2013). The
record amply supports the district court’s imposition of this enhancement.
2
Finally, Lane’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. See United
States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]n the overwhelming
majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range
of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances,” United States
v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Carty,
520 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and
Lane’s within-Guidelines sentence is no exception.
AFFIRMED.
3