United States v. Titus Bryant

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-30198
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:14-cr-00094-SPW-1
v.
TITUS MARK BRYANT, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 31, 2017**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE,*** District Judge.
Titus M. Bryant appeals a special condition of his supervised release
sentence. That special condition imposed by the district court requires Bryant to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
comply with the violent offender registration requirements of any state in which he
resides. Bryant contends that the court abused its discretion because the condition
does not reasonably relate to the statutory goals of sentencing and imposes a
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. We reject these
arguments and we affirm.
First, the requirement that Bryant comply with violent offender registration
laws is reasonably related—indeed, it is perfectly tailored—to the goal of deterring
him from violating those laws. That relationship is enough. See United States v.
Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A condition of supervised release
does not have to be related to the offense of conviction, because the sentencing
judge is statutorily required to look forward in time to crimes that may be
committed in the future by the convicted defendant.” (quoting United States v.
Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010)). Also, if a state requires Bryant
to register as a violent offender, then the goals of deterring future acts of violence
and protecting the public are served by notifying people about the potential danger
Bryant poses.
Second, the condition does not deprive Bryant of any liberty he would
otherwise enjoy. Violent offender registration laws may encroach on Bryant’s
liberty interests, but the condition requiring compliance with these laws does not.
Bryant was not ever free to break the law. Uncertainty about the precise
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requirements of the laws of fifty states does not make this special condition unduly
restrictive.
AFFIRMED.
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